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No More Cousin Toms

WALTER GOLDSTEIN and S. M. MILLER

Herman Kahn: Ideologist of Military Strategy

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Edmund Wilson and the Sea Slugs

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The Sociology of Marxism

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The New Peace Movement—I

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Comments on Cuba

WINTER 1963

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AMONG THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Roger Hagan—Editor of the Council for Correspondence Newsletter. Has written for the *Nation, Contact, American Scholar.*

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Lewis Coser—One of our editors and most frequent contributors, also writes regularly for *Commentary, American Sociological Review* and other publications. The author of several books, he was co-author with Irving Howe of *The American Communist Party,* reissued as paperback by Praeger. He is a professor of sociology at Brandeis.

Seymour Martin Lipset—Professor of sociology and Director of the Institute of Social Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. His book, *Political Man,* recently received the MacIver Award from the American Sociological Association. His next book will be *The First New Nation: United States in Comparative Perspective* to be published in 1963.

Walter Goldstein—Assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College. He is completing a book on the implications of the Suez invasion. He and—

S. M. Miller—professor of sociology at Syracuse University, have collaborated on a series of articles on deterrence and accidental war. Miller is working on studies of school dropouts, youth unemployment, and the politics of poverty.

Roy Finch—Member of the faculty of Sarah Lawrence College where he teaches philosophy.

Fairfield Porter—Has written criticism for *Art News* and the *Nation,* and is a painter whose work is exhibited at the Tibor de Nagy gallery in New York.

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DISSENT

VOLUME X
WINTER 1963

NUMBER 1

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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AMONG OURSELVES

Our bi-annual fund drive, begun in November 1962, got off to a fine start with a jovial and well-attended dinner in New York City, at which Norman Mailer, Shelley Winters and Irving Howe spoke. The immediate response to our fund appeal was gratifying, and the usual large pledges came in from a number of editors and close friends. But as of the moment —December 20—the total is *not* what it should be. Right now it stands at $5700—a good deal less than the $7500 which we asked for as the necessary minimum for the next two years. If no further pledges come in, that would mean probable survival, but in a state of cramped penury; and after a time that gets to be exhausting. It also means that we would have almost no funds for improvement, translations and writers; what is thus far available must be ear-marked for the printers.

We are sending out a reminder note to those friends who pledged two years ago but have not yet done so this time. And we would like to ask those of our readers who feel close to the magazine but have not yet sent anything in:—do please try to help us. DISSENT isn't, can't and shouldn't be like other magazines: it rests on the support of a limited but committed readership. The editors work hard, donating time, labor, money; most of our writers, when they send us articles for which they receive no payment, are making the equivalent of cash contributions. We therefore feel free to ask those readers who care—to show it.

From conversations some of us have had throughout the country, it appears that the impression is widespread that DISSENT is a well-established institution. In an intellectual sense, this may be true; but financially, the idea that anyone should suppose it makes us wince with irony. The truth is we are always on the verge of destitution, and sometimes well across it. That we have not skipped an issue in over nine years of publication, is something of a feat, and sometimes we wonder how we've done it.

Anyway, enough exhortation. There is a blank at the bottom of page 58; if you've not yet sent in a pledge, please do it.

P.S.—An aditional problem this year is the very high proportion of pledges to cash. We trust everyone to come through on pledges, as in the past; but meanwhile we need money.

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One of the more pleasant problems in running DISSENT is keeping up with the books of our contributors. Ben Seligman, who writes for us on economic topics and has been among our most valued writers, has just published a major work, *Main Currents in Modern Economics*, which should interest many readers. We hope to find a reviewer competent to deal with this ambitious study in a future issue. Paul Goodman, whose productivity is so amazing, has come out with two books, one a pamphlet called *Drawing the Line* which consists of discursive and topical pieces ranging from a study of anarchism to the piece he did for DISSENT last year on the Kennedy Administration, and the other called *Community of Scholars*, which will be discussed at length in a forthcoming issue. And the popular novel *Fail Safe* by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler had its origin in an article Wheeler did under a pen name for the Winter 1959 issue of DISSENT under the title, "Abraham '59."

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Next issue will contain several pieces on problems of underdeveloped countries, as well as part II of Roy Finch's study of the peace movement. We are also planning two special issues: one on the relation between economic and political power in the United States, and the other on the life of the academy in the United States. Prospective contributors to either issue are invited to suggest articles.

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JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER

INDIA: A TIME OF DANGER AND DECISION

The plight of democratic India has aroused little compassion in America. If it is accurate to say that the Administration has handled the Indian crisis admirably—not too much pressure on the Nehru government, no moralizing, a restrained effort to create a favorable climate for India-Pakistan negotiations — it must also be acknowledged that the American people remain cool and complacent over the issue. Partly this is due to the general tone of the Administration's politics which precludes a passionate campaign in behalf of the Indians, indeed, in behalf of anything except anti-Communism; partly it is due to lack of knowledge which reflects itself in the mistaken belief that what is involved here is a "border conflict" in a remote region, fought at fantastic heights.

Nor should disappointed Indians forget the effect upon the United States of the unctuous and pharisaical Krishna Menon. What a price India is paying for allowing one individual to present its worst possible side to the world! The damage done by Menon can be effaced only by a consistent campaign of truth concerning India's struggle for survival.

For the blunt truth is that nothing less than survival is at stake. Concerning the motives of the Chinese there have been many speculations, and most of them contain some truth, though none seems entirely satisfactory. Perhaps the most essential one is this: *the Chinese have unleashed a struggle for the political domination of Asia in which they seek to demoralize the Indian people and disintegrate the Indian state by destroying its prestige and its policies of neutrality, peaceful orderly progress and democracy.* An examination of the Chinese proposals for "negotiations" indicate that these cannot be accepted by a

CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S "CHINA" SPEAKS UP

Here is the statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Formosa on October 10, 1962; i.e., at the height of the Chinese Communist assault upon India:

> *The so-called McMahon line is a line unilaterally claimed by the British during their rule over India. The Government of the Republic of China has never accepted this line of demarcation and is strongly opposed to the British claim. Since the armed conflict has drawn world attention and touched upon the question of demarcation between China and India, the Government of the Republic of China (Formosa) is constrained to reiterate its position on this matter.*—[*Chinese News Service*, Oct. 30, 1962.]

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self-respecting regime; they point a loaded pistol at India's head for as long as the snows remain on the Himalayas. What people can permit such a permanent threat to its security and independence? Every nation within the orbit of Southeast and South-central Asia would depend upon Chinese approval for its national survival. In essence the Chinese would hold an indirect veto power and control over the economic and social planning of India and the nations that border India. The whole notion of Chinese domination over this area is intolerable. In this respect we are dealing with incompatible ideological opponents and exclusive "ways of life." The Indians hesitate to stress this fact, but fact it nevertheless is.

A Time of Appraisal

An "agonizing reappraisal" is now going on in India. All political parties are in a state of flux, reexamining their outlook and their future. India will never again be the same. The present uneasy "truce" provides a convenient respite to facilitate this soul-searching, and although it is too soon for an outside observer to draw binding conclusions, the very line of questioning tells us much

There are those in India who demand reappraisal of their country's position with respect to Tibet and have even concluded that liberation of Tibet from Chinese occupation ought to become a goal of Indian policy! This is quite a reversal from Nehru's acceptance of the Chinese concept of "suzerainty" over Tibet and its one and a half million people. There is much truth in the view that the moral corroding of the Indian position began years ago when it tacitly accepted the medieval concept of suzerainty based upon military force, (1954). When the Chinese Communists first seized Tibet (1951), India helped block the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations; three years later India made a treaty with China recognizing Chinese sovereignty (a step beyond "suzerainty") and, finally, in the Tibetan revolt of 1959, India was most aloof toward the revolutionaries.

All of this, of course, was the fruit of the Menon-Nehru policy of conciliation with the Chinese. What was basically wrong with this position was that *it served to undermine morally the position of India in the world.* It is *not* non-alignment that was mistaken, as so many American critics would have it now; it is the fact that non-alignment was given a deceitful twist by Menon, with Nehru's approval, which in effect encouraged aggression. No one can fail to understand or approve of India's desire to remain uncommitted, given its tremendous problems of economic development and security; any effort to bring India into the Western bloc would only be a disaster, allowing the discredited Menon and his allies a chance to recoup their political fortunes. But what should now emerge from the discussion in India is a clearer understanding of what non-alignment in the world power struggle means for a country like India—that, at the very least, it does not mean tacit approval of totalitarian aggressions which happen not to threaten India at the moment.

If we reject out-of-hand efforts by the American Right and cold-war spokesmen to moralize over the Indian crisis and to make the abandonment of non-alignment a condition

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for American military aid, this does not preclude examining what did happen and why, in the words of the Indian socialist weekly, *Janata,* India is forced to fight "a cruel and crude war for which this nation was totally unprepared," and why the story is one ". . . of the total collapse of our defense and foreign policies pursued during the last six years." While the Chinese spent years planning their blows in the Ladakh and NEFA areas, the best section of the Indian army was tied up in idleness along the Kashmir front facing Pakistan; while the Chinese built roads and stockpiled materials of war, the pitifully small Indian units facing them lacked modern weapons and even proper equipment for winter.

The Choice Ahead

Just as the Indian leadership failed to modernize its army and to make it a part of the Indian people representing all sectors and regions of the nation, so may this failure of leadership be extended to virtually all facets and levels of Indian social, economic and political life. The tragic failure of the Indian army is a concentrated expression of the failure to make adequate progress on other fronts: the agricultural, the communal, the industrial. This is not to deny progress since 1947 independence, but to affirm that it has been insufficient, too slow, too patchy. The blame for this must be placed upon the party that has governed India without challenge for 15 years now: the Congress party. This is why the present crisis in leadership is taking place inside the ranks of the Congress party. This political struggle has just begun; it will be long and complex, with many changes and the emergence of new leaders. Integration of the nation, greater justice and equality for the peasant and industrial worker, an end to caste and communalism—these are some of the great questions India must grapple with once again and more successfully than before. In a country like India, where nerves of social life are, so to speak, painfully exposed, the relationship between domestic policy and the national crisis is especially acute, and the latter cannot begin to be solved without strong measures in regard to the former. The issue of equality of sacrifice in the war effort becomes decisive.

The Praja-Socialists of India, who, behind the leadership of Asoka Mehta, have unconditionally given their support to the government's war efforts, have sounded the right note in insisting that concepts of social justice and equality influence directly the popular response to the present crisis. A speech of Surendranath Dwivedy, parliamentary spokesman of the Socialists, has said:

> Where the simple village girl surrenders her prized nose-ring and bangles and even wedding ring, the rich and opulent still keep their gold hoarded in the lockers of banks. When the worker strains to increase production and contributes part of his wages to the Defense Fund, highly paid officers remain a paradox in these hard

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times. This gross inequality needs correction if the many millions who have risen as one man to resist the enemy are to be sustained in their faith as in their hopes of a better world.

History is still alive with choices, and from India's grave danger may yet come the most radical social transformation Asia has yet seen.

STANLEY PLASTRIK

NO MORE COUSIN TOMS:

The Clash Between the Unions and the Negroes

"The sentiment of organized labor in the country is decidedly in favor of maintaining and encouraging the recognition of equality between colored and white workers. . . ."

". . . to the union of the trade belongs absolute jurisdiction on all matters connected with the trade."

". . . if the colored man continues to lend himself to the work of tearing down what the white man has built up, a race hatred far worse than any ever known will result. Caucasian civilization will serve notice that its uplifting process is not to be interfered with in any way."

The same man, Samuel Gompers, wrote all three of those statements. Gompers, the AFL's founder, maintained that he was opposed to racial discrimination by unions, but accepted segregation as a necessary condition for organizing workers. And though he disapproved of excluding Negroes from unions, he believed that the "absolute jurisdiction" of the autonomous unions affiliated to the Federation included the right to carry out such policies. Then, goaded by the actions of Negroes who became strikebreakers because only in that way could they get jobs normally controlled by the unions, Gompers would angrily lash out at them, failing to understand how deeply Negroes felt about organizations which in convention resolutions promised them the future while depriving them of jobs in the present.

An embarrassingly obvious parallel exists between Gompers and George Meany; between the craft union-oriented American Federation of Labor and the AFL-CIO, still dominated by old AFL traditions. Like Gompers, Meany says he is opposed to discrimination. Like Gompers, Meany believes he is powerless to expel unions which still practice discrimination within the AFL-CIO—despite his formal authority to do so. Gompers thought that the price of survival for the young Federation was acceptance of unions discriminating against Negroes; Meany believes he cannot expel discriminatory unions without wreck-

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ing the AFL-CIO. In both cases the justification is the same: discrimination is better fought if the guilty unions remain in the Federation than if they are either refused admittance or expelled.

And just as Gompers bitterly accused Negroes of "tearing down what the white man has built up," Meany loses his temper when the AFL-CIO is attacked by Negroes today. "Who in hell appointed you the spokesman of the Negro people?" Meany shouted in 1959 at A. Philip Randolph, president of the Sleeping Car Porters Union. Randolph, for many years the sole Negro spokesman in the AFL, had protested the failure of the AFL-CIO executive council to take decisive action against international unions which, he said, were still discriminating against Negroes despite the merger agreement prohibiting such discrimination. It was at this same convention that Meany defended, on the basis of autonomy, the right of unions to set up separate locals of Negroes and whites if the members wanted them.

The Choice of Moment

But it is in the attacks he has made against the NAACP and its labor secretary, Herbert Hill, that Meany has vented his full bitterness; a bitterness shared by many other labor leaders who believe that they are being attacked solely for demagogic purposes. Now, there *are* differences between the condition of the AFL under Gompers and that of the AFL-CIO under Meany: while many AFL unions openly and formally excluded Negroes, only one in the AFL-CIO still has a constitutional bar against Negroes; even though discrimination is still prevalent in unions, it is slowly easing under outside pressures.

And most union leaders have proved incapable of understanding that it is precisely at the moment when unions relax their racial bars, indeed precisely *because* the bars have been lowered, that they are subject to even more intense pressure from Negroes. It is this failure to understand the dynamics of protest that has exacerbated the current dispute with the NAACP. Many union leaders quite honestly feel hurt and indignant that the Negroes fail to appreciate what, in the face of great difficulties, has been done for them by the unions.

In this sense Meany is not only a symbol of the AFL-CIO; his violent reactions to the attacks of the NAACP are shared by many other union leaders, especially men like David Dubinsky, long active in liberal causes. Indignantly, Meany points to the changes made under his leadership: the drop in the number of unions which openly exclude Negroes; the establishment of a civil rights committee by the AFL-CIO and his own efforts to break down discriminatory practices, including even an offer personally to recruit non-union Negro electricians for a construction job in Washington if the electrical workers local there continued to ban qualified Negroes.

"What other institution in the country has done as much, voluntarily, for the Negro as the unions?" ask the union leaders, pointing to their lobbying for civil rights legislation in Congress, their support of the Supreme Court decision on school segregation, their cooperation with FEP committees, their resolutions of praise for the NAACP, and their financial aid to the Negro cause. So it sticks in their craws that they, the friends of the Negro,

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sometimes the only friends of the Negro, should now come under such severe criticism from the Negroes. It is the indignation of the union leaders, the hurt tone that has now grown into impatience, which reveals a great deal about the distance between the unions (read liberals, too) and the Negroes.

Union leaders do not understand that today it is a mark of status for Negro students to have served jail sentences for participating in the sit-in movements; that pan-Africanism has moved from the gin mills of Greenwich Village to the auditoriums of Oakland, California; that the Negroes no longer are prepared to be "patient." Today, no Negro leader can survive without adopting a posture of action against the white world; today, the Negro intellectual has come back, full circle, to where he started: once again he is a black man first who may happen also to be a writer, a painter, or a homosexual. But most union leaders understand very little of the change in tempo within the Negro world.

There is something else, too, that the union leaders fail to comprehend: that the attitude of articulate Negroes toward union leaders in their roles as white liberals is a special one, different from that held by Negroes toward the rest of the white community. When Negroes deal with open Southern segregationists, the rules of behavior for both groups are well established, even if detested. But in their personal and organizational relationships with liberal union leaders, it is very rarely that the Negro has any degree of certainty about the white man's behavior; there is always the fear that, under certain stresses, the liberal will turn white.

The union leaders do not understand that it is because they *have* committed themselves for so long on paper to the Negro cause that Negroes now demand the unions live up to their claims. Union leaders are discovering it is true that if you give minority groups a finger, they want a hand—*as indeed they should.*

Changing Direction

The change in the level of aspiration for the Negroes in unions is most marked in the growing rejection by Negroes of the token Negro on the staff, the black man to whose office are directed the overseas visitors. For a long time, when they had nothing else, Negroes had to be content publicly, no matter how they mocked at them privately, with these token Negroes, these if not "Uncle" then "Cousin Toms" who possessed no real power in the unions because their status was dependent on white leaders. But now this Cousin Tom has become a symbol not only of white paternalism but of Negro shame, and there are great pressures in the Negro community to open up the union hierarchy to Negroes.

No union is completely free of these tensions, although the United Packinghouse Workers is uniquely better in this respect than any other organization. But there are marked differences in how the union leaders see the problem and what steps they take to cope with it. The leadership of the United Automobile Workers, with more Negro staff members than any other union in the country, cracks down hard on locals which attempt either to maintain separate seniority lists or separate facilities, but until its last convention has resisted the pressures to add a Negro to the Reuther slate of officers. The Packinghouse Workers, incidentally, is probably the

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only one with a mixed membership that has many elected high officials who are Negroes.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are still unions in which Negroes are denied membership, much less office; others with segregated locals; some, especially in the South, which maintain separate seniority lists; and still more which block the entrance of Negroes into apprenticeship programs.

Between these two poles, a very wide range of union practices exists, dependent upon the technical character of the industry, its social composition, the history of the union, the traditions of the trade and the amount of autonomy granted the locals by the international. In some unions, the relationship of the locals to the central headquarters almost duplicates the autonomy of the international unions in the AFL-CIO. Negroes, for example, are so numerous in some large locals of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union that they constitute a major political force, but even in this "progressive" union at least one local excludes Negroes. Confronted with this charge, Harry Bridges is forced, Meany-like, to fall back on the high degree of autonomy given the ILWU locals as a justification for the failure of the international to act.

And Bridges' argument is a powerful one when the alternatives seem to be either reluctantly allowing the local union to continue its discriminatory practices or expelling it. The provocation for expulsion has to be great before any union will voluntarily give up a bloc of members and, clearly, discrimination against Negroes seems not to be enough to warrant such action even in the ILWU. So, too, the excuse given by some industrial unions for organizing either segregated locals in the South or not resisting discriminatory hiring and promotion practices is that to do otherwise is to run a great risk of losing the entire organizational battle.

There is a partial truth to this argument, too, for unions have lost bargaining elections in the South because the company raised the race issue. But the whole truth is that unless unions are organized initially on a non-discriminatory basis and unless they continue to operate on a non-discriminatory basis, they are forced to carry the burden of segregation from then on. It is a hard fact that unions have very little area for compromise with principle: only decisive action, not time, eliminates discrimination in unions.

Recognition of this fact has been one of the reasons impelling the NAACP, through its labor secretary, Herbert Hill, to mount the bitter campaign against the AFL-CIO which has ruptured relationships between the two organizations in the past few years. The hard line adopted by the NAACP

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had other origins as well; the need for the NAACP to put itself forward as a fighting organization lest it suffer a loss of prestige within the Negro community, and also Hill's own changing conception of the role played by the trade unions in modern society. But primarily the fight has occurred because of a basic difference about what the tempo should be for eliminating discrimination in the unions.

How True Is True?

Continual charges have been made by the AFL-CIO and its defenders that the NAACP, through Hill, has grossly exaggerated the extent of union discrimination. Hill is irresponsible and a demagogue, who incidentally stirs up anti-Semitism, claims the Jewish Labor Committee. This organization, whose officers are also union officials, visualizes its role as working within the framework of the Federation rather than attacking it from the outside and so endangering access to the unions.

The truth about discrimination inside the AFL-CIO lies someplace between what Hill says and what the Federation's defenders claim. But the over-all pattern is closer to Hill's description than to that put forth by the Federation. If Hill does have a tendency, as is claimed, to fire off charges without checking into them too thoroughly, nevertheless he is right about the substance of the situation and about the mood prevailing inside the *AFL-CIO.*

Three phases have characterized relations between the NAACP and the AFL-CIO. After the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955, there was organizational cooperation at the top: convention speakers were exchanged and mutual resolutions of support passed. During this period, the NAACP was content to operate inside the framework of the Federation and to process the complaints it received through the civil rights department established by the merger agreement. But the NAACP's attitude changed by 1959, as unemployment among Negroes increased 2¼ times faster than among white workers, as little progress was made in opening apprenticeship programs to Negroes, as segregated locals still continued, and as several international unions were accepted into the Federation despite "whites only" clauses in their constitutions. Pressure began to be substituted for patience, and the second phase began as the NAACP opened its public attacks upon the AFL-CIO.

Inside the AFL-CIO, A. Philip Randolph continued raising the issue of discrimination as he had for 25 years; but at the 1959 convention Meany instead of hearing him out and ignoring what he had to say, as had been the custom for 25 years, hit back from the convention platform. Randolph was left standing alone, figuratively and literally, on the convention floor, while the liberal labor leaders were either absent from the platform or apologetically silent during and after the Meany tirade.

Following the convention, Randolph organized the Negro-American Labor Council on a national basis, and, in Detroit, Negro members of the UAW, including a number of staff personnel, set up what constituted a Negro caucus in that area. The NAACP continued its attacks against the AFL-CIO, filing complaints against companies and unions with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities. Finally, in Janu-

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ary, 1961, the NAACP issued a report, "Racism Within Organized Labor," stating that the AFL-CIO Executive Council had made no systematic or coordinated effort to eliminate racism within local unions, especially in most building and construction trades and the railway industries but in other skilled crafts as well.

The NAACP report received widespread press coverage and suddenly the AFL-CIO found itself very much on the defensive. The AFL-CIO leaders attacked the report as false and even censured Randolph when he issued a statement supporting it. Once again, no member of the Federation executive council voted for Randolph's position; the bitterness between the AFL-CIO and the Negroes cut deeper and deeper, aggravated by inflammatory articles in the Negro press. And when Hill, in his dual capacity of NAACP official and consultant to a Congressional committee headed by Adam Clayton Powell, issued a blast at the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, what had been a parochial squabble erupted into a national issue.

The quarrel between the AFL-CIO and the NAACP entered its third and nastiest phase when the NAACP filed a lawsuit against one union and decertification proceedings with the National Labor Relations Board against three others, including a local of the steel workers. This step, taken "as a last resort," according to Hill, "when we found that negotiations brought no significant change," brought the relationship between the AFL-CIO and NAACP to a complete rupture. Charles Zimmerman, an ILGWU vice-president, resigned from the board of the NAACP's legal and financial fund, George Meany issued a ukase cutting off the NAACP from any more financial help, and even Randolph disassociated himself publicly from the NAACP action.

It's possible that the war between these two groups will now taper off somewhat. The NAACP will ease up the stridency of its charges in the months to come and the Federation may cease demanding Hill's resignation from the NAACP staff as the price of continued cooperation. But however Hill's private emotions may have adversely affected the way in which he conducted the battle, there is no doubt whatsoever that his self-conscious and planned attacks upon the AFL-CIO have forced the Federation into a more self-conscious, planned and rapid attempt to eliminate discrimination. Hill may enjoy the role he plays, but he must still be given credit for having been willing to engage in a very unpopular but very important battle.

At some point in the near or, at least, not too far distant future, the pressure of the NAACP upon the AFL-CIO will ease up and then the next phase in the complicated history of the Negro in unions will begin. It could be another extremely difficult one, too, for the success of the Negro in gaining power and status inside the

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unions will then depend on how quickly competent Negro leaders develop. Hill, after all, is white and outside the unions, while A. Philip Randolph is growing old. At the moment no major figure has appeared capable of taking their places as articulate voices of Negroes in the unions. This lack of leadership represents a major problem, for when Cousin Tom leaves, someone must take his place.

PAUL JACOBS

THE PROSECUTION OF U. S. COMMUNISTS

With the fatality of opportunism, the government is pursuing its prosecution of the Communist party under the McCarran Act of 1950. After 12 years of harassment, it is now within striking distance and may again succeed — some triumph! —in putting Gus Hall and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn into jail.

The McCarran Act requires that "Communist-action organizations" make public the names of their officers and members, as well as forfeit a variety of privileges. Failure to comply with the registration provisions is punishable by a five-year prison sentence and a fine of $10,000 for each day of refusal. When these provisions first came to President Truman, he wrote in a veto message that "they represent a clear and present danger to our institutions."

That danger the Attorney General is now enforcing. Morally, it is a shameful business because it would drive political enemies into the position of either dishonor or jeopardy: either informing upon their followers or suffering jail penalties. Politically, it is stupid, for it allows the futile American Communists to pose as—indeed, *to be*—martyrs. Both principle and expediency suggest that in their extremity of self-exposure the American Communists be allowed to speak without interference or punishments—as exhibits of confidence in the idea of a free society.

Very likely, the leading figures in this prosecution understand this as well as we do; but in the special Kennedyite version of *real politik* they show zeal in prosecution rather than trying to educate the American public to repealing an iniquitous piece of legislation. And yes, yes, we know all the political difficulties this would involve; but we also know when you refuse to face a truth you know to be true, that when you go along with repressions you know to be repressive and deceits you know to be deceitful, you are no longer being shrewd or realistic, you are conniving in something rotten. And that is precisely what the Attorney General's office is doing as it hunts down the aging leaders of American Communism instead of letting them molder in the obscurity in which they would otherwise be.

I. H.

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CUBA: a discussion

Roger Hagan

TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY?

The fan-magazine treatment of the handful of men in the President's kitchen cabinet who steered the nation through the crisis of the Cuban blockade has become embarrassing. Washington had already become the Hollywood of the upper middle class, and fashion magazines now have their girls model sweaters playing touch football. Through the slick media, every mannerism of the first family and other Administration personalities reverberates through the suburbs of the land. Most accounts of the crisis weeks, therefore, simply carried on in the *Photoplay* tradition. Analysis of the Cuban affair since the crisis has been mostly in terms of operational style and technique, seldom substance—except in the matter of Stevenson. But even there, where a substantive question was raised, it was treated as a case of social obtuseness. Nobody had told Adlai that the hardnosed look was the new style, so the poor fellow came wearing his old attire: nothing a quick trip to the tailor couldn't fix. By and large it has come to be the *manner* of the operators in Washington that is important to most college-educated Americans, so they were pushovers for the Cuban blockade. It was an exciting vicarious experience, and not one to be questioned. Who questions the premises of *Ben Hur*? The result, of course, was that a lot of flimsy arguments were swallowed whole.

There are unquestionably some impressive aspects of the President's performance. If we grant the existence of a crisis demanding immediate and dangerous action, we can celebrate that Kennedy chose the moderate and cautions course of a naval blockade on arms shipments. Given the American, and his, attitude toward the Castro regime, we can admire his attempt to place a defensive, non-provocative interpretation on the arms buildup which was proceeding all summer long, and feel sorry that his interpretation finally trapped him out on a limb. Given the history of

NOTE: This article will be part of a book about the blockade crisis by Roger Hagan and Bart Bernstein to be published by Ballantine this Spring.

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our slow or negative responses to Khrushchev's soft initiatives and our quick belligerence at his hard ones, we can be glad the President took Khrushchev up on his curious, still-secret letter of Friday night even after the tougher one of Saturday had arrived. The diplomatic gamble paid off and brought the crisis to an end. Furthermore, I for one am grateful to Robert Kennedy for saying that his brother would never be responsible for a Pearl Harbor. He is probably the only person in Washington who does not have to wait and see which way the wind blows before he speaks his mind. Maybe he will save us all, depending, of course, on what is on his mind.

But it is disturbing that he had to say it. Where were our academic friends? Where were the great liberals? Where was Fulbright? The closer one looks, the more disturbing it is. In fact, a lot of alarming limitations have to be granted before one can locate what one admires in the conduct of the Cuban blockade affair. The question is, can we afford to grant them?

We often say that "Kennedy's hands were tied," but one must ask: tied by what? One reads with uneasiness that "there was some acceptance [in Washington circles] of the contention that political considerations had played more than a minor part in the blockade decision," that "the President, and many of those closest to him in the White House, are known to have been smarting under Republican jibes at his 'indecisiveness' in dealing with Premier Fidel Castro and his Soviet allies." (New York *Times*, October 23) To the extent that such considerations were pivotal, it appears that the President was confronted with two alternative kinds of risk: he could take a course that would risk war, or a course that would risk his political future and that of his party. Since things turned out well, it seems to be assumed that he chose the right risk. One cannot let this situation go without criticism, regardless of what one can realistically expect. Is this the kind of judgment that the times demanded?

Kennedy's reaction, while moderate, was within the American consensus. His greatness was the kind that sums up America while keeping it from tripping over its own feet. It was American popular thought in a nutshell when he said that the worst thing we could do would be to do nothing. But there is another kind of greatness that might have been evoked: that which not only epitomizes the weaknesses, strengths, and internal conflicts of a society but finds a new resolution for them, to carry the society beyond itself to a higher level of perception. This we have not been granted, and regardless of the urgency of the matter, the quality in question is apparently not to be called forth. One focuses, fascinated, on the figure of Kennedy struggling with great problems and threats, one man in battle with vast forces, and the word "greatness" comes easily. But one turns back to one's fellow countrymen and finds them neither able to perceive the world differently nor urged to do so, unquestioning of the causes and objects of their belligerence, unlikely to behave differently or more humanely in the future. If anything, their

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most inappropriate habits of response have been confirmed. They know now that playing "chicken" pays, and the half-hearted disclaimers of the President and his aides and journalists will not deceive them. They were left to believe that the President endorsed the ignorant abuse of the Monroe Doctrine of *Time* and the Congress, and further that such unilateral declarations constitute international law. And the atmosphere of snapping nerves, which *The Economist* reported during the blockade, coninues. It alone reaches new level in each crisis.

Reasons and Reasons

The official explanations of the situation disclosed the extent to which the entire justification for risking war had come to rest on shoddy and misleading argumentation. It was hardly an elevation of public discourse. The key argument that the missiles in Cuba seriously altered the strategic balance is, as we shall see, a dubious one to those familiar with the logistics of the matter. Yet at the height of the crisis the Pentagon, or by some reports the White House, passed along, through the New York *Times*' trusting John Finney, an explanation for its concern about the missiles so obscure and confused as to give the impression that not only were we worried about losing our first strike capacity (and one of the headlines said precisely that, which must have given Marshal Malinovsky a new axe to wield over Khrushchev's head) but that we were even concerned that our retaliatory second strike would be reduced below the deterrent level. Joseph Alsop had made the same comment the day before, warning that, if things proceeded as they were, we might be able to get off "only" fifty warheads at the Russians, and assuming that this would not deter them. It may be that the prospect of losing fifty cities would not deter Joseph Alsop, but the Russians are something else. More to the point, however, the figure was patently wrong, as will be seen.

A few weeks later, Stewart Alsop gave what was meant to be the official McNamara view of the matter in the first of his two controversial *Saturday Evening Post* articles. The stir over the second of these (containing the "Adlai wanted a Munich" charge) has led critics to ignore the first, which as an Administration apologia was actually the more important. It justified our urgent maneuver by saying that our deterrent still depended upon SAC bombers and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, a combination alleged to be easily broken by Cuban missiles, and that our missile strength was still negligible at the time of the crisis. This falsehood was contradicted by official sources shortly thereafter, but the Stevenson affair obscured the contradictions which undermined the argument from military peril.

The whole question of why the missiles were assumed to be offensive simply because they could reach into our heartland, while our soft intermediate range missiles in Turkey should be assumed to be defensive, never surpassed the level of "because *we* know our intentions are not aggressive." This smug answer was made on the Senate floor by Senator Sparkman (to Senator Chavez), in the Pentagon booklet written for the

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U. S. troops to qualm any possible misgivings about their imminent invasion duty, and in Hanson W. Baldwin's retrospective analysis (New York *Times*, November 7) of the "debate on U. S. bases": "The real measure of the overseas base therefore is its purpose. The United States contention, shared by its allies, has always been that its overseas bases were established solely in answer to Communist aggressive expansionism and at the request of the countries concerned." All made the assumption that the Russian missiles were in Cuba against the will of most Cubans, solely as part of the Soviets' strategic network, and symbolized the enslavement of the Cuban people to an alien power. It was the argument of the demagogue, attempting not to explain but to cut off discussion by playing upon prejudice. The entire discussion had roughly the dignity of the use of the word "nigger."

Another major premise of the President's speech was that the Soviet minister had lied to him. The case for claiming deception in the Gromyko interview was far from clear. The worst statements that Kennedy could attribute to Gromyko were that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." Was this all false in the same way our claim not to have sent a photo-reconnaissance U-2 over Russia had been false? Kennedy could argue that he had already made the distinction between ground-to-air missiles (defensive) and ground-to-ground missiles (offensive), but the distinction breaks down when applied to any other missile-equipped nation and Gromyko may have been rejecting it. For the Russians, the operative terms may have been in the September 11 statement of the Soviet Government that it had such powerful rockets in Russia that there was "no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." They could claim not to have put the missiles in for their own purposes but at the request of the Cuban government, and that they were therefore defensive in intent. Senator Sparkman and most of his colleagues could hardly object to that reasoning.

There is a more clear-cut case of deception in the assurances made to Robert Kennedy by the Soviet embassy official which Alsop and Bartlett report in their partly discredited article; but the President did not refer to this, probably because it was more a "leak" than an official statement, the sort of deception that all governments including our own find useful. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet leadership wanted to avoid a fuss in America about their missiles until after the latter were operational and the elections were over, and might resort to false leaks to keep one from developing. There is nonetheless something questionable about an attempt to discredit a major representative of Soviet leadership with an internally weak charge for the purpose of developing a righteous rage among the American people.

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There are reasons and reasons. If the real reason for our being disturbed over putting Soviet missiles in Cuba was that it constituted, as the first meeting of the National Security Council assumed, "a left hook designed to make Khrushchev look tougher when he comes at us in November, presumably on Berlin,"—and this would seem to be the best explanation for Khrushchev's part in the Soviet decision—then one would wish we might have argued the case on those grounds rather than cooking up the pretense that "offensive weapons" can be strictly so defined and spicing it with a mock rage about "deception." The first would have been somewhat cynical but at least honest; the way we chose to handle it will prove to be more vicious than an open cynicism. Most Americans were quite ready to support an aggressive action for the sole purpose of not allowing Khrushchev to strengthen his hand for the Berlin negotiations, and it would have been possible for those who opposed the diplomacy of righteousness and unilateral action to have helped the nation measure the gains from this procedure against the gains from designing a response to promote international legality. The legalists might have lost the argument, but the argument would at least have been to the point.

Righteous Realpolitik

This is the first tragedy of the Cuban affair; the discussion was never to the point, neither during nor after the crisis. If ever an incident demanded that the role of cheap politics in dictating or restricting policy be isolated, it was the Cuban missile showdown. Yet among the men in the top ranks of the Administration, none of them cheap politicians, there is probably not one who could separate out the several kinds of motive and say which most moved him or his chief into what history will probably record as a panic reaction. The point is not that the National Security Council consciously contrived a false rationale while pursuing hidden purposes. Politics, toughness, a sense of nakedness and military peril, a sense of being tested, silly rage, all were probably mingled into an unanalyzed conviction of the necessity of our action. The point is rather to remind us that the task of intellect is to dispel fog, to clarify and evaluate the sources of action—hopefully in time to affect it. If the most intellectual Administration in our history did not do this, it is fully as disturbing as if it had done it well and acted solely from cynical arguments. Realpolitik is bad enough, but at least retains reason; righteous realpolitik is insufferable.

Were we naked? We argued that the weapons were offensive. This could have been taken either of two ways (excluding the vague way most Americans interpreted it, as reaffirmation of some sort of bloodthirsty communist nihilism): that the Cubans intended offense, or that the Russians did. If the former, it was downright silly, as silly as the photographs of soldiers stringing barbed wire along the beaches of Key West. Castro's own simpleminded hope was probably to threaten American cities if the U. S. threatened to invade, holding out the prospect of

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at least a mutual Götterdämerung. Obviously he could not use them for anything less. Since we insist that Cuba has nothing to deter, and furthermore has no right to deter it, this idea has not been seriously entertained. There would be some justification for ignoring Castro's probable purpose in the fact that the Russians showed no intention of turning the missiles over to Castro and laying themselves open to a war started by Cubans. Castro (by *Newsweek*'s report) had never even been allowed to set foot an a missile site, much to his fury, and Khrushchev took pains to tell William Knox, the Westinghouse vice-president he saw during the crisis, that Russia would retain control of the missiles. However, we did not acknowledge this to be the case. Dean Rusk won a large vote in the OAS for our blockade and possible invasion by saying that intermediate range missiles in Cuba could also reach Latin American capitals.* That he could do so, incidentally, illustrated how little the statesmen of most countries know about strategic theory. The idea that Castro might make this type of threat with his island surrounded by Polaris-bearing submarines, or with even one U. S. missile aimed at Havana ready to punish such folly, seemed somehow credible to them. One doubts that it was to Rusk.

The contention that the missiles were offensive as part of Russia's strategic network, however, cannot be totally dispensed with. It may have been part of the equation which produced the decision in Moscow, although probably not the part most important to Khrushchev. (Raul Castro spent almost all his time with military men in his early summer visit to Moscow.) Fidel himself cannot have believed that the missiles were to be simply part of the Soviet force, unless he sees himself and all his people as a Kamikaze pilot for the Soviet Union. If he were host to the kind of force that could clearly play such a role—that is, a force much greater than what he had received—his entire island would certainly become a primary U. S. target, susceptible to complete destruction should Soviet rockets from any source in the world begin striking the U. S. In other words, if Castro thought that his island was being used to serve larger strategic purposes, he would have been a fool to accept the weapons. Furthermore, if one can distinguish between strategists and

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* *Newsweek* of November 12 suggested that there was "some evidence that—deliberately or not—the reach of the missile threat was exaggerated. Mr. Kennedy spoke of medium-range missiles with a range of 1000 nautical miles and of bases for intermediate-range missiles capable of striking as far north as Hudson's Bay and as far South as Lima—2200 nautical miles, by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's count. These are far higher than previous military intelligence estimates for Soviet MRBM's (400 to 700 nautical miles) and IRBM's (1130 to 1300 nautical miles). The higher figures, obviously, would tend to strengthen the U. S. hand at home and in Latin America." Making a similar observation, *Aviation Week* called the missiles PRBM's—Political Range Ballistic Missiles. (Coming on the heels of our righteous rage over Soviet deception in a diplomatic interview, the government's possible attempt to deceive the press and the Latin Americans at once, in this and other points, on the grounds that "news is a weapon," did not set well with the media. The White House was "dismayed by the barrage of criticism.")

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simpler military minds, it can be argued that a Soviet strategist would not have found the number or type of weapons in Cuba, or even three times that number, a sufficient increment to justify a first strike, nor even to make Russia substantially more secure from a U. S. first strike.* But some military men believe that more is always better, and their kind of thought cannot confidently be ruled out of the decision process that sent missiles to Cuba.

If one looks at the missiles solely in their way, they were worth trying to get out of Cuba. But even assuming that a Soviet first strike or the threat of one was the motive—and this means assuming an irrational motive of a low order of probability—the means were utterly incommensurate with the end. The missiles and bombers did not add to the Soviet strategic force anything so suddenly destabilizing as had been contended. Four of the thirty IL-28 bombers (range 700 miles) had been assembled. Between 30 and 40 medium range (said to be 1000 mile) missiles were installed or near completion. These could reach only Southern SAC bases most of whose planes would have been dispersed to hundreds of airfields at the first sign of tension anyway. Three or four of the intermediate range (said to be 2200 mile) missiles were to have been completed by the end of the year. By that time the United States was to have 144 Polaris missiles under the seas, about 200 land based intercontinental missiles installed within the United States, sixteen attack carriers with more than 400 attacks bombers, 700 SAC B-52 and B-58 long-range bombers and 700 B-47's which can reach Russia with air refueling. The smallest strategic warhead carried by any of these means is a half megaton, and they range up to 20 or 30 megatons. It was a dissimulation to imply that the missiles and bombers in Cuba, even added to Russia's fewer than 100 ICBM's and inferior force of long-range bombers and missiles-firing submarines (Russia has no aircraft carriers), posed a *sudden* threat to America's deterrent capability. One could argue that the buildup would continue, but the Alsop-McNamara view was that we could be vulnerable solely for those two or three early months until our missiles came in, after which our defense combination would be unbreakable. In fact, this combination existed at the time the crisis developed.

All this is not to say that it was not desirable to have the missiles removed from Cuba. Regardless of what one makes of them, they would be an added impetus to the arms race and a possible cause of accidental war. As such their removal would have been a proper aim of negotiation. But an understanding of the weapons' significance does effect the choice of means, and their rate of completion even at its worst hardly justified sudden unilateral action with any risk of immediate war, particularly action which to any extent left the choice, the way out, to the other side.

War was possible, one must recall. The situation was not dependably

* This argument is spelled out in Hagan and B. Bernstein, "The Military Value of Missiles in Cuba," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* February, 1963.

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under American control. At the time it seemed a serious risk. The relative weight given this risk is one of the alarming aspects of the Cuban affair. It can be said that the use of a naval blockade left the choice of whether or not to escalate the possible conflict partly to us, but this would have been so only if the Soviets chose to retaliate there. Washington was apparently not confident that they would, fearing action at Berlin or some other sort of escalation. It is sobering to learn that the "Damage Assessment Center," a unit "crammed with computers and civilian experts and scattered through underground sites around Washington" and "designed to keep the President's nuclear balance sheet up to date, listing the targets destroyed and resources remaining for post-attack operations," was put into full operation during the crisis; or that the key men were ordered to have their bags packed for a quick trip to shelters in Maryland and elsewhere; or that we had already decided on an invasion of Cuba for the following week that would involve killing Soviet personnel, and were not sure what the Russian response would be. Furthermore, to have been assured at the time that the President's action was a safe and controllable measure, one must assume that, should the naval battle that could well have ensued have gone badly, the President would have had the freedom Khrushchev had to negotiate a settlement rather than try a bigger weapon. This is far from certain.

When Is a Country a Country?

There is another disturbing portent in our decision to treat the missiles solely as part of the Soviet strategic network when the objective case for it was poor. In ignoring the contention of both Russia and Cuba that the missiles were to help deter aggression, in making our case rest solely on assumed Soviet designs, we confirm our treatment of the first social-revolutionary government in Latin America as a non-country. Let us face facts: Cuba has something to deter. Alpha 66 has made raids out of Puerto Rico. Prominent Senators have been calling for invasion. President Kennedy has never taken back his pledge to rid the hemisphere of Castro and Communism. Every meeting of the OAS is used to isolate Castro and deny him the collective security provisions of its charter. It is entirely understandable that he should suppose more aggression to be underway than actually is. We have threatened the Cuban government and pretended that it exists only as a pawn of the Soviet Union. One of the strongest and probably most heartfelt things Castro and Guevara used to say to the peasants was that under the old system they had not been treated as men, sovereign and responsible. This has strong meaning to any socialist in a country where there are large numbers of exploited poor. We appear to be perpetuating the old system on the level of nationhood. It should not be surprising that the Cubans have subsequently refused inspection and may be looking for ways to cheat on an agreement to which they were not a party.

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While the cautious moderates and occasionally corrupt reactionaries who now vote with us in the OAS may not be concerned about this, it is probably safe to say that in the Latin America of five years hence, there will be several countries led by men somewhere between moderate democratic socialism and Castroism. An avowed Marxist, Miguel Arrais, has been elected Governor of the State of Pernambuoco in northeastern Brazil. Guatemala may fall to revolutionaries within months. Peasant riots were reported from Peru in November. Emerging leaders in these countries see the United States now treating Cuba as if it were a society not making its own choices, not to be held responsible for its own acts. Although the theater of retaliation was specified to be Cuba in Kennedy's warnings, the decisions were assumed to be solely Russia's. This looks suspiciously like the way the United States always treated Latin Americans. Certainly there is some pretense involved in treating Castro's Cuba as a stable autonomous society with a legitimated power structure. It is not greater and is probably less than the pretense in treating Formosa, South Viet Nam, South Korea, or Bulgaria as such.

This contemptuous attitude, so resoundingly reaffirmed in the Cuban crisis, betrays a deadly failure to anticipate even the immediate future, as if the details of the moment are all we can concentrate upon. One possible purpose of addressing Russia, the lawyers tell us, was to put our blockade on slightly firmer legal grounds: if we had addressed ourselves to Cuba, we would have been stopping the ships of a third party. The improvement in our legal position was hardly impressive, however, particularly when weighed against the effects in the most dangerous areas of the future of continuing the country club approach to international affairs. China should be giving us nightmares, yet once again the message from the top is that we can pretend that troublesome societies do not exist, and that governments are legitimated by seeing things our way on crucial matters. Current estimates are that China may test a nuclear weapon in 1963. When one reflects on the ignorance of the most cosmopolitan Latin American leaders and of most of the American Congress on matters of nuclear strategy, one realizes how unlikely it is that China will ever play the cautious and subtle game of deterrence as the United States and Russia have developed it over the years—particularly when China, unlike Russia, is aware of no community of interest with the West. Yet we take steps neither to give her this community of interest nor to involve her in disarmament aggreements. Instead we throw other societies out of our community, which we define ever more exclusively as Western "have" nations, strengthening both China's parochial hatreds and her influence.

Would not the Cuba-Turkey deal have made the same mistake of treating these countries as less than sovereign? It might be worth imagining a hypothetical negotiated settlement to see if the Munich analogy need be applied. If Cuba and Turkey were present at the meetings of

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Soviet and United States negotiators, each would object that it has a right to its own defense. Each of the great powers would say that while this is so, it must be weighed against the destabilizing effects of placing such weapons near the borders of the great nuclear powers; that the problems of nervousness, public pressure, misperception and the like must be given some weight. It could be pointed out that nuclear weapons controlled too clearly by the great powers are dangerous to small host countries if they appear to make sense chiefly as part of the supplier's strategic force, because the host nation then becomes a prime target. (This is the point Bulganin tried to make to NATO countries in 1957, with some effect.) As suppliers and presumably owners of these weapons, Russia and America would have leverage to use, as well as compensations to offer, and non-invasion pledges might be exchanged. (As it was Cuba might have gotten one from us while Turkey got none from Russia.) The subsidiary weaponry, such as our tactical air bases and radar installations in Turkey, which current discussion pretended would somehow necessarily be lost if we gave up the fifteen Jupiter missiles in Turkey, and Soviet MIG's and anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba, might well remain by agreement.

The implication that the Jupiters are essential to our defense commitments to Turkey was another of the little fibs which filled the news during the crisis to make an easy case for our action. It has never been clear what good the missiles might have done to defend Turkey herself, since if Turkey were invaded and they were used in retaliation, the response would probably be against the U. S. and other lands harboring U. S. bases—which means that we probably would not have used them "first" (in retaliation for conventional armed aggression against Turkey alone) but only as part of a large, coordinated strike in response to a much larger act of aggression. They are slow-fueling and unhardened, so they are useless for a second strike. Now that other missiles have superseded them the use of which is more credible, Turkey would actually be safer with them off her soil in order to be removed from Russia's prime target list should nuclear war break out elsewhere.

If our demand to remove the IL-28's from Cuba proved embarrassing when it came to what type of plane we might base in Turkey, we might do either of two things: change the Turkey-based planes, or, if we still saw long range planes based there as vital to deterring Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, accept the bombers in Cuba. After all, they pose a far lesser problem to our warning mechanism than did the missiles, they are vulnerable to anti-aircraft missilery already perfected as well as to standard jet fighter defense, and they have a shorter range than even the medium range missiles were said to have.

In short, negotiations need not have weakened our alliances, and they might have served many far-sighted purposes, among which one of the most vital would have been to further the idea, so essential to whatever world order is possible, of the juridical equality of states.

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Role of the U. N.

What of law? The question of legality was considered *ex post facto.* Once again the U. N. was seen as useful only as a cover for an invasion or strong action taken unilaterally by the United States, to be bypassed if it could not so serve. Once again the Organization of American States was to be a rubber stamp or else ignored. It was consulted at all only because Ambassador Thompson urged developing a legal grounding. The Russians, it seems, "had a feeling for 'legality.'" The point, as the *Times* reported the meeting in which he said this, was apparently taken to mean not that we should too, but that we could get more play out of the Russians if we considered this idiosyncracy of theirs. Later, U Thant's effort to introduce arbitration techniques as the crisis was reaching its most dangerous point was seen by Washington only as an inhibition to its thrust. Thant asked Kennedy and Khrushchev on October 24 to suspend for two or three weeks both the blockade and the arms shipments while negotiations were held, and Khrushchev agreed. Though it still looked as if the confrontation that might lead to war was immediately ahead of us, the Administration was annoyed with Thant's proposal because it was thought it would (again in the words of the *Times*) "surely disarm [our] powerful diplomatic and military initiative." The Administration "doubted that it could ever again regain momentum if negotiations failed, as it was expected they would." It has been a long time since a prize fighter thought he could overrule the referee, or a steelworkers' union a government injunction, on the basis of such a consideration.

These, then, are some of the matters of concern that strike one in reviewing the Administration's handling of the crisis of the Cuban blockade. These and others linger on as the celebration of our courage and good fortune dies away: the indictment of our political system inherent in the suspicion, despite all one's charity toward the President and his counsellors, that had Khrushchev been able to delay disclosure of his missiles until after the elections, we might have been willing to take the matter before the United Nations rather than acting unilaterally; the way the discussion in the National Security Council "executive committee" seemed to have been limited from the start to procedural questions, with no one asking whether unilateral action of any sort was appropriate; the mechanical way in which we applied the lesson of the U-2 incident, in which Khrushchev disclosed what he knew slowly enough to trap us in false excuses, to the October 18 meeting with Gromyko, so as to develop the pretext of deception for an action that had been decided upon before the deception was produced. And there is the reemergence of Dean Acheson as a "hawk" (urging strong interventionist measures), which suggests a sense in which the crisis of the Cuban blockade represents the reassertion of the seaboard aristocrat's claim for leadership on terms set by the arriviste pseudo-conservative who fought him in the fifties and made Acheson's "giveaway" of mainland China

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one of the rallying cries of the decade. The phoenix has not quite made it through the fire—another American tragedy.

All this clouds one's thoughts of the future, but not so much as the fear, somewhat contradictory to the foregoing, that the Administration really believes the case it made for Russian evilness. "President Kennedy and his most intimate advisors... have come away from the nightmare of the last two weeks with a bitter recollection of what they regard as Soviet duplicity," wrote Max Frankel in the New York *Times* "News of the Week" for November 4. "They respect and are grateful for Premier Khrushchev's prudence in the face of disaster, but they are not likely again to think him incapable of the lowest punch in the cold war." Again the convinced are reconvinced, and the juggernaut hurtles on. One wonders whether *Pravda* was reporting similar disillusionment among Soviet leaders after Khrushchev had trapped—or been trapped into trapping—President Eisenhower in the U-2 affair. Khrushchev could of course wait until Kennedy replaced Eisenhower and begin again. We, however, have no such sacramental event to count upon to cleanse the Soviet leadership of its sins, before we must begin discussing with it the thousands of matters demanding each its quantum of respect and good faith. In the vast public relations game which is the cold war, in which each elite must manipulate its own public for every inch of leeway, we do our motivational research very badly. We cannot afford many such triumphs.

And how many can Khrushchev afford? His astonishing freedom to withdraw as he did can be explained only by assuming that a core interest was not threatened by doing so—which would be the case if the chief military value of the weapons was to defend Cuba—and that this possible outcome had been programmed in advance and seen as a less desirable but not wholly negative outcome. Some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that he wanted things to happen precisely as they did, that withdrawal would make him look more interested in peace than thoughness and would restore negotiability to matters that had arrived at impasse. This is carrying things a bit far. But it may be that, if other purposes had to be abandoned, he could still hold that the net effect would be positive, because withdrawal would give him the right to say "Look how reasonable I was, now at least give me something to take home to my people" when the discussion turned to Berlin or inspection later. Within Russia, Khrushchev has not staked his reputation on military superiority so much as on proving that peaceful coexistence is possible, that Russia will prosper under such conditions, and that the rest of the world would then come its way. It now appears that this has been the position of the ascendent theoretician Mikhail Suslov as well.

The returns are not all in, but chances are they were proven wrong. This would be clear as soon as they reached the conference tables. The right-wing conterattack against Kennedy's moderation began very early to dissipate the liberating feeling of victory, and with it probably any magnanimity. The crisis was passed and Cuba was still there, perhaps

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safer than ever. The President himself seemed afraid that he might indeed have committed himself not to invade. The signs are that we held to the on-site inspection demand in Cuba less because of the objective needs of the case than as a precedent to use later in inspection negotiations concerning the test ban, and to delay unto oblivion the non-invasion pledge. Still the rightists felt betrayed.

As a result, the liberals concluded that toughness won, and the conservatives concluded that moderation failed. One early test of what hopefulness remained in these inauspicious circumstances would be our ability to respond to the newly-expressed interest of the Russians in the "black-box" proposal worked out by the Pugwash group to detect underground tests. The results were depressing. If Berlin and disarmament negotiations show as negative a yield, and the Chinese make their predictable gain among the incipient revolutionaries in the Southern Hemisphere *vis-a-vis* the Russians, we may find Khrushchev forced into adventurist behavior which will make the Cuban blockade not the last but the first of a series of crises on a new level of peril for the world. It can be argued on military grounds that the counter-escalation factors in our developing counterforce capability invite the non-counterforce nuclear power to spread its arms to local areas of tension in order to forestall a series of local defeats and humiliations without risking the destruction of its homeland.* Cuba, it can be argued, was the first place where this was to be tried, and presumably the theory was not disproved by Russia's being forced to withdraw while the weapons were still being shipped and installed. Our tough and localized behavior was precisely what counterforce makes possible for us. If the Soviet military's answer is weapons dispersal to extra-territorial trouble spots, and if the political result of the Cuban affair is now to make Khrushchev put up or shut up, we may find that our demonstration of resolve has precisely the opposite

* *Cf.* Hagan and Bernstein, *loc. cit.*

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affect from that intended. If that should be the case, we end having served no long-range pacific or legal goals, either externally or internally, and with our short-range victory turning bitter in our mouths. This may be the greatest tragedy of the Cuban blockade.

Henry Pachter

THE U. N.'S 17th ASSEMBLY

Wednesday, the 24th October, was "United Nations Day" when every year one nation provides an artistic entertainment for the delegates. This year, it was the Russians' turn; since morning the place had been swarming with coat-tailed members of the Leningrad orchestra. The Security Council interrupted a dreary session (which everybody knew would produce no solution to the current crisis) so that the nations could be united in Tschaikovsky and Beethoven. When the concert was over, the delegates left their be-furred ladies and hurried into huddles or to the radio—to hear that the crisis was almost over: Khrushchev had written a letter to Bertrand Russell, had proposed a summit meeting, and had ordered his ships to turn around. This was the time for Dean Rusk to say "The other fellow has blinked"—not two days later, as reported in the *Saturday Evening Post.* There were three more meetings of the Security Council, one of which gave Mr. Stevenson the chance for his remarkable performance as public prosecutor—but Americans who have seen it on TV failed to notice that he concluded with the even more remarkable admission that this was not serious work, and peace had to be made by direct negotiation between the main participants, the Soviet Union and the United States; for the latter was not talking to Castro, and the neutrals were unable to produce a resolution expressing a "general will." The one they did submit said precisely that the parties should confer with the Secretary General; but they did not even insist that it should be voted upon—in fact it never was; even after the crisis was over, the big powers did not allow the Security Council to hold a final session so that it might close the books on the incident.

It would be comforting to know that in the absence of collective action at least the Secretary General had a hand in settling the crisis. Many delegates cite his letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev and the latter's enthusiastic acceptance. But we must be precise in defining what these letters did and what they did not do. They gave Khrushchev an opportunity to say: I

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am not yielding to the United States, but I will do my friends Russell and U Thant a favor by holding my ships back. We call this a face-saving device, and the United Nations is a great institution for saving faces. One day it might save the peace by saving a face, but this was not such an occasion. No one saved Khrushchev's face three days later when he meekly bowed to a U. S. threat of escalating the crisis. This threat was conveyed to the Russians, among other channels, through U. N. diplomatic gossip. The Secretary General, far from expressing a general will of the nations, had been degraded to a simple letter-carrier, and the letter he carried read: Surrender or else.

After Kennedy had won, he graciously allowed U Thant to assume a minor function, that of persuading Castro to allow the Red Cross a peek at the dismantling procedures. It is worth reading the minutes of this meeting which Castro has published. U. Thant did not speak as a representative of the United Nations, but as one who had been at Bandung and at Belgrade, speaking to a fellow neutralist, in the name of 45 other neutralist nations entreating Castro to make a small contribution to peace. He agreed with Castro that he had no right to make such a demand. His reward for not pressing his request was to come soon after the Cuban crisis: Khrushchev dropped his troika plan and allowed the election of a Secretary General to which he had objected before.

International Law Abandoned

It is characteristic of the Russians that once they realize a mistake, they can make a 180 degree turn-about. Western governments usually go in quarter-turns to avoid strictures by the opposition, or because their pride will not permit admission of error. The Russians have no such inhibitions and compunctions. Khrushchev's authority in the Kremlin has not been hurt by the withdrawal of his rockets from Cuba, any more than Stalin's was hurt by his withdrawal from Iran or by the abandonment of the Berlin blockade. The Cuba crisis showed to Khrushchev that it is better to have one Secretary General than three. This was a positive result of the October events, for U Thant is planning great things in areas which may be more important than those which make world political news.

The sad, negative result was the proof that international law had been abandoned even by the U. S., its avowed champion, and the U. N. had been shoved aside deliberately. The reason unfortunately had long been obvious to all who are concerned about collective security. The very concept had been eroded year after year as one nation after the other took the law into its own hand and the majority condoned unilateral action because each of them counted on reciprocal services. Several of the neutralist nations are in contempt of U. N. resolutions, others refuse to pay their assessments on expenses whose purposes they disagree with. The International Court at the Hague recently judged that assessments are dues. It stands to reason that nations cannot benefit from collective arrangements unless they abide by collective decisions. Moreover, the nations which are delinquent on this issue are precisely the ones which wish to give the United Nations more authority on substantive matters, even of internal policy within individual member nations. They have done so again dur-

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ing the Seventeenth Assembly, notably in matters regarding racial colonialism. They have adopted resolutions which may be in direct conflict with the words of the Charter which restricts the United Nations to the more formal task of regulating the mutual external relations of states. To expand its jurisdiction to substantive matters of domestic policies, we must apply the same reasoning which has extended the jurisdiction of the U. S. Supreme Court. But to make new constitutional law means to apply a new principle to all citizens alike, or in this case, to all nations alike. Human rights and civil rights must be granted to all people, and the right of self-determination to all peoples the world over. We do not achieve world federalism or peace if new substantive law is applied with discrimination, for the benefit of some but not all, to satisfy the personal ambitions of some leaders rather than by the wholehearted adoption of new principles, to suppress independence movements rather than to promote freedom. The Committee of Seventeen, reporting on the termination of colonialism, specifically excluded from its terms of reference "contiguous territories," i.e., to avoid debating India's Naga question, it defined colonialism strictly as naval imperialism (Russia simply smiling). The interest of collective security here lies athwart the interest of the new nationalism which uses the noble garb of anti-colonialism to promote special designs of power.

In the Congo itself a rather ugly situation is developing. Contrary to some American press reports, it is not of Soviet making but grew out of the U. N. action in that unhappy country. Tshombe, by a whimsical turn of history which makes one believe in Providential retribution, now is allied with the pro-Communist (so-called) forces which try to unseat the weak Adoula government which in turn now is supported by the Belgians. As Indian troops are withdrawn and Indonesians are taking their place, Lumbumbist influences from outside the country are gaining ground in Leopoldville. This was the moment the U. S. government chose to establish a "presence," once more supporting a government which is bound to fall, and again the U. N. provides a fig-leaf for intervention which by this time is resented by all Congolese. Khrushchev, a mere month after his utter defeat in Cuba, has warned us off the premises, and at the time of printing we may have another crisis.*

Fortunately, the Cuban crisis was not settled at any particular place; otherwise we might have to deplore, by the time this column reachers its readers, the demise of another "spirit of —." Although I am writing at Christmastime, I cannot believe that any new spirit of reconciliation has broken out. The Russians still refuse to pay their assessments for U. N. operations; they still refuse to allow any kind of inspection that alone would make disarmament talks meaningful; they are testing away merrily while bombarding us with offers of a moratorium. They have not renounced their designs on Berlin but decided to try a diplomatic rather than a military approach.

A New Era?

Nevertheless, there were some signs of detente after the Cuban crisis. I already have mentioned the election of U Thant to a full term. The con-

* As we go to press, Tshombe seems to be finished.

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genitally vicious Zorin has been recalled to Moscow. A resolution detailing co-operation in outer space for civilian purposes was adopted unanimously. The United States proposed to terminate Sir Leslie Munroe's mandate to investigate political conditions in Hungary and U Thant has accepted an invitation to visit Budapest—not as executor of resolutions still being flouted by the authorities there but as a private person, and Kadar has hinted that he might release some political prisoners in return for the validation of his delegates to the U. N. Even Castro has consented to the return of his prisoners—at a price. More important perhaps was the removal from the Assembly agenda of an item Zorin had strained all his efforts to get included—the condemnation of war propaganda and subversion.

Under this title Khrushchev apparently had planned to bring up the subject of Berlin. He had threatened ominously to come to the U. N. session, but not before his rockets were in place to support his claim to the city.

There is the opportunity for a few historical digressions. Some good souls still pretend to wonder why Khrushchev emplaced these silly gadgets on Cuban sites. It seems he spent a billion rubles just because Castro needed some toys—yet he didn't even let Castro play with them, but sent a Russian guard to keep them under lock; so you can see, they were just there to improve the landscape, because anyway if he wanted to hit New York and Washington, he could do it from Russian bases as well. Which is true. Fortunately Khrushchev has answered the fools in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 12th: he wished to "make the American imperialists realize that war was at their door, so that they would realize more realistically the dangers of thermonuclear war." Just a friendly reminder, in case we had any intention to continue "subversion" in Berlin.

This item came off the agenda, or did not get on to it. Do we have reason to rejoice in a new era of good feelings? We are told that after Cuba has shown the brink to our and their policy-makers, perhaps the leaders will open a new book and place foreign relations on a basis of "coexistence" rather than contest. By way of confirmation we are assured that Khrushchev was not responsible for the Cuban crisis; if any Russian, it was Marshall Malinovsky, the Neo-Stalinists or the "Chinese faction" in the Kremlin. This theory is supported by the confusing story of "the two telegrams." On Friday the 26th evening, Kennedy received a panicky note accepting peace at almost any condition, but on the following morning another note came, demanding the dismantling of the American bases in Turkey in return for a Russian retreat from Cuba. This unusual occurrence is interpreted in the following way: when the first telegram was sent, it was 2 o'clock in the morning Moscow time. Khrushchev must have stolen out of a panicky meeting with his generals, to offer peace to Kennedy. But when the generals (or Stalinists, pro-Chinese) became aware of his misbehavior, they forced him to send a second telegram, conceived in more ponderous terms and demanding compensation as is customary in diplomatic dealing.

The authors of this fantasy fail to explain how Khrushchev, another 24 hours later, got the better of his col-

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leagues and again accepted the terms of surrender. And where are those "Chinese"? Has a single culprit been purged, or even named? All we hear is a general attack on unknown "Stalinists"—certainly the most expected thing at a time when important economic shortcomings were being castigated. And then, why "Stalinists?" Stalin never placed rockets in foreign communists' hands—not to speak of Cubans'; he pulled out of Iran, ended the Berlin fight, cut the Greek Communists off arms supplies; he trusted Chiang Kai-shek and sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan; in fact Khrushchev could have found no better authority for his "coexistence" than Stalin himself, and he has repeatedly said: in matters of foreign policy we are all Stalinists. Or Malinovsky, whose barracks looks so impressed the reporters in Paris 1960! It was Malinovsky who only two years ago submitted a secret memorandum asking for "a decade of peace to permit socialist construction in the Soviet Union." Does he sound eager to risk war over Cuba? Incidentally, he is Khrushchev's man; he helped him to liquidate Zhukov and the anti-party faction. It was Malinovsky, too, who apparently saw that no deal on Berlin was to be gotten for the Cuban bases and thought of settling for American bases in Turkey. The idea had been suggested to him by—the American government which not only had agreed to place this question on the agenda of the disarmament talks but even had inquired in Ankara how the Turkish government would react. In the "Excom" discussions Ambassador Stevenson reminded the President that the item still was on the agenda; the swapping of bases was suggested in the English press and by Walter Lippmann on October 24. It was a face-saving Soviet demand on the 25th, and hence appeared in the note composed on the 26th for publication on Saturday, the 28th. But while the ponderous Soviet bureaucracy was "processing" this note, grave events intervened on Friday, the 27th; the Cubans shot down a U-2 and Kennedy spoke tougher language. The possibility of nuclear war was staring the Kremlin leaders in the face. It was then, probably, in the wee hours of a Moscow morning, that they decided to throw in the towel. Khrushchev sent his urgent, panicky telegram, written so hastily that it bears the mark of unprofessional composition. Apparently it was not "processed" through the departments and therefore arrived in Washington a few hours before the other which had been written earlier.

If the "second" telegram really was the first, the theory of "the military" forcing Khrushchev to take an intransigent stand is wrong. The Cuban missiles were political blackmail to begin with, and Khrushchev was as responsible for their emplacement as for their removal. All of which proves that it is wrong to see Khrushchev as either good or bad. He is both, because basically he is an opportunist. We must never forget his two sides, or rather Western policy must try to show him that aggression comes to grief. I would be happier to say: the United Nations should make all aggression impossible At present unfortunately, the United States alone is able and willing to make this point, even at the risk of war. It would be far better if the United Nations were to provide collective security. But to do that they must be prepared to take the same chance all together. It will not do in

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the long run to be neutral between right and wrong, or to advise the victim to negotiate with the aggressor. Tragically the foremost representative of this attitude now has received a dose of his own medicine, and at that, from those whom he flattered himself to lead. Of course it is a mere accident that two events which happened simultaneously exposed two basic faults of neutralism: it is ineffective in saving the neutrals from aggression, and it has no policy when two major powers are steering a collision course. Moreover, this craven neutralism has destroyed the effectiveness of the United Nations as a peace-making and peace-keeping agency.

Stanley Plastrik

POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS

Everyone recognized that the Cuba crisis opened a void of annihilation. But there was another void, in American political life, that few people remarked upon: the almost complete absence of any serious opposition or even restraining influence as the Administration mounted its skillful answer to the Russians. It is simply awful that a man—who like Stevenson has passed for the spokesman of liberalism—has to purge himself of the suspicion that he had proposed a more moderate approach than the one adopted by the Administration. That the possibility of his having advocated an exchange of bases with the Russians should be regarded as evidence of political "softness," speaks poorly of our political climate. And it speaks poorly for the integrity of the Kennedy Administration that influential figures in its upper echelons should have been willing to use this weapon against Stevenson, whose futility has, in any case, been sufficiently demonstrated by now. The atmosphere of specious "national unity" does not bode well, no matter how great a victory the Administration scored and no matter how much we all share the sense of relief that Khrushchev had the sense to pull back.

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Certain aspects of the Cuba crisis remain a mystery. The timing, for example. Doubt has already been cast upon the "discovery date" of the Russian missiles; still more difficult to grasp is the lightning speed and the meshed-in sequences of the vast operations that followed hard upon the "discovery." Within a few days, as we later learned, the United States called forth powers capable of mounting the apocalypse. And surely a good deal more remains hidden. Everyone in

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Washington agrees on the effectiveness of the news blackout during the days of crisis. But more than serious news—for what was also blacked out was the possibility of public discussion, of domestic participation, of popular consultation. The Cuba crisis raised the most disturbing questions about the workings of our governmental machinery in crisis situations: how the increasingly concentrated executive power is to be reconciled with democratic norms, what the role of Congress and its war-making powers is to be, etc.

Nor will it do to cry emergency. For there is no proper basis of comparison between the Cuba crisis and a presumed enemy attack in response to which the Administration must make instant decisions. If the cry of emergency, the clamor for efficiency and speed of response, becomes the effective standard of national response, then there will have occurred a still further erosion of democratic processes.

Meanwhile, it is hard not to sympathize with the remarks of Malcolm Muggeridge in the *New Statesman* (November 2, 1962):

> They [the American people] cannot believe that it makes much difference and have come to think of government as something apart from themselves. They wonder what Kennedy is going to do about Cuba, with little sense that the decisions he makes are supposed to be on their behalf. He can go to war or not go to war, and they will follow. . . . Even the dread prospect of nuclear destruction lose its terrors when there is nothing to destroy. Only some neon lights to be put out, some amplified voices to be silenced, some ideas almost forgotten to be quite forgotten. Special editions announcing: "Russians yield: 'We'll Quit Cuba,' " caused as little obvious excitement as the President's original announcement of the crisis. History today is in Technicolor, and we, the human race, sit in our dark seats and watch. The show is lavishly produced at enormous cost with an all-star cast, but the script is repetitive and long-winded. The sound effects, however, are excellently contrived.

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The Cuba crisis involved another effort—this time a particularly bold one by the Russians—to shift the balance of world power. In a keen analysis (*Encounter,* December 1962) Richard Lowenthal puts the matter well:

> The real purpose [of Khrushchev's gamble] must have been *politically* offensive. . . . By literally "bringing home" the nuclear threat to the American people, the bases would confront them with an unprecedented psychological situation, calculated to weaken their capacity for rational response, and would force on their government a choice of evils. If the U. S. decided to destroy the new bases by preventive action, they would be branded aggressors and arouse widespread indignation, especially among the Latin American nations. If they failed to act effectively, they would demonstrate their impotence before all the world and above all before those same neighboring states, among whom Castro's ideological appeal would henceforth be reinforced by his new power of intimidation.

One may have a variety of estimates as to the tactical or strategic military significance of the missile bases. One may argue, accurately enough, that all of Europe, including Russia, has lived for years under the immediate threat of missiles and that this makes somewhat less than morally unimpeachable

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the American desire to continue as a privileged sanctuary. Nevertheless, given the present balance of power, Khrushchev brought the world to the brink of war.

For unless he were so ill-informed about the political atmosphere of the United States as to suppose his maneuver would go unchallenged, he must have realized that it would have to encounter some kind of check. The only question is: what kind? Those sections of the American "peace movement" which failed to acknowledge the urgency of popular response to the Russian bases in Cuba, and which in effect argued against any kind of countermeasures, were simply cutting themselves off from even the most modest political effectiveness. *Something* had to be done to redress the disturbed balance of terror.

What was alarming in the crisis, and what merits the most stringent criticism, was the unilateralism of the American response; the exclusive reliance upon military threat; the readiness to brush past the usual diplomatic means for handling such crises which offer opponents a mode of retreat that is not too politically damaging. I would agree with some critics who urged that the U. S. first go to the United Nations before instituting a blockade. I would share the curiosity of those critics who wondered whether any effort was made through conventional diplomatic means to apprise Khrushchev of how serious the situation had become in the eyes of the U. S. government and to urge upon him a retreat before the possibility was cut off through public gestures of defiance. I would share the dismay of those critics who felt that the U. S., acting as it did, reduced all the other nations to a state bordering upon impotence and thereby helped perpetuate that fateful concentration of power in the hands of two great super-states which is itself a major source of our recurrent crises and approaches to war.

In the short run, it may be that the consequences of the Cuban crisis will be favorable. It may be as Richard Lowenthal writes, that the outcome "has greatly increased the chances of a serious attempt to limit the risks of the world-wide conflict between the Soviet bloc and the system of alliances centered around the United States.... The indispensable condition for an agreed limitation of risks is that neither side should count on being able to tip the balance quickly and decisively by the bold use or threat of force; and it now seems possible that, as a result of the Cuban affair, this condition may be fulfilled in Mr. Khrushchev's case for the first time since his assumption of full power five years ago."

Perhaps; it is still too early to say. But it is also possible that the game of brinksmanship will continue in exacerbated form; that Khrushchev will learn tactical lessons from Kennedy; that new provocations will be made in geographical and technical conditions more favorable to the Russians; that the two power contenders will become increasingly locked in the strength of each other, grappling with desperate sudden thrusts that, in any single case, could mean war.

The world is worse off since Cuba, not better. The relief everyone felt that the bombs did not fall, we share. But the essential fact remains that in the crisis the ultimate appeal was to war and that Khrushchev's retreat came in response to an open threat of

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war. Does this offer any grounds for an improvement in future relationships between the contending blocs?

More than ever, the fate of the world depends upon power relationships: how many operational and deliverable missiles, short, medium and long range, do you have? Decisions as to the future of humanity rest increasingly on the tug and pull exerted by the two great powers. Temporarily disturbed, the balance of terror was temporarily restored. How long will it be before one or the other side tries once again to "adjust" that balance? And what will save us next time: the proposed direct telephone between White House 3-0030 and Kremlin 6-0800?

This concentration of "credible power," to use the current jargon, conflicts head-on with the growing complexities of the real world: that is, with the emergence of whole continents of independent nations striving to assert larger amounts of non-dependency; with Western Europe and its independent Common Market; and with the disintegration of the Communist monolith. Each of these developments offers the possibility, admittedly modest at the moment, of a growing opposition to a centralized power-ruled world in which essential decisions rest in the hands of two capitals. But to the extent that the outcome of the Cuban crisis contributes to maintaining a balance of terror as the dominant system of international relationships—the very system which was itself a main cause of the crisis—there is no particular reason for optimism concerning the future.

One-Party Rule in Algeria

The following response was received from Messali Hadj, founder and originally leader of the Algerian nationalist movement, in response to questions concerning press reports that Algerian "Messalists," many of them just released from years in French prison camps, were being persecuted by the new Algerian government. Messali Hadj is today in France, having been denied permission to return to Algeria, where he leads the newly formed opposition movement, the Algerian People's Party.

Since the cease-fire went into effect, our militants and sympathizers, their families and all those who support the PPA (Algerian People's Party) have been the victims of kidnappings, torture and assassinations. The number of victims can be established at between 700 and 1,000 persons. Among these are prisoners just recently liberated after long years of detention.

The impression one receives from this pitiless pursuit of the PPA by the FLN is that the latter sought to profit from the cease-fire in order to liquidate once and for all our party in Algeria. The accounts of this tragedy which have been brought to us by those who escaped go beyond the most horrible things one can imagine. This situation lasted from March 19 to the end of September, 1962, when installation of the first Algerian government took place.

(Continued on page 74)

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Harvey Swados

C. WRIGHT MILLS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR

I first met C. Wright Mills in 1941 or 1942, when he was a young assistant professor of sociology at the University of Maryland (at that time, at least, a singularly dismal-looking provincial school whose president was one "Curly" Byrd, a former football coach). I was about twenty-one, some five years his junior, and at the time I was either working the night shift in an aircraft factory or had recently left the factory to join the Merchant Marine; in either case, I was aware of what Mills was up to, from certain pieces that he was publishing, and we hit it off at once. He was living with his first wife and baby daughter in a coöp development which he supported on principle but otherwise ignored completely, since he was absorbed day and night with other problems. He might have said the same of the baby, who crawled about at his feet —if indeed she was old enough to—while he explained, to my youthful astonishment, that she was still a vegetable and would only be worth bothering with some few years later.

I last saw C. Wright Mills in 1962, late in January, at the Nice Airport, where I had driven him from my French home so that he could return to America, after many months of fruitless wandering about Europe, to die. His youngest child, who had been toddling about, tripped and split open his lip on the terrazzo floor. Mills was concerned, but unable to cope (fortunately his wife was). We shook hands, for the last time, and I looked back to see him walking slowly up and down with his child, being the dutiful parent because at this terrible moment he had nothing else to do with his time or with his life.

In the two decades between those two encounters, Mills and I were very closely attuned, psychologically and intellectually, so much so that we often quarreled violently, and there were years on end when we had absolutely nothing to do with each other. When we parted with that final handshake in Nice, it was with the tacit recognition that after twenty years neither of us really understood the other. More than tacit: We had just spent the better—or rather the worst—part of a month grappling vainly for clues that might lead us back to the whereabouts of an earlier Mills.

"At those crossroads of one's life," Manes Sperber has written in *Journey Without End* (incidentally, a book which I had tried unsuccessfully a year or two earlier to get Mills to confront), "when one ceases

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to ask, 'What is still to happen to me?' and begins instead to wonder: 'What has happened to me? What have I done with my life?'—that is a time when it is easy to panic."

There are aspects to Mills which are badly understood or misunderstood, and which my experiences with him may help to clarify. He was an important and a characteristic American, and if I was not always able to predict and hence to rely on his conduct in a given political or personal circumstance, I knew him I think better than anyone else ever did, with the possible exception of my wife. However, if I were to attempt to unburden myself of the complicated tangle that our lives, and those of our families, became during those years, I would have to undertake an exercise in autobiography, a distasteful and impossible task.

Within those narrow limits, then, there follow some reflections on the man who called me his best and only friend (in all honesty I think he said the same to two or three others, depending on his mood and the kind of sustenance he needed from those others), and whom, far from regarding as my best friend, I must say frankly I never loved, often did not like, but always struggled to respond to and to aid. In the end I think that maybe I failed him, but that too is a personal matter.

Mills was a complex man because he was a bundle of contradictions. That is an easy thing to say—it needs some spelling out. In recent years he was perhaps more appreciated abroad than at home; but if the Europeans—and the Orientals and Latin Americans—understood what he was *saying* better than the Americans did, they could not possibly understand what he was *doing*. As a result we already find him described as a battler for the oppressed, which is absurd, or as a crusader without honor in his native land, which is ludicrous. In the United States there is a tendency to think of him as a disinterested clinical observer, which seems to me equally wrong, and to refer back to Thorstein Veblen.

I would suggest that if we think rather in terms of Theodore Roosevelt and Scott Fitzgerald, or if possible of a weird melange of the two, egomaniacal and brooding, hearty and homeless, driven by a demon of discontent and ambition, with faith only in the therapy of creative work, whether intellectual or physical, we will come closer to the mark. In all of his writing, as in his lecturing and his public stance, and indeed in his private existence, it was the blending of these forces that gave his work and life its ineluctable impact, its sense of a powerful mind and a forceful personality at grips not with the petty and the ephemeral but with the profoundly important questions.

My first inkling of the way in which this was to operate in our personal relations came in 1946, when I was living in Brooklyn Heights and Mills in lower Manhattan. I had to leave town for several weeks, and told him not only my schedule but my reasons for going. Yet upon my return I found a note in my mailbox from Mills, informing me that he had walked all the way from his house to mine with his little daughter

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in tow, in hopes of finding me in (I had no phone). I was touched, of course, that anyone should go to so much trouble to see me; but as I thought about it, and discussed it with him on my return, I came to see that while he was truly anxious to talk with me about a number of problems, he was so absorbed in the problems—his own and not mine (which was almost always to be the case)—that he had no interest in and hence no memory of those of my movements and activities which were unconnected with his.

For many people this utter self-absorption was intolerable, and I must confess that there were occasions when it was for me also. But after a time it was borne in upon me that Mills could not function without the absolute conviction that what he was doing was not only right but was more important than what anybody else was doing. More than that, the unique thrust of his best work—I am thinking of the decade of the fifties, of *White Collar* and *The Power Elite*—derived directly from his egocentricity. These books would have been paltry if they had not been informed throughout with a sense of the magnetic self-assurance of their author.

The contradictions of which I spoke earlier worked in greatest tension during those years and issued in those books, written when Mills was in his thirties. Thus he was simultaneously sociable and aloof, democratic and snobbish, uneasy and bold, generous and close, humble and cocky, rationalistic and simplistic. Although he could still rattle off the Latin he had learned as a choir boy, he tended to make light of the effect upon him of Catholic dogma, and I incline to think he was right about this, for religion in any of its manifestations simply bored him. On the other hand, he insisted more than once that what had made him into a rebel and an outsider was the relentless hazing he had undergone as a college freshman before transferring to the University of Texas. He swore to me that for the entire year he had lived surrounded by a wall of silence, without another student addressing a single word to him. Perhaps. Yet he loved to romanticize his early years, even more than most of us do, and he conned people into believing that his background was such as to make it remarkable that he should have become an intellectual at all. The truth was, as I learned for myself in the course of a visit to San Antonio, that his parents were—and are—sympathetic middle-class people, proud of their son and his achievements.

This was, however, one of Mills's charms as well as strengths. I shall never forget his leading me stealthily to a bureau and then triumphantly pulling out the top drawer to disclose layer after layer of O. Henry bars. "I decided to lay in a man-sized supply because I never could get enough of them when I was a kid."

He never could get enough of anything. One afternoon he came upon us drinking a bottle of cherry soda, vile stuff I have always thought. For Mills it was a great discovery, so great that on our next visit we

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tripped over cases of it that he had laid in and stacked outside his kitchen door.

He worked hard, often twenty-four hours at a stretch, and he relaxed hard. Since he knew nothing of tennis, swimming, skiing, even walking, he took his relaxation in the form of sleeping (he could recharge his batteries like a baby, for twelve hours on end), eating (he was the greatest trencherman I have ever known—one night at the Homestead Restaurant he enjoyed our steak dinner so much that after dessert he called back the waiter and ordered the same dinner all over again, from scratch), gadgetry, and building.

This gadgetry was another form—a very American form—of gluttony. When he found a gadget that pleased him he would seemingly try to corner the market in it; and when he became deeply involved in a mechanical hobby, as with cars or cameras, his passion to possess all the peripheral gimmicks was really unbounded.

Thus he started with an MG and worked his way up through a Porsche to a BMW motorcycle; along the line he acquired driving goggles of every conceivable tint, driving gloves of leather, cotton, and wool, and a shelf full of subscriptions to obscure and arcane British motoring journals, the contents of which used to drive us into hysterics—Mills included—when we read them aloud. He never participated personally in races or rallies, he didn't even care to drive fast (although there were times when we commuted down Route 303 at 85 miles an hour, with me riding pillion on the BMW), and he did not enjoy tinkering with motors (although he flew specially to Germany—his first glimpse of Europe! and his favorite country!—to take a factory course in servicing his motorbike).

I believe there were two principal reasons for this particular passion, both of them related to Mills's code, to his political attitudinizing, and to his published work. First was a respect amounting to reverence for the well-made object, its designer, and the man who knew how to use it properly. Among the Americans whom Mills respected most (in truth there were not very many) were a group of mechanics, factory foremen, and such, who had a motorcycle club—a serious one, not of the black-leather jacket variety—and were first-rate riders. His second reason was a hatred, which became more ostentatious as the years went by, of everything marked Made in America. It seems to me that the last American vehicle he owned, before the MG and all the rest, was that masterpiece of ingenious simplicity, the jeep.

In any case, there was a connection between the gadgetry and the love of building, which so impressed those who came upon Mills in the act of putting up with his own hands a house of his own design. In addition to its serving as his greatest relaxation after prolonged bouts of research and writing, it bolstered in his mind the proud belief that he, like the mechanics, drivers, architects, and designers whom he so admired, could do things that were utterly beyond the ken of metro-

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politan intellectuals who could only write books, or worse, articles about books and articles about articles about books. Although we never spoke overmuch about this, it was a shared assumption, and I am sure that for him it had its roots in profound feelings of uneasiness in confronting dyed-in-the-wool intellectuals, particularly Jewish intellectuals who made him feel the outsider. Just so, I am sure that this was one of the two main links which bound us in our peculiar connection (the other being the fact that we were both constitutionally loners, incapable of fitting comfortably into the *Partisan Review* set, the *Commentary* set, etc., etc.), for over the years we exchanged a good many man-hours of labor on mutually helpful projects, as well as kicking around and even getting involved in a kind of subsistence farming.

I was always ready to pitch in, to the best of my ability, on his outlines, his drafts, his chapters, his galleys; and I spent many weeks working with him on *White Collar, The Power Elite, The Causes of World War III,* and *The Sociological Imagination* (a book which I did not very much like, even in its toned-down final draft, despite the fact that Mills dedicated it to my wife and to me). He for his part was always ready to advise me on problems of my house, and to put in time and labor too.

If I worked for some weeks laying the fireplace for his first Rockland County house and the footings for his second Rockland house, he showed me how and helped me, over a dozen years, to pull stumps with his jeep, to fit up my gutters, leaders, and drainage pipe, to construct and sink in concrete a new cover for my well, to build a closet in my daughter's room and last of all to tie into my new wing a comfortable typing table and an open file hooked to the wall (he was always appalled at my sloppy filing, particularly in connection with any work in progress). He was so patently my superior in all of these tasks, whether at his house or at mine, that I was perfectly content to do the dirty work under Mills's supervision.

When it came to writing, however, this was not the case, and I must say that I never had any particular interest in his opinion of my fiction. I never reciprocated his imperious demands for help by so much as showing him my work, for his taste in contemporary fiction ran to writers like the late Nevil Shute, whom he regarded in all seriousness as being one of the word's ten best living novelists; and, on the one occasion that I requested that he read something of mine in draft, because I needed technical clarification of some social science stuff, he put me off. I was hurt by this at the time, for I had never turned down a similar request from him, but God knows he had his troubles, and I did not continue to hold it against him. If that was my first request, it was also to be my last.

What I have said thus far has probably been weighted on the Teddy Roosevelt side of Mills's personality, his heartiness, handiness, ruggedness, and seemingly limitless gusto and self-assurance. But when I speak of his unending and humble desire to learn how to commit to paper with

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precision and fluency all that he believed, I must refer to the Fitzgerald side of his character.

I am not attempting to point up the parallel between Fitzgerald's dashing about France without troubling to learn the language and Mills's wanderings about Europe without knowing a word of any foreign tongue, although that was true enough; nor between Fitzgerald's high living and Mills's living on unwritten books, although that was true enough too; nor even between Fitzgerald's crackup and Mills's terrifying conviction at the same age that he was written out, worked out, burned out, although that was horribly true. What I am thinking of are Fitzgerald's—and Mills's—devotion to their craft and their belief that through it they could express a unique vision of America.

This is what Mills's detractors have never been able to understand. Attacking him bitterly, often with as much venom as he attacked them, for the crudities of his style (of which he was painfully aware and worked unremittingly to overcome), for his unrefined methodology, his grandiose generalizations, his gross inaccuracies about the military or the educational system or whatever, his fascination with the supposed technological efficiency of totalitarianism, they were unable to understand how it was that he was not merely respected but looked upon as spokesman and mentor by many of the best of the young academics and by many thousands of plain readers, nor how it is that he is avidly attended by millions in Japan, in Russia, in Mexico, as a refreshingly different voice of America.

For a long time I have thought—I still do—that it was because all these people were responding to what was at bottom not merely a logical indictment which could be upheld or attacked, but a poetic vision of America; an unlovely vision perhaps, expressed with a mixture of awkwardness and brilliance, but one that did not really need statistical buttressing or the findings of research teams in order to be apprehended by sensitive Americans as corresponding to their own sense of what was going on about them, more truly and more unflinchingly than any other contemporary statement. They were responding, in that unlovely decade, the fat and frightened fifties, to one who refused to compromise or to make the excuses that others were making—excuses mislabeled descriptions or analyses—for what was happening to their country. They sensed correctly that, faulty and flawed as it was, the vision of Wright Mills cut through the fog and lighted their lives for them.

I have deliberately left out much. I must say a word, however, about Mills's fascination with the totalitarian variety of the global shift to what is called socialism. He and I had many sessions, some of them shouting sessions, over this, at about the time when he was writing *The Causes of the World War III,* and after his first (triumphal) visit to the Soviet Union. At the end, early this year, we had arrived at what I suppose you might call a kind of truce. The ever-accelerating race of history would demonstrate soon enough where the deeper truth lay, and each of

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us was wholly persuaded of the other's good-will if not persuaded of the other's correctness.

What happened, it seems to me, is that Mills was caught up by the greatest contradiction of all, that which had carried him so far but was in the end to fall crushingly on his massive shoulders, the impossibility in our age of being simultaneously a Teddy Roosevelt and a Scott Fitzgerald, a public figure-man of action and an artist-thinker. Increasingly, with everything he wrote, Mills found that he was addressing himself to a defined audience. He was becoming a leader with a following. Not merely requests to speak, but pleas for guidance and counsel came pouring in on him, and after *The Causes of World War III* they became a flood. Under such circumstances the temptation to become oracular was almost irresistible; for a man who was absolutely sure of his own insight and analysis it was inevitable.

So was the tragedy. I do not think I am overstating when I say that Mills was never deeply affected by what totalitarianism did to great masses of people. To particular intellectuals, yes; but not to masses. For him Nazism was something that could be comprehended by reading Neumann and some other books; there were no horrible unplumbable depths. Hence he was impatient with my continually reminding him of German anti-Semitism: he regarded the murder of six million Jews as one of the terrible things that can happen when reactionaries take over and nation-states go to war. Nothing more. For him Stalinism in its turn was contemptible not for what it was doing to national minorities, to workers and peasants, to millions languishing in Siberia, but for its political vulgarity and intellectual emptiness. Its standard bearers throughout the world were crude epigones, parrots incapable of originality or vision, much less of redirecting mankind toward new goals.

For a while it seemed to him as though the Chinese Communists might very well be doing just this. The Great Leap Forward excited him enormously. Eager to be shown that the pro-Communist Australian—and other—Sinologists whom he read, underscored, and filed, were indeed right, he itched to be off to China to see for himself. But he was not able to get there because, like it or not, he was an American. Cuba, however, was still available, and people in both North and South America had been asking him what he had to say about the Cuban Revolution, an event far more anti-American in its implications than the Chinese Revolution.

Anyone who knew Mills's admiration for the motorcycle drivers could have foreseen his admiration for the successful Cuban guerrillas; anyone who knew his hurt at being ignored or patronized by his colleagues could have foreseen his reaction to Castro's assurance that he and his fellows had been studying Mills during their long months in the mountains. The result was *Listen Yankee,* in which Mills climbed further out on a limb than he had ever gone before.

For a new generation the Cuban revolution, together with its after-

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math, was a crucial event comparable in magnitude, in resonance, to the Spanish Civil War for an earlier generation. For Mills it was definitive proof (as it was for many of us) of the blind rapacity of the American power elite; but more, it provided him for the first time with an emotional home. When this latter certainty was destroyed, everything was destroyed.

In his last months Mills was torn between defending *Listen Yankee,* as a good and honest book, and acknowledging publicly for the first time in his life that he had been terribly wrong. This would have meant not only caving in to the few whose opinions he valued, which I believe he would have been strong enough to do (I had waited until I believed—mistakenly—that he was recovered from his heart attack before telling him what I really thought of the book), but returning to the United States and telling not only his enemies on the right, but the hundreds of thousands who had, so to speak, voted for him, that he was not a rough rider after all, but only a man of ideas who could be wrong, as men of ideas so often are. The tension was too much, the decline of the revolution, atop his personal pains, was too much. I can only add that he declared to me in his last weeks that he was becoming more and more impressed with the psychological and intellectual relevance of nonviolent resistance and absolute pacifism.

When I think of my friends who have died prematurely in recent years I mourn the missing sweetness of one, the incomparable insightfulness of another. I would be a liar if I were to say that Mills was a sweet and lovable friend, or that he understood and cared about many individual humans any more than he understood or cared about many individual artistic creations. But hardly a day passes without my arranging in my mind an argument to present to Mills about this event, that book, this development, that crisis. He was as combatively exhilarating as any man has ever been, he worked with the contagious wild passion of an inventor or a driven idealist, and when he was really dauntless he was the bravest man I have ever known.

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Lewis Coser

PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW NATIONS

Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism or Democracy?

The sudden emergence of new nations in Asia and Africa poses crucial problems for our age. No longer is it sufficient to applaud the demise of imperialism. We have also to discard any previous reliance on simple ideologies of progress. And we have to recognize that some or all of the new nations will present features deeply distasteful to men of a libertarian vision. There is no guarantee that the new will be desirable or appealing. Nor can we assume that the end of colonial servitude will necessarily usher in an age of democracy. We must ask bluntly what are the chances that a democratic polity can ultimately win over authoritarian and totalitarian politics?

Owing partly to the rapidity with which they have gained independence, most of these new states are characterized by fluid and ill-defined social and political structures. Many of them have a political structure boasting the paraphernalia of the modern state while their social structure is composed of essentially tribal or semi-feudal units. In many of these new nations a thin veneer of 20th-century ideology is superimposed on a community in which magical rather than rational modes of thought predominate. In most of them the cultural distance between the intellectual elite and the underlying population is so wide that the two strata seem to live in entirely different worlds.

None of the new nations outside of the Soviet orbit has achieved even relative social and political stability. All are in flux, open to various courses of development. This very openness poses a challenge: Is it possible to isolate at least some crucial factors which will help determine the structure of these nation-states? This essay will focus attention on a few such variables without claiming that these are the only ones needing consideration.

I. Three Societal Models

The difficulty inherent in the fact that political systems differ in a great many ways, so that comparison seems almost an impossible task, can best be overcome by constructing theoretical models against which particular units can be measured. I shall describe three such models, the liberal, the totalitarian, and the authoritarian, and then discuss

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their applicability to the new nations. The forces likely to push toward one or the other model in the years immediately ahead can then be analyzed and an attempt made to assess the long-run chances for democracy.

Any society beyond the relatively undifferentiated tribal level can be broken down, for purposes of analysis, into major institutional orders of which the political, the economic, the military, the religious and the family or kinship orders may be considered the most important.[1] These institutional orders must be integrated in some way if the society is to function. But the way integration is brought about may differ very significantly. Three "ideal typical" models of social integration, derived from a variety of concrete instances, will be outlined. No claim is made, of course, that any of them is fully embodied in any society or nation-state. The three were chosen because they have all been associated with the course of industrial development in a variety of historical settings. The democratic socialist model is not discussed here because, as Marx foresaw, it has been approximated only in those nations which have already gone over the hump of development.

a. The Liberal Model

In the classical liberal model of society, the structure is unified, yet leaves a high degree of autonomy to the various institutional orders and minimizes the dominion of the state. Conflict and competition between the various orders, far from endangering integration, help to "sew society together."

In the liberal model, economic agents are relatively free from political or religious interference, and so are religious organizations, which are usually not dominated by economic agents; the family also is protected from political interference. Only the military order has limited autonomy; it is firmly controlled by political agents. All orders are interrelated and influence each other, yet each maintains a high degree of autonomy.

In the nineteenth century, when the liberal model was most nearly approximated in parts of Europe and North America, non-governmental forces such as kin groups, autonomous religious organizations, owners of landed or mobile property succeeded in restricting and limiting governmental action. The political order thus never achieved a large measure of dominance over the other institutional orders; nor did it dominate the individual. Nor did any other order achieve dominance. By being pitted against each other in competition and conflict, and struggling for the loyalty and allegiance of men, they furthered individual autonomy.

To be sure, the freedom thus made possible was a negative freedom only, freedom *from* rather than freedom *to*. To the extent that the various institutional orders limited each other they allowed individuals a certain interstitial leeway. The full flowering of positive freedom was precluded in the liberal model if for no other reason than that it could

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function only if internalized repression among its citizens domesticated drives and energies into institutionally approved channels. The liberal society assured that, to use Erich Fromm's term, the great majority of individuals wanted to do what they had to do.

Some political compulsions did in fact face the individual in such liberal societies. The state may have been a "night-watchman" state, but it nevertheless imposed, even if hesitatingly and sparingly, compulsory military service, education and taxation, and it held firmly to its monopoly over the legitimate exercise of the means of violence. Yet the state's recourse to its power of compulsion, that is to political means, was only thought of as a last resort; the major decisions within the society were preferably brought about through bargaining, conflict and competition between the agents of the various institutional orders. The state claimed primacy during situations of emergency or stress, but in the ordinary course of events limited its impact on the other orders.

What has been said about the relations between the various institutional orders in liberal society applies even more strongly to relations within these orders themselves. In none of them did a single interest dominate the whole. Even where a state church existed, other organizations served to balance and limit its power in the religious sphere. The competition for souls between proselytizing religions furthered the freedom of the individual; the competitive struggle for scarce resources between a great variety of economic interests prevented the preemption of economic chances. Competition for marriage partners prevented the domination of the marriage market by kinship groups and enhanced the chances of free marital choice. Within the political realm, different political parties competed for power and thus maximized the chances for the citizen's democratic participation in the political process.

Liberal society was criss-crossed by many conflicts and antagonisms between, as well as within, institutional orders. As individuals affiliated with a multiplicity of groups and as these multiple affiliations crisscrossed each other, they welded society together. The multiple antagonistic and diversified interests which found expression within such social structures served as a balancing mechanism, preventing the cleavage of society along one line. At the same time the multiple affiliations of individuals in a variety of groups and associations served to enhance personal freedom.[2] The individual came, so to speak, to stand at a point at which many conflicting or non-conflicting groups and institutional orders intersected. Such a position in social space helps to minimize the chance of individual autonomy.[3]

b. The Totalitarian Model

In comparing the liberal with the totalitarian model one can apply Max Weber's distinction between individual and collective appropriation of power.[4] Individual appropriation takes place through conflict and competition among the members-at-large of those strata which have a legitimate claim to power; in collective appropriation all positions

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of power have been appropriated by a single ruling group which then allots shares to individuals and groups according to their status.

The totalitarian model may be considered the antithesis of the liberal model. Here integration is attained through deliberate coordination of all institutional orders and the suppression of conflict among them. The essence of totalitarian regimes is that their claims are total; i. e., that they aim at the control of all institutional spheres. In such regimes we witness an apotheosis of the political order. Political power has been appropriated by a political elite which suppresses all rival claimants. The political order has unquestioned primacy over all others; no independent organization even of an utterly non-political character is allowed to exist. Every social unit must be "gleichgeschaltet"; i. e., coordinated with the governing apparatus. Insofar as different institutional orders still continue to exist, activities within them are heteronomous; they do not follow laws of motion of their own but are impelled by forces emanating from the political order. Economic agents act in accord with the demands of State and Party, religious institutions become adjuncts to political institutions, and even the family is pressed into the service of political goals.[5]

Totalitarian societies destroy traditional social groups, communities or self-conscious classes and then replace them by new units which are subject to coordination and control by State and Party. Deprived of the support of non-governmental structures, the individual faces alone the immense tutelary power of the Party and State. Though in such societies he has multiple affiliations with a great number of groups, these do not conflict with or criss-cross each other; they follow the same impelling direction. Social forces are no longer antagonistic, the various interests are no longer diversified; indeed, their pressures are mutually reinforcing. The distinction between public and private spheres, central to the liberal model, disappears in totalitarian society. Just as the totalitarian state cannot tolerate autonomous organizations, so it cannot tolerate individual withdrawal into a private—and hence uncontrolled—sphere. The engineering of souls is as essential as the engineering of the social structure. The private as well as the public man must be caught in the seamless web of control. To the totalitarian powerholder anything that is not controlled will seem a fatal flaw.

Monopolistic control of the means of violence and of the channels of communication, as well as an official ideology covering all major aspects of a man's existence, characterize totalitarian societies. No claims of family, property, or religion counter-balance or limit the actions of the State and the Party. All social life is "politicized"; society is integrated by fiat of the State.

c. The Authoritarian Model

The authoritarian model may be said to stand midway between the totalitarian and the liberal models. Where totalitarian societies suppress all forms of autonomous organization and all independent sources of

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information, the authoritarian regimes suppress organized opposition and public criticism. Where liberal society fosters the autonomy of the various institutional orders, the authoritarian society limits and confines activities within these orders but does not attempt to control them completely. While totalitarian societies suppress all conflict among component parts of the social structure, the authoritarian society channels and deflects such conflicts without, however, eliminating them altogether.

In such societies the political power-holders may recognize no constitutional limitations of state power, yet in practice they do recognize *some* limitations. They may try to make the Church into a pliant instrument of their rule, yet they will not attempt to deny the religious order a measure of autonomy in regard to otherworldly concerns. They may limit the exercise of proprietary rights and channel the allocation of scarce resources, yet they will not attack the legitimation of property as such. In authoritarian societies the military order is typically somewhat independent of the political order; it may even tend to dominate it. Where totalitarian societies have "politicized armies," authoritarian societies often have a "militarized polity." Authoritarian regimes will attempt to mobilize the citizen in the pursuit of their political goals, yet they will not obliterate the distinction between the public and the private sphere—they will leave the latter relatively untouched. The political elite monopolizes political power but it shares social powers with the agents of other institutional orders.

Consequently such societies do not exclude conflicts between the various orders or within them. The Church, the army, economic agents, class interests—all may clash and limit each other. At the same time such groupings and institutions will limit the political agents and prevent them from exercising unchallenged sway. The Church, the army, the family, and property constitute distinct and not always harmonious interests; they compete, and the resultant balance of power among them leaves a deep impress on political decision-making. As distinct from liberal societies, here the non-political orders enjoy no customary immunity from the exercise of political will, but neither are they deprived of all power.

The individual in authoritarian societies does not enjoy the autonomy granted him in liberal societies. He is cribbed and confined by agents of the political order. Yet he can escape from the public scene into the relative autonomy of an uncontrolled private life. To the degree that conflicts between groups and orders mark the social life of authoritarian society—even though they may be channelled and partly directed—individuals have some chance to realize their non-political interests.

The integration of authoritarian society is achieved by a "mixed" process of authoritative imposition on the part of the political agents and spontaneous balancing among the other institutional orders. Shifts in the balance of power between the various groups will find their indirect reflection in political life. Such regimes are likely to lack the

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frozen rigidity of totalitarian regimes while also lacking, owing to the heavy predominance of the political order, the flexibility of the liberal model. They tend to have a somewhat unstable character. They face two dangers: the rise of liberalism through a revival of the power of temporarily suppressed groups, and the establishment of a totalitarian regime through a *Gleichschaltung* of all orders and interests.

II. *The Consequences of Underdevelopment*

By comparison with the West, all the new nations are "underdeveloped" economically. Their productivity, national product and per capita income is low and this is reflected in low standards of nutrition, housing, education, and health. The bulk of their populations live in traditional rural communities; most of them have not yet reached the take-off stage in the process of industrialization. This underdevelopment is due to a complex of historical circumstance which can only be hinted at here. Colonial exploitation both through unilateral transfers of wealth from colonial countries to Western Europe and the seizure of peasant-occupied lands for plantation purposes, played a major part. The destruction of rural handicraft industries through the competition of cheap industrial goods from Europe and America was another significant factor. Imperialist domination hindered the development of a class of indigenous industrial entrepreneurs, though it often favored the emergence of a partly Westernized class of *comprador* traders and middle-men.

But quite apart from the impact of imperialism, the traditional cultures of Asia and Africa in themselves did not foster strong and independent middle classes—the classes which in the West were the main promoters of capital accumulation, industrial enterprise and rational work discipline. The gradual development of a "Protestant" work ethic and a peculiar pattern of repression and self-control has been a precondition for the development of capitalist industrialism in the West. Individual autonomy, discipline, methodical application to work characterized the early entrepreneurial middle class, and this "innerwordly asceticism" was a powerful stimulant for that energetic pursuit of rational domination over the world and of industrial creativity which has characterized the West since the seventeenth century. There are no equivalents to this entrepreneurial ethos as yet discernible in the new nations. This relative absence of a work ethic and a tradition of individual self-control and autonomy accounts also for the fact that nepotism, corruption and the like do not encounter institutional or internalized obstacles to nearly the same degree as in the West.

The underdevelopment of economic resources has significant consequences for the system of stratification. The poorer a country, the greater the differences between the rich and the poor; i. e., the steeper the stratification pyramid. Not only are the poor in underdeveloped countries poorer in absolute terms than those of the West, but they are relatively poorer within their own class system. The social and economic distance between them and their own upper class is greater than that

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between the poor of the West and their upper class. In other words, not only absolute but relative deprivation characterizes the mass of the underlying population in the new nations. Moreover, with the growth of modern mass communication and transportation, the poor of the underdeveloped countries increasingly have occasion to compare their lot with that of the population of the developed countries of the West.

So long as the ideology or mystique of a society continues to hold the allegiance of the masses, they will endure the grossest inequalities of wealth, status and power. But when the traditional legitimations for the status quo break down—and they have broken down to a greater or lesser degree in all underdeveloped countries—then a new standard of judgment seeps into the consciousness of the deprived groups and leads them to compare their situations with that of other groups both within and without their own society.[6] Hence the urge to develop the country so as to reap the fruits of industrialization, raise national product, and reduce inequalities becomes well nigh irresistible in underdeveloped nations which have broken from traditional moorings.

Role of the Intelligentsia

What social stratum is likely to take the initiative in this development? Since entrepreneurial middle classes have hardly developed in these nations, and the traditionalistic leaders have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, the partly Westernized intelligentsia is likely to take the lead. This intelligentsia first becomes aware of the backwardness of the country through more intimate contacts with Western conditions than are available to other groups. Given their trained receptiveness to new ideological currents, the Westernized intellectuals are the first to criticize the accepted scheme of things. As gatekeepers of ideas, they are strategically placed to facilitate the penetration of modern ideologies. Cut loose from traditional thought, troubled by a sense of national humiliation, intellectuals in fact have taken the lead in the movement toward independence and modernization.[7]

When the intelligentsia searched for models to guide economic development, they almost invariably discarded the liberal model. Lacking an independent entrepreneurial middle class and its peculiar ethic, the new nations could not rely on unaided economic development. A liberal order, moreover, requires some ideological preparation. Before a liberal politics could make its appearance in Europe a new breed of autonomous, self-governing men had first to develop. But such men are still very rare in the new nations. As Richard Lowenthal has said in an essay from which I have borrowed several seminal ideas: "If conditions were such that a liberal economy would work, the country would not have remained underdeveloped in the first place."[8] Given the absence of independent economic agents, the task of development had to fall to the powers of the state. While in the West industrialization was mainly the outcome of a process of spontaneous growth in the economic order, "nourished by the enterprise of individual profit-seekers, exploiting new

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techniques to their own advantage,"[9] the development of the new nations required concentration of economic power in the state. The mopping up of savings to raise funds for investment, the allocation of scarce resources to the strategically most important tasks, the promotion of an intellectual climate favorable to the development of an ethos of work, the breakdown of the traditional barriers to the exercise of disciplined and rational modes of organization—none of these tasks of industrial take-off could be accomplished without public action by the agents of the political order. If the universalistic criteria which are a precondition for industrial development were to prevail, the particularism of the kinship order and the non-rational taboos of religious tradition had to be broken down. Hence the liberal model with its emphasis on the balanced interaction of different institutional orders found little favor in the new nations.

The appeal of the totalitarian model, in particular in its Communist form, was, on the contrary, considerably stronger. Lowenthal so ably summarizes the attractions of Communist totalitarianism for underdeveloped countries that I shall quote him at length:

> In its Stalinist form, the Communist ideology has been specifically adjusted to deal with the problems of forced modernization. It justifies a ruthless policy of forced savings . . . It proclaims the superiority of planned investment by the state over *laissez faire*. Finally, it furnishes the militant faith needed for the cultural revolution, with its materialist attack on traditional superstition, its glorification of dedicated, disciplined work for the community, its emphasis on production as the highroad to national power and individual liberation from misery. It invests the uprooting of traditional life, the frightening impact of social and technical change, the bitterness of years of sacrifice with a meaning. And, last but not least, it justifies all the privileges a self-appointed but dedicated elite may require.[10]

While the totalitarian model has considerable attractions for the underdeveloped countries, it also encounters deeply seated resistances. In fact, most of the leaders of these countries are not at present prepared to accept the totalitarian and monolithic state as a precondition for the planning of development.

The adoption of the totalitarian model would necessarily mean that an underdeveloped nation would forego much of the technical know-how available in however slim a stratum of native entrepreneurs and professionals. Nor would the bulk of the native Westernized intelligentsia relish a head-on clash with the traditionalistic elites—a clash which would inevitably occur should an attempt be made to mold the state according to the totalitarian pattern. They may be committed to deep-going agrarian reform, yet shrink from wholesale collectivization on the Chinese model involving the breakup of familistic property patterns. They may hesitate before the application of terroristic means for the extraction of surplus labor from the peasantry. They may harbor resentment against

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the West, yet shrink from a course which would inevitably cut them off from Western economic aid, both public and private. (I need hardly stress that considerations in regard to the cold war play an important role in this context.)

Obstacles to Totalitarian Model

There is a more profound reason why the Westernized elite of most of the new nations, though willing to borrow techniques of development from the Communist arsenal, cannot easily accept the totalitarian model: large illiterate populations, strong traditional ideologies, the newness and numerical weakness of the urban population and the elite—these factors preclude the planned mobilization of the total population. Such mobilization, however, is a *sine qua non* of the totalitarian model. The localism, particularism, and traditionalism which militate against the development of democracy also act against the introduction of efficient Soviet-type totalitarian regimes. Recent developments in Touré's Guinea are instructive in this respect. A year ago Guinea seemed on its way toward a Moscow-dominated "People's Democracy." Today it has moved in the direction of a mixed regime—and has expelled the Russian ambassador. Even when a determined effort is made to centralize political power, this power seems all too often to seep away through innumerable rivulets to village communities and tribal structures, to money lenders or army chieftains, to religious leaders and heads of clans. Myrdal seems correct when he says that "even if they were willing, they would not be able to exert the fanatical discipline implicit in the Soviet system."[11] We may then provisionally conclude that the totalitarian regime, short of direct military take-over by external Communist powers, is not likely to become the model for developments in the new nations, at least, not before the destruction of traditional power.

There remains the authoritarian model. Though the nationalist intelligentsia reacts against the traditional culture which it holds responsible for the backwardness of the country, it is also unwilling and unable to create a cultural *tabula rasa* through the imposition of a ready-made total plan. It is typically drawn toward an eclectic program in which it strives to counterbalance traditional elements and innovating plans. Hugh Seton-Watson calls such regimes "populist," by analogy to the well-known Russian movement of the 19th century, in so far as they attempt like their Russian forebears to achieve some kind of synthesis between traditional culture and the need for modernization.[12] In these new nations the intelligentsia is likely to exhibit a fierce pride in the distinctiveness of native culture and must hence be extremely reluctant to rupture the continuity with tradition; yet it is also well aware that only a resolute break with major aspects of past tradition will allow a take-off in development. Hence its ambivalence. And hence the chance that, though it will attempt through programmatic planning to shorten the trials of development, it will at the same time resist the temptation of totalitarianism.

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The concrete forms of regimes dominated by the intelligentsia may differ widely. In some countries, as in Egypt, Iraq and Sudan, where standing armies have been available as a source of power, a revolutionary "intelligentsia in uniform" has succeeded, through domination of the military order, in controlling the political order; in other instances, as in Ghana, Guinea, or Tunisia, a civilian intelligentsia, skilled in methods of mass propaganda, has succeeded in appropriating the governmental apparatus and has used mass parties built around a charismatic leader as an effective counterweight to the traditional forces. There are in addition, as in Pakistan or Burma, a number of mixed modernizing regimes embodying in greater or lesser degree traditional and innovating elements as well as civilian and military power, and maintaining these elements in an uneasy balance.

Such authoritarian regimes might move against the claims of the religious order if its representatives attempted to limit the innovating actions of the state through an appeal to religious norms. Yet they will not break with the religious agents or attempt fully to control the religious sphere. They will react against the particularistic criteria emanating from the kinship order or the tribal structure and attempt to displace them with universalistic standards of judgment and performance. Yet they will not try to dissolve the traditional family loyalties. They will attempt to lay out economic plans and allocate resources according to criteria of economic development rather than in terms of profitability. Yet they will not destroy the institutions of property. They are intent upon introducing the rational techniques of the West while preserving what they consider viable in native tradition.

Traditional Interests Weakened

In practice, then, whether by design or force of circumstance, the authoritarian regimes in the new nations will not be able in the immediate future to coordinate the various institutional orders. They will rather operate in an environment marked by a high incidence of clash and conflict. Nigeria, Pakistan, even Burma and Indonesia provide excellent examples. In none of these countries have the strong centripetal tendencies of the ruling strata succeeded in breaking down the centrifugal pull of various types of traditional elites. Furthermore, in none of these countries has it been possible for the ruling elite to develop an indigenous ideology and a set of organizations strong enough to attract and hold men suddenly freed from the world of tradition. In all of them, though economic development is ardently desired, the elite encounters most serious obstacles from the traditional powers.

Yet it seems true that while the day of reckoning may be postponed for a considerable period of time, in the long run such innovating authoritarian regimes will inevitably weaken the hold of traditional interests. The very process of modernization, even though it may be cushioned in various ways, undermines traditional structures, be they tribal or feudal, particularistic family domination or religious interests.

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But as the checks on power that can be exercised by traditional elements decrease, so do the chances for a drift totward totalitarian regimes increase. When individuals are freed from the dominance of traditional institutions and when they cannot be attracted by authoritarian regimes devoid of a coherent ideology, they become available for a new type of integration along the lines of totalitarian coordination. Where traditionalistic sources of power have dried up and given way to modern universalistic power structures manned by members of the rapidly swollen intelligensia, the chances of authoritarian regimes decline. At this point the new nations will face another set of choices: totalitarianism or democracy.

III. *The Chances of Democratization*

A minimal condition for democracy is the legitimation of regular opportunities for changing governing personnel, i. e., the presence of social mechanisms—political parties, free elections, free press, etc.—permitting the underlying population to choose among contenders for political office.[13] But in addition to such mechanisms, a democratic polity requires a sufficient dispersion of power. If the community is to have the right to share in the direction of political affairs, the diffusion of power among a number of power centers is essential. Since only power can effectively check power, democracy requires the presence of secondary groups and associations which can be nodal points of power interposing themselves between the individual and the state.

Democracy has historically been highly correlated with relatively high standards of living, with urbanization, industrialization and education. But the correlation is not automatic, for in Europe democracy grew out of the resistance of various semi-autonomous communities, strata, and religious bodies to the absolutist state which had begun the process of modernization. And in most cases, this was not a gradual growth but a series of revolutions. In feudal times, the immunities of Church and estates, of landed aristocracy or independent townships prevented the center from monopolizing power. When absolute monarchs attempted to win such a monopoly, democracy was powerfully enhanced by the struggle of new social formations, reformed churches and sects, trade unions, voluntary organizations of all sorts, and local and regional bodies, all of which sought to limit governmental power and ensure their members a voice in the affairs of state.

In the new nations, with their low living standards, their small degree of industrialization, and urbanization, their low standards of education, and their lack of a "protestant ethic," the basis of a democratic polity is not at present available. These nations are not only underdeveloped in the economic but also in the political sense, since in none of them is there a sufficient degree of development of those key factors that are necessary for secure democratic systems (though in some, notably the Philippines, India and Ceylon, a number of favorable factors have al-

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lowed approximations to Western democracy). Nor have the social groups and classes which made revolutions in the West developed in the new nations. These revolutions depended on the ability of various institutional orders (e. g., the religious and the economic) to modernize themselves, and then to provide opposition cadres—as did the protestant sects in England or the Third Estate in France. But if modernization at all levels comes to depend on the state alone, if there are no local, religious or class forces independently pushing in the same direction, then democratic revolutions become unlikely.

With gradual modernization, one can expect a gradual rise in education, living standards and the like, and this will remove a significant barrier to democracy. But one cannot expect that the other major barrier —the concentration of power—will necessarily decrease and hence allow the expansion of chances for wider participation in political life. And yet the chances of democratization depend ultimately on the degree to which power will be dispersed or centralized.

The modernizing elites, in their efforts to create new collective symbols and a new source of legitimacy as well as a new economic and social structure, clash with traditional centers of power and prestige. They must attempt to undermine and neutralize traditional modes of behavior. They must desire to create citizens free from particularistic loyalties to village, communal groupings, family, tribal chief or traditional aristocracy. They must attempt to legitimize secular power, even giving it a "sacral" character, so as to free the polity from control by traditional powerholders and representatives of the religious order.

Integrating Individuals

Yet once the power of the Indian princes, the Indonesian traditional aristocracy, the Ashanti chieftains in Northern Ghana or the emirs in Northern Nigeria has been broken, the new nations still face the problem of integrating individuals who have become freed from traditional allegiance and loyalties.[14] This integration can conceivably take place in two different ways: the energies and activities of those who have relinquished traditional positions of leadership as well as of those who can be freshly recruited into leadership positions can be channelled into diversified centers of power, or they can be funneled into one center. If the ruling intelligentsia prevent the emergence of new diversified centers of power and loyalty, if they attempt to control all accumulations of newly available power, they move in a totalitarian direction. If, on the other hand, there emerges a diversity of allegiances and a many-sided integration of individuals in a variety of institutional orders, then the chances for a democratic development at a later time are increased. The liberal model has no chance of institutionalization in the underdeveloped countries, if for no other reason than that economic development will require an amount of deliberate centralized planning which is incompatible with liberalism. Yet, if the road toward later democratic

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developments is not to be blocked, the widest possible diffusion of power compatible with centralized planning is a prerequisite.

The claims of efficiency might appear often to militate in favor of authoritative directives and centralized government. The requirements of struggle against traditional elements lead to the erosion of local centers of feudal and tribal power. National allocation of scarce resources requires central planning. Yet if the population is not in the long run to become totally dependent on the tutelary power of the state, it is essential that the political elite of the center does not control the new forces set free, thus preventing the development of autonomous social and political centers of power.

The chances for greater participation of non-governmental organizations in the modernizing process will increase if under authoritarian regimes there grows up a new social structure with an autonomous life of its own: modernizing rural cooperatives under the guidance of new members of the technical intelligentsia; trade unions in the industrial centers; local and regional governing boards; autonomous educational and scientific institutions, and the like. If in addition there develops a rich associational life in the non-political orders, the national community may gradually be led to rely on the process of bargaining between groups and individuals rather than on governmental fiat. Under such conditions direct governmental intervention could be kept at a minimum and broad policies replace detailed directives. The very clash and conflict between autonomous centers of power would serve as a balancing mechanism. Whether such a development will come about will depend to a very significant degree on patterns of recruitment; i. e., on whether potential leaders will be attracted mainly by the centralizing state or at least a certain proportion of them will be available for leadership in local and regional centers of power, and in non-governmental institutions.

The Use of Talent

Given the dominant role of the state apparatus in the new nations, it is to be expected that it will attract a high proportion of all those who wish to rise on the scale of prestige and to profit from the reallocation of power. The discrepancy in living standards between the elite and the rest of the population which characterizes underdeveloped nations will be an added incentive for joining the elite. Employment in the state or party apparatus, be it in executives bodies or the bureaucracy, is likely to be regarded as the most significant channel of upward mobility and as the major means of access to scarce power, resources and prestige. This would lead to the gradual erosion of other, non-political institutional orders, and the preponderance of the political over the economic, cultural, and educational elites. To the extent that the centralized state would assume predominance and come to constitute in the eyes of the population the major source of power, financial reward and prestige, the local, regional and non-governmental centers of power would be

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weakened. If other centers fail to attract gifted leaders, the political order will preempt the available supply of scarce talents.

If gifted members of the intelligentsia flock exclusively to the service of the government rather than, say, to teaching positions in schools or colleges, then the latter will be staffed by the mediocre and lose even more prestige. Consequently they will not be able to function as a counterweight to the powers of the political order. Similar consequences are likely to follow in the economic order, be it private or cooperative: the quality of the economic elite will steadily decline and so will its prestige if the more enterprising and ambitious members of the younger generation will be attracted by employment in the central economic administration.[15] When power and opportunity are concentrated in the center, they act like a magnet, attracting the talented men from the whole society and gradually undermining the resistances emanating from off-center powers.

Tocqueville knew this well when he wrote, "In proportion as the duties of the central power are augmented, the number of public officials by whom that power is represented must increase also. They form a nation in each nation ... they more and more fill up the place of an aristocracy." In the long run this would lead to an approximation of the totalitarian model. Such a trend can be effectively weakened only to the extent that participation in the non-governmental sphere will carry no less prestige and influence, and bring psychic and monetary income commensurate with that derived from employment by the state.

Hence, the strengthening of autonomous institutions, such as independent schools and universities, independent trade unions, regional and local power centers, village cooperatives and the like, are of prime importance if the road toward democratization is not to be permanently barred. (This is why India, where such institutions function rather vigorously, seems to have the best chances fully to institutionalize democratic processes.) Not only are such centers of secondary power likely to function as effective checks to central power; they are also likely to struggle with the central power, as well as among themselves, for the allegiance of the citizens. As citizens are drawn into such conflicts they increase their own political awareness and participation. Conflicts with some produce associations with others and provide bonds between citizens, drawing them into a rich social life. Individuals otherwise isolated, mutually hostile or apathetic, are in this way brought into the field of public activities. A multiplicity of associations, a pluralism of power centers, whose diverse purposes criss-cross each other, help to prevent the atomization on which totalitarianism has always thrived. For atomized and isolated individuals are ready to rely on the immense tutelary power of a state which alone, so it seems to them, is able to provide the satisfactions they crave; men tempered in the struggles and contentions of societies with rich and diversified group life, drawn toward each other in multifarious battles to realize their own goals, are less wont to rely on the tutelary power of the state.

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The Futherance of Democracy

Tocqueville considered the gravest peril for individual freedom to stem from conditions where "the performance of private persons are insignificant, those of the state immense." It follows that the furtherance of democracy requires the strengthening of "private persons" and this is possible only if such private persons can rely on protective secondary powers uncontrolled by the state. They must, in other words, become part of a network of diverse social relationships in a variety of group involvements.

Those who are moved only by considerations of efficiency and consider that only neat and orderly arrangements are likely to permit the new nations to emerge from the sloth of traditional stagnation, are likely to find my suggestions rather unappealing. But they should heed the warning that the most efficient administrations are likely to be found in model prisons rather than in vital human communities. The best chances for democracy may sometimes clash with the optimum conditions for efficiency. Wherever this is the case, the democrat must be willing to sacrifice optimum efficiency.

A kind of vulgar Marxism has again become quite fashionable of late. Many commentators seem to argue for a rigid determinism according to which industrialization in the underdeveloped countries must necessarily bring in its wake predetermined "superstructures." Yet the European experience itself suggests no such easy generalizations. Consider only the immense difference in the "superstructure" of, say, 19th century Germany and England. This is why I cannot subscribe to the theory of an ineluctable drift toward totalitarianism which is now so often bandied about. The new nations, and those who will make the key decisions within them, face a series of crucial choices. Much will depend on their intentions and on the ideology which informs them. They can, if they so desire, deliberately create or at least permit the growth of a dispersed power structure in their countries. They can, though ruling as authoritarians, lay the foundations for a future democracy. Whether they will do so in a significant number of cases it would be rash to predict. All one can say at this stage is that this is possible, and that the road into the future of the new nations, far from being determined in advance, is still open.

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1 Cf. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1953, esp. Chapter XII.

2 Cf. George Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation*, transl. by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955.

3 Cf. Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956.

4 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, transl. by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 139–43 and 245–50.

5 Cf. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Meridian Books, 1958; *Totalitarianism*, ed. by Carl Friedrich. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959.

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6 Cf. Irving Howe and Lewis A. Coser, *The American Communist Party,* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 513–16.

7 The process has often been described in Asia; for a fine study of similar developments in Africa cf. David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. See also James S. Coleman, *Nigeria, Background to Nationalism.* Berkeley and L. A.: University of California, 1958. For an excellent analysis of key political factors in the new nations see Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, ed., *The Politics of the Developing Areas,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

8 Richard Lowenthal, "The Points of the Compass," *Encounter,* London, Sept., 1960, pp. 22–28.

9 Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, p. 121.

10 Lowenthal, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

11 Myrdal, *op. cit.,* p. 126.

12 Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War Nor Peace,* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, Chapter VI.

13 Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man,* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960, p. 45 ff.

14 For ideas developed in the next few pages I have borrowed considerably from a seminal paper by Professor Samuel N. Eisenstadt of the University of Jerusalem, "Soziale Entwicklung und Politische Stabilitaet in Nichtwestlichen Gesellschaften," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie,* XII, 2, 1960, pp. 189–203. Cf. also Bert Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," DISSENT, VIII, 2 (Spring 1961).

15 It should also be noted here that to the extent that there are tendencies toward closure in the political and bureaucratic structures; i. e., to the extent that they limit recruitment of new personnel from the outside, there is a danger of the creation of strata of disappointed office seekers. Such strata are peculiarly apt to engage in the politics of discontent; they are especially susceptible to the appeal of communism. Thus both a too exclusive recruitment of the elite into the central political order, and a closure in that order barring potential recruits from access and yet not offering alluring chances in other areas, are likely to have detrimental consequences for the process of democratization.

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Seymour Martin Lipset

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MARXISM*

The continued influence of Marxism as an intellectual doctrine, as distinct from its role as the integrating ideology of Communist societies and parties, surprises many who regard its basic errors and irrelevancies to the analysis of contemporary society as obvious. Recently Talcott Parsons has pointed to the "striking fact that general orientations in this field [sociology] have, in recent years, tended increasingly to polarize between a nondogmatic and nonpolitical 'Marxian' position and one which in the broadest sense may be called one or another version of the theory of action [his own conceptual approach]."**

George Lichtheim, whose book *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* represents the first detailed effort at a sociological analysis of the development and appeal of different variants of Marxism, presents as his basic thesis the assumption that Marxism as a set of revolutionary doctrines is most appropriate to societies in the early stages of industrialization. Marx's original political analysis as reflected in *The Communist Manifesto* was a product of a period in which concepts derived from an idealization of the French Revolution and the Jacobins predominated among those who would democratize the changing social system. But such analyses, both of class relations and of politics, became increasingly unrealistic with the evolution of mature industrial and politically democratic states. Hence radical Marxism, before World War I, was unable to become influential in western Europe and North America, while it secured considerable support in the politically or economically backward regions of central and eastern Europe. And Marxism supplied the theoretical and ideological base for an actual revolution in Czarist Russia, whose social conditions, in the early twentieth century, most closely resembled the European economic and political situation at the time the *Communist Manifesto* was written.

The Logic of Gradual Change

The proposition that revolutionary Marxism could win support as a response to the social strains inherent in rapid industrialization but

* George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), $8.50. (All quotes not specifically footnoted are from this book.)
** See "The Point of View of the Author," in Max Black, ed., *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 362.

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would lose its appeal with economic maturity, was explicitly stated by Engels in 1884. He wrote to Bebel that the reason for the growth of socialism in Germany as contrasted with its stagnation in other capitalist countries

> is that with us [in Germany] the industrial revolution is only just in full swing, while in France and in England, so far as the main point is concerned, it is closed. There the division into town and country, industrial district and agricultural district is so far concluded that it only changes slowly. The great mass of the people grow up in the conditions in which they have later to live, are accustomed to them; even the fluctuations and crises have become something they take practically for granted. . . . With us on the other hand, everything is in full flow. Remnants of the old peasant industrial production for the satisfaction of personal needs are being supplanted by capitalistic domestic industry, while in other places capitalistic domestic industry is already succumbing in turn to machinery."*

Since the bulk of the writings of Marx and Engels occurred during the period of slowly emerging legal labor movements, they themselves tended increasingly to accept the logic of gradual change, of the need to build workers' organizations of all varieties, parties, unions and cooperatives. It was wrong to try to speed up the pace of revolution. Socialism's triumph would follow from the inevitable growth of such movements to a position of power as capitalist industrialization created a majority of proletarians employed under conditions of large-scale industry, who would develop class consciousness as a result of the inherent conflicts with the owning class.

Though, as Lichtheim makes clear, the issues of what Marx and Engels really meant are basically irrelevant to any effort to understand the development and political significance of Marxism, it is important to note with him that the political content changed greatly during their lifetime. The two founding figures of the doctrine, like later parties that claimed to be their orthodox successors, modified their beliefs in line with changing circumstances of capitalist society. Perhaps the most ironic example of how little effect explicit formulations have on the way in which later generations of Marxists perceive what earlier ones wrote may be found in an official Communist edition of the *Correspondence of Marx and Engels* in which the following is printed on the *same* page. Engels wrote in his critique of the draft program of the Erfurt Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party in 1891: "If one thing is certain it is that our Party and the working class can only come to power under the form of the democratic republic. This is even the *specific* form for the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . ."

The Communist editors than state: "On these statements of Engels Lenin comments in *State and Revolution:* 'Engels repeats here in a par-

* In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence 1846–1895* (New York: International Publishers, 1936), pp. 431–432, and p. 422. See my elaboration of this thesis in *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 68–71.

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ticularly emphatic form the fundamental idea which runs like a red letter throughout Marx's work, namely, that the democratic republic is the *nearest* approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat.' "* Apparently Lenin and the editors were unable to distinguish any difference between the words "specific form" and "nearest approach."

Influence of French Revolutionary Thinking

While most of the analyses of the origins of Marx's philosophical ideas have properly stressed the transition from Hegelianism, much more important for an understanding of his politics and sociology is the extent to which Marx's thought before 1848 was dominated by French revolutionary thinking, by an idealization of the role of the Jacobins, of the possibility of total revolution. As Lichtheim states, "the *Manifesto* spells out the implications of a world-view which owed more to reminiscences of 1789–94 than its authors would have been willing to admit." The chiliastic views expressed in this founding political document were appropriate for a tiny sect anticipating revolution in absolutist Europe.

A concern with French politics remained the source-point from which much of Marxian ideas about class and politics were drawn. After the *Manifesto,* the *Class Struggles in France,* the *Eighteenth Brumaire,* and the *Civil War in France* became the basic texts of concrete class analysis. Yet, ironically, as Lichtheim points out, France, though the country of the great bourgeois political revolution, was relatively much less advanced in economic terms. Britain and the United States, the most developed countries economically, should have been the prime examples of capitalist class relations and politics, but each deviated from the assumptions of growing class tensions. Britain retained stable aristocratic institutions, and the American working class was a model of moderation. (Lichtheim pays little attention to the extent that Marx tried to draw socialist lessons from America. Thus, as Lewis Feuer has pointed out, Marx saw in the early American Workingmen's Parties of the 1820s and 1830s evidence that strong socialistically inclined labor parties were endemic outgrowths in a bourgeois republic, and even urged that the

* Marx and Engels, *Correspondence 1846–1895,* op. cit., p. 486. (Emphasis mine.) But if Lenin was unable to acknowledge he was a "revisionist," that he had rejected Marx and Engels' belief in democratic institutions, Stalin could and did. In the famous short course *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* written under the close supervision of Stalin, we read the following:

"Before the Second Revolution [February 1917], the Marxists of all countries assumed that the parliamentary democratic republic was the most suitable form of political organization in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism. . . . Engels' authoritative statement in his criticism of the draft of the Erfurt Program in 1891, namely, that "the democratic republic . . . is . . . the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat" left no doubt that the Marxists continued to regard the democratic republic as the political form for the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . What would have happened to the Party, to our revolution, to Marxism, if Lenin had been overawed by the letter of Marxism and had not had the courage to replace one of the old propositions of Marxism . . . by the new proposition concerning the republic of Soviets. . . ." A Commission of the Central Committee of the C. P. S. U. (B.), *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)* (New York: International Publishers, 1938), pp. 356–57.

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American experience proved that the working class would come to power.)

The general question of why France was economically backward as contrasted to the English-speaking nations did not concern Marx directly, although he was aware of the fact. Marx tried to explain the increasing political conservatism of the French and other continental bourgeoisie on the ground that they were frightened by the emergence of the proletariat as a distinct class which threatened private property; but he ignored the fact that this phenomenon did not explain why the French businessmen were much more reluctant than the English to take advantage of identical economic opportunities.* Explanations that would account for variations in class behavior by reference to the differing value systems of national societies were absent, except on an *ad hoc* basis, from Marx's work. It is ironic that Marxists have taken as the classic model of bourgeois polities and societies precisely the one nation, France, which later-day social scientists were to treat as the classic case of a society whose business class least reflected the capitalist ethos.

The French experiences reinforced the revolutionary and Blanquist aspects of Marxism which came to fruition in Leninism. Marx pointed to the Paris Commune as conclusive proof that the proletariat could come to power in its own right, that it could destroy the old state apparatus, and Marx's propagandistic pamphlet on this subject was subsequently to serve Lenin in good stead in his polemics. Yet the fact was, as Marx himself acknowledged in a private letter in 1881, the Commune "was merely the rising of a city under exceptional conditions, the majority of the Commune was in no way socialist, nor could it be." He went on to criticize the Communards for not having shown a "modicum of common sense" in reaching a compromise with their opponents in Versailles. But though Marx's final judgment of the Commune was that it had exaggerated the potential of the situation, that it had not been socialist and had been foolishly unwilling to compromise, his published *Civil War in France* was to instruct generations of Marxists that the Commune "was essentially a working-class government, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor."*

Effects of the Commune

Although the Paris Commune deserves a special place in the annals of socialism since it gave rise to the one major example of socialist internationalism (the German Social-Democratic leaders faced jail to defend it), its ultimate impact on the Marxist movements can only be

* For a detailed account of situations in which French capital demonstrated its unwillingness to take advantage of economic opportunities which were seized by their British equivalents see David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas* (London: Heinemann's, 1958).

* In Lewis S. Feuer, ed., *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 369. For a detailed study of the Paris Commune which demonstrates the non-socialist character of the uprising see Edward Mason, *The Paris Commune* (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

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regarded as tragic. The tragedy was not its failure—that, as Marx argued, was inevitable—but the fact, as Lichtheim suggests, that it introduced "a political myth" which sharply contradicted the political concepts which had been emerging with the formation of the First International in 1864. By that time, Marx had lived in England for 15 years, and the *Inaugural Address* which he wrote for the International reflected British experience. Unlike the 1848 *Manifesto,* which stressed revolution, the *Address* as Lichtheim notes emphasized "the aims of organized labor, working through legislatures. . . ." It praised British labor for having pushed the Ten-Hours Bill through Parliament, and saw in the growth of the cooperative movement promise for even greater advances. As Marx wrote: "The value of these great social experiments cannot be overrated." The Paris Commune had led Marx temporarily to return to the youthful rhetoric of chiliastic revolution contained in the *Manifesto,* and his even more violent "Jacobin-Blanquist aberration in 1850," the *Address of the Central Committee of the Communist League.* But basically, except for his pamphlet on the *Commune,* Marx had abandoned an insurrectionist image of the revolution and had formed, as Lichtheim points out, "a political outlook which fitted the requirements of the modern age. In this mature conception, labor's conquest of power represents an aspect of the struggle for democracy."

The words written by Marx in the heat of internationalist ardor seeking to glorify the deeds of the Communards in a propaganda document were to plague the Marxist movement in the twentieth century. They enabled Lenin both to ignore the conclusions of the mature Marx and Engels in favor of democracy, and to distort the reality of the Commune itself. For as Julian Martov and many other Mensheviks pointed out, they, rather than the Leninists, advocated policies which corresponded to the activities of the Commune which Marx had approved. The Commune had been the legally elected government of the municipality of the Paris, and it had been controlled by a coalition of left parties; no effort had been made to exclude anyone from it. If the Commune presented a political model for a socialist state, it was a model of a completely free democracy with competing parties, not a society led by a "vanguard" party.

But while Marx and Engels did change their ideas in the direction of what later was to be known as reformism, the fact remains that a total working-class conquest of power remained the ultimate goal. Their analysis of class struggle always posited a continuing basic conflict between the workers and their parties with the dominant class. This image of a continuing class struggle did not find much support in the politically more democratic western countries. Britain was to remain the great disappointment. In Latin Europe, the workers' movement divided between reformist, largely non-Marxist socialist parties, and anarchist or syndicalist movements. Political democracy produced political reformism, while small-scale industry and the absence of centralization sustained "libertarian" doctrines.

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Up to First World War

Marxism had its greatest successes between the time of Marx's death in 1883 and the outbreak of World War I in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In these countries the workers' movement seemingly exhibited

> relentless opposition to capitalism, as well as to "class rule": the latter term signifying not the domination of the bourgeoisie (of which indeed in Germany there was little sign), but rather as with Lassalle, the absence of democracy. This . . . explains how a movement which had never really broken with the Lassallean heritage could regard itself as "Marxist." The clue to the mystery lies in the political backwardness of Germany, compared to western Europe. Under German conditions—and the same was true of Austria-Hungary, the other citadel of "orthodox Marxism"— democracy was still a revolutionary slogan.

It is important to note, with Lichtheim, that for German Social-Democracy, for Engels, Kautsky, Luxemburg, as well as Bernstein, the fight for socialism was identical with the struggle for more political democracy. Where Kautsky and other "orthodox" Marxists differed with Bernstein was not concerning political democracy, but rather on the question of whether major crises and tensions producing the need for a clear-cut taking of power by the workers were inherent in capitalism.

But if reformism had some strength in undemocratic central Europe, it was almost absent in the Czarist empire. There, more than in any other part of Europe, the conditions which sustained the chiliastic doctrines of 1848 continued to exist. The Russian state was an autocracy, and was enduring all the strains typical of periods of early rapid industrialization. As Lichtheim indicates, Lenin's early writings on the need to organize for a revolution to be led by the proletariat alone "breathe the spirit of the *Communist Manifesto* and the *Address of the Central Committee of the Communist League* [which] is another way of saying that the Russia of 1898 was fifty years behind Western Europe." And he notes that all Russian socialists agreed with Lenin that the proletariat had to be revolutionary. The differences among them concerned the role of the party, not the necessity for revolutionary policies.

Lenin was a true heir of the Jacobins as glorified and supported by the Marx of 1848–1850. The Bolsheviks, as Lenin himself stated, were "the Jacobins of contemporary Social-Democracy." And Lichtheim notes that his methods were "modelled on the Marxist interpretation of Jacobinism as a radical-democratic movement which employed dictatorial means to clear the ground of pre-bourgeois encumbrances. As Lenin remarked complacently . . . 'If the revolution gains a decisive victory—then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or if you like, in the Plebeian way.' "

It is important to recognize, as Lichtheim points out, that the idea propagated by Communists that Leninism in pre-revolutionary Russia represented orthodox Marxism pitted against Menshevik revisionism is simply not true. On all the matters concerning Marxist doctrine which

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were in dispute in the German party, the Mensheviks like the Bolsheviks were in agreement with the Marxists. It was impossible to be a gradualist or reformist in Czarist Russia. Where the Mensheviks differed with the Bolsheviks was precisely over the question of organizational structure and democracy or dictatorship. And "if anyone introduced a profound 'revision' of Marxist doctrine, it was none other than Lenin himself. This was immediately perceived by every Marxist of note, from Plekhanov and Kautsky to Luxemburg and Trotsky." Lenin basically proposed, in violation of the traditional Marxist emphasis on the need to develop class consciousness and political maturity among the workers, to place a small group of professional revolutionaries in complete charge of the movement, and not to admit the workers to the party, since they were incapable of absorbing the necessary knowledge.

> [T]he Leninist model in fact amounted to the political expropriation of the proletariat and its subjection to a dictatorial machine operated by the Bolshevik leadership: a leadership which was essentially self-constituted and irremovable.... As Trotsky in particular was never tired of pointing out, it represented a throwback not merely to the immature proto-Marxism of 1848–50, but to pre-Marxist forms of organization.

Since the party according to Lenin was to be much more than a representative of the conscious policies of the workers, and had to win the support of a society which was overwhelmingly peasant in composition, it "could only succeed in this role if it represented an independent force, namely the 'classless' intelligentsia, which alone could staff the cadres of a ruling political elite. But although in *What Is to Be Done?* he came to the brink of stating this fact, the full realization was hidden from him...."

Stalinism and Leninism

Soviet totalitarianism and Stalinism, therefore, must be seen as derivative from Leninism. Basically, Lichtheim regards Lenin as the first great totalitarian leader who created the model which evolved into Stalinism and Fascism.

> Speaking generally, totalitarianism is the outcome of a situation in which the state is captured by a party which has resolved upon the wholesale reconstruction of society.... [T]he whole process can only go forward under "conscious direction," i.e., by unremitting pressure from above.... Before hastening to conclude that socialism therefore spells monolithic rule by a caste of planners, it is well to remember that historically this danger was perceived quite early by the nascent labor movement which for precisely this reason insisted that socialism should be democratic. It was the emancipation of the Bolshevik party—ultimately of the Soviet dictatorship—from all forms of democratic control that made possible the identification of "planning" with the untrammelled rule of a new privileged caste.

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The Bolshevik form of Marxism emerged and had its successes primarily in pre-capitalist underdeveloped nations. Jacobin, Blanquist, and Bolshevik tactics could only succeed in such pre-modern conditions. Marx's hopes in 1848–50 failed because "mid-nineteenth-century France was already too highly organized.... For... the urban rising needed an agrarian revolution to complement it, just as the Jacobin seizure of power in 1793–4 had done. Once the peasantry had ceased to be a revolutionary force, the age of successful proletarian insurrections was over."

The Bolshevik leaders, of course, did not understand this. Rather they believed that their revolution would spark similar revolts in the more developed countries which could then aid them in the economic development of Russia. They were not able to recognize that the social conditions which might sustain proletarian revolution had disappeared forever in advanced industrial countries, "that the October Revolution, so far as being the first great proletarian uprising, might be the last." And the last two decades have witnessed three seizures of power by Communists, in Yugoslavia, in China, and to a lesser degree in Cuba, in which the mass base of the revolution was almost exclusively in the countryside.

The thesis that the chiliastic image of a new society ruled by an intellectual elite on behalf of the poor (which is basically what the Leninist variant of Marxism implies) can only foster revolution in impoverished pre-industrial countries is, of course, not new. What is noteworthy in Lichtheim's presentation is his systematic effort to relate the modifications in the doctrine both by Marx and Engels, as well as by various "Marxist" parties, to the changing social conditions of the working class and their organizations in different countries. And since the "Marxist" writings of Marx and Engels cover a time-span of fifty years, from the days preceding the Revolution of 1848 to the period of Fabianism, a mass German Social-Democratic movement, and universal suffrage, there is much in their published works to sustain all variants of socialist doctrine. The reception to their different writings correspond largely to the state of economic and political development of given countries.

The Tools of Analysis

It is surprising to find a congruence between Lichtheim's analysis of political developments and that of most contemporary sociologists who have written on these problems. Surprising, because both in this book and others of his writings he has expressed considerable dissatisfaction with modern sociology. Seemingly his uneasiness rests in what he regards as the ahistorical character of much of sociological writing, as well as the conservative bias which he sees inherent in functionalist theory. However, in discussing the belief of the Russian Communists that their "state serves the general interest," Lichtheim presents what can only be described as a typical example of ahistorical functional analysis. He tells us that this Communist belief is sustained

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> by the actual role of the Communist party as the mediator between the privileged stratum [of Russia] and the masses. Since the party knows itself to be doing what in principle *every ruling power must do:* namely, hold the balance between the socially dominant class and the working people, it can with a fairly good conscience repudiate the charge of serving the interests of the privileged upper crust. What its ideologists fail to see is that the Soviet state is not unique in *harmonizing social conflicts, preserving law and order, and in general functioning as the executive organ of society as a whole.*

Lichtheim, though much harsher in his judgment of Marx and his sociology than most academic sociologists, defends Marx against those sociological critics who according to him seek "to prove Marx wrong by invoking 'status differences' as distinct from class relations." In doing so, he argues, such sociologists are in error, since "Marx was not unaware of the texture of social life: as an inhabitant of Victorian England he could hardly fail to notice the complex interplay of class and caste relationships, and in fact his writings supply ample evidence that . . . he was alive to their significance." And Lichtheim adds in a footnote: "The notion that 'status' is a modern discovery could only have occurred to people who have never been outside a university." The issue, of course, is not when men first recognized status as distinct from economic class —the ancient Greeks knew of this distinction—but rather whether the concept is used as an analytic and explanatory category or as a descriptive one. There can be little doubt that Marx did not use it analytically. Engels himself has testified to his personal puzzlement over this issue. In 1892 he wrote that he had been unable to understand why the British bourgeoisie continued to submit to the landed aristocracy after they had attained economic dominance

> until the great Liberal manufacturer, Mr. W. A. Forster, in a public speech implored the young men of Bradford to learn French, as a means to get on in the world, and quoted from his own experience how sheepish he looked when, as a Cabinet Minister, he had to move in society where French was, at least, as necessary as English! . . . The English bourgeoisie are, up to the present day, so deeply penetrated by a sense of their social inferiority that they keep up, at their own expense and that of the nation, an ornamental caste of drones to represent the nation worthily at all state functions; and they consider themselves highly honored whenever one of themselves is found worthy of admission into this select and privileged body, manufactured, after all, by themselves.*

But the main faults of Lichtheim's book are not primarily a result of his misconceptions of sociological modes of political analysis. As I have indicated, he has absorbed, largely through Marxism, a variant of this type of inquiry. Rather, the basic weakness of the work is method-

* Frederick Engels, "On Historical Materialism," in Karl Marx, *Selected Works,* Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 411–413.

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ological. Lichtheim, in spite of his extensive historical knowledge and use of comparative materials, basically seeks to illustrate a thesis rather than to test hypotheses. Embarrassing, that is contradictory, evidence is largely ignored. In discussing industrialization in Czarist Russia, he mentions in passing that the two nations which rapidly were entering the industrial age before World War I were Russia and Japan. In many ways they were similar as modernizing autocracies, but Japan is never referred to again. Why did it not experience major revolutionary movements in this period? Lichtheim later suggests that 1917 was probably the last date that Russia might have had a revolution, that with greater industrialization it would no longer have provided the social conditions for revolt. But again, Japan which did not have a large revolutionary Marxist movement in its pre-modern phase, has developed one as a major industrial power. Explanations for the phenomenon of Japanese economic growth (Japan rather than any Communist state has the most rapidly growing economy) have been offered by sociologists which could be absorbed with the framework employed by Lichtheim; the problem, however, is that he attempts no explanation, he simply ignores the facts, Similarly, there is no mention of the emergence of mass Communist parties after World War II in Italy, France, and Finland. The first two states are discussed briefly in their pre-World War I period when their political behavior can be fitted into his general thesis; they are ignored when they provide negative evidence. The sociology of European Communism clearly presents complex problems and requires the introduction of variables not employed in the book, e.g., strains derivative from conflicting values. It obviously would not have been possible for Lichtheim to deal with these matters in detail in this book, but some mention should have been made of the problem which such developments pose for the issues he does discuss.

Sources of Political Ideology

Lichtheim has written a pessimistic book for a pessimistic age. He concludes with words reminiscent of Michels (whose name is curiously never mentioned) that "the march of events was to confirm what critical observers of the labour movement had already begun to suspect, viz, that political 'rule' by the working class was an impossibility, whether in advanced or backward countries. A class which encouraged or tolerated the dictatorship of a body such as the Communist party was clearly not fit to exercise political power, and possibly inhibited from such a role by something more permanent than mere immaturity." This is a puzzling conclusion since it rests not as Michels' does on an analysis of the intrinsic oligarchical traits inherent in organization, but rather on the view that totalitarianism has been "accepted" by the Russian workers. But if submission to autocracy or totalitarianism means that a class is "not fit to exercise political power," what is one to say about the political capacity of business, military, or bureaucratic strata, or Protestant

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ministers after their behavior in Nazi Germany? Or conversely if the Soviet experience (in a predominantly ill-educated peasant country) does indicate how bad a regime, a party claiming to represent workers can create, why should not the morality and decency of the Scandinavian or Commonwealth Labor and socialist movements suggest a positive potential on the other side?

In his eagerness to get Marxism out of his system, Lichtheim will not even accept the arguments of those who argue that Marxism's erroneous and tragic assumptions about politics "are extraneous to what is really important about Marxism, namely its sociology; but this is to introduce an arbitrary separation between elements of the system which must be viewed as a whole. Moreover the idea of a classless society was not simply a philosophical extravagance." And his ultimate political evaluation is that Marx provided the key link between the Jacobin view of revolution and the emergence of modern totalitarianism, a judgment which makes of Marx one of the great demonic figures of history.

This is a tortured book, tortured because Lichtheim seems torn between past attachment to Marxism as the best form of sociological and political analysis, and current rejection of everything it stands for. On one hand, he refuses to acknowledge the possibility that latter-day sociology is superior to Marxism in any way, or even that it could possibly incorporate any of its approach. Consequently there are the snide remarks about sociology both for criticizing Marxism and for accepting it. On the other hand, he feels it necessary to deny to others, sociologists or not, the possibility of applying any part of Marxist analysis. But though Lichtheim may feel that he has written the penultimate answer to Marxism as a sociological approach, one may safely predict that Marxism will not only remain alive as a source of political ideology, but that its insights into the operation of social systems and processes of change will also continue to enlighten social science research. And ironically, this book will probably do more to keep Marxism viable within the academy than to destroy it.

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NOTEBOOK

Irving Howe

Edmund Wilson and the Sea Slugs

There are ways in which *Patriotic Gore** is a masterpiece. As an evocation of the literary and intellectual figures whose experience was shaped by the Civil War, the book is Plutarchian in its vividness. It displays to full advantage Wilson's gifts for historical narrative and critical description; it moves from writer to writer, topic to topic, with an ease that is astonishing; it vibrates with the passions of a supreme national crisis. But since all this has already been said by reviewers elsewhere, let me simply join in the praise and proceed to glance at certain problematic assumptions behind Wilson's book. What follows, then, is not a review of *Patriotic Gore* but a note about its introduction.

Edmund Wilson is not at home in the modern world. He dislikes its cheap-jack commercialism, its frantic vulgarity, its ingrained deceit. He detests American chauvinism, and looks with a cold eye upon our claims to moral superiority in the Cold War. He fears the centralization of the bureaucratic state, and takes toward it an attitude of hostility such as, he implies, might have won the approval of nineteenth-century American intellectuals like Oliver Wendell Holmes in the North and Alexander Stephens in the South, men who were their own masters and lived by standards of public service and stoic virtue. Whether the attitudes expressed by Wilson can be called radical is less important than that they convey a criticism of modern society with which many radicals sympathize.

Now, it is from this perspective of disenchantment that Wilson approaches the Civil War. He is concerned not merely with the political meaning and cultural reverberations of the war, but also with the chain of causation which has transformed America from a country where republican virtues were once cherished by an austere minority to a country where

> We Americans whose public officials kept telling us we were living in "the Free World," discovered that we were expected to pay staggering taxes of which it has been estimated that 70 per cent has been going not only for nuclear weapons capable of depopulating whole countries but also for bacteriological and biological ones which made it possible for us to poison the enemy . . . We are, like the Russians, being spied upon by an extensive secret police, whose salaries we are required to pay, as we are required to pay, also, the

* *Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the Civil War*, by Edmund Wilson. Oxford University Press. 815 pp. $8.50.

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> salaries of another corps of secret agents who are infiltrating foreign countries. And while all this expenditure is going for the purpose of sustaining the United States as a more and more unpopular world power, as few funds as possible are being supplied to educate and civilize the Americans themselves...

Borrowing perhaps from the Marxism to which he was once drawn and of which there remains a sediment in his writing—though a Marxism that in regard to historical (as distinct from literary) problems never achieved a sufficient flexibility in his hands—Wilson sees this monster state of our time, this "Demon of Centralization," as rooted in the triumph of the industrial North. Memories of Charles Beard come to mind: the Beard who educated a generation into regarding the Civil War not merely or primarily as a holy crusade to abolish slavery and preserve the union but also as "the Second American Revolution" confirming the power of capitalist economy. But despite this deflation of Northern war aims, Beard never showed any doubts as to the relative merits of North and South. He was trying to describe an historical event in its full complexity, so that our awareness of the social transformation signalled by the Civil War would lead us to qualify *but not eliminate* both Northern and Southern claims to moral and ideological purposes. Wilson, however, in his distaste for what he regards as the consequences of Northern victory, will not consider seriously the professed Northern aims; his inclination is to dismiss both Northern and Southern statements as mere propaganda and self-delusion; he comes close to accepting the view that ideology, as Henry Ford once remarked about history, is "the bunk." He speaks of "the myth that [the North] was fighting to free the slaves," a myth that "supplied the militant Union North with the rabble-rousing moral issue which is necessary in every modern war to make the conflict appear as a melodrama." He compares the Civil War to other American wars, such as the one against Mexico, that were openly imperialist in character. He accepts all too readily a good part of the Southern view of the Reconstruction period, even permitting himself a reference to "the premature enfranchisement of the Negroes." And despite his contempt for Southern apologetics, he finds himself expressing admiration for Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Vice President who saw the Southern cause as a crusade against federalist centralization and in behalf of that crusade repeatedly embarrassed Jefferson Davis.

There is more to Wilson's discounting of ideology. He puts forth a view of history that might be described as a reductive biological determinism:

> In a recent Walt Disney film showing life at the bottom of the sea, a primitive organism called a sea slug is seen gobbling up smaller organisms through a large orifice at one end of its body; confronted with another sea slug of an only slightly larger size, it ingurgitates that too. Now, the wars fought by human beings are stimulated as a rule primarily by the same instincts as the voracity of the sea slug.

If this be true, even "as a rule," then political ideas and moral sentiments can play only a trivial role in history; the past is a mere horror of ingurgitating voracity; and the future doomed to a nightmare-repetition of the past.

II

The complexity of human events, either in the American past or else-

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where, can hardly be grasped by anyone seriously adhering to such notions; and one reason *Patriotic Gore* is so fine a book is that Wilson's critical practice is superior to his theory. Plunging into his rich materials, he ignores most of what he has said in his introduction. But my interest here is with more than his critical or historical method: for the kind of disgust that motivates Wilson's reflections upon American history is often shared by people who find themselves disenchanted with the Cold War and who turn therefore to a kind of absolutist emotional radicalism, a radicalism without or even against politics, a radicalism of nausea.

It is a nausea we all know. Human history can be regarded, easily enough, as a nightmare; Wilson's analogy with the sea slugs has great emotional force, releasing as it does a wish to be done with the whole bloody mess; and who can deny that much of the past, as also the present creeping into the future, can be fitted into the scheme of ingurgitation? If men behave like sea slugs, the power of the comparison rests in the idea that they, like the sea slugs, cannot help doing what they do, for as Wilson remarks, they do it "by the same instinct." And that leaves little to say, since the problem of history has been not solved but dissolved.

But the comparison with the sea slug is too grandiose, too monolithic, too apocalyptic. Claiming to encircle the whole of behavior, it fails to discriminate among the many kinds. Isolating the beast-like element in history, it distracts attention from those forces which even as they cause men to act like beasts are nevertheless peculiar to men. One need not cling to theories of inevitable progress in history to find purpose and direction, morals and sentiments, ideas and ideals, all contributing to the outcome of events and all a good deal more than mere disguises for the urge to power. Whoever doubts this need only read *Patriotic Gore* and follow Wilson's sensitive account of the way thinking men on both sides tried to cope with their experience during the Civil War.

Wilson's sea slug theory of history implies an answer to the problem of evil and violence, an answer that lies forever ready as a biological constant, an answer that precedes the problem. Meanwhile, it is an approach to human affairs which creates a special illusion of "realism": for what could seem more tough-minded than treating men as insatiable beasts whose thinking is little more than a cover for appetite? And in that "realism" there lies, also, a justification for impatience with political nuance and analytic shading: for if men are indeed like sea slugs, then there is no need to discriminate and choose among contending forces, either in 1865 or 1963, and all can be dismissed as ingurgitating organisms, while we unhappy few fall back upon a trench of rectitude, the Holmes's and Stephens' of the twentieth century.

III

Once into the heart of his book, Wilson quite forgets the sea slugs and becomes embroiled with the ideological disputes of his protagonists. Though contemptuous of the conventional Southern apologists and by temperament and belief himself a man of the North, Wilson bears down hardest on the claims for Northern idealism. Yet are his discoveries here quite so novel as he seems to suppose? That the North was driven by the pressures of an expanding capitalism and the South by

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the needs of a besieged slave economy; that a fundamental clash between two orders of society was often masked by the vocabulary of righteousness; that many Northern leaders were hostile to the Negroes and some indifferent to the horrors of slavery; that important Southern figures were humane gentlemen fastidious about trading in black flesh; that the Northern armies were often brutal; that it is much too simple to see the Civil War as an unambiguous conflict between good and evil—all this was pressed upon the consciousness of anyone who grew up and read books twenty-five years ago. Yet it does not follow, as Wilson so strongly implies, that the war was an utter disaster without moral value which set loose that sequence of events leading to bureaucratic centralization. Nor does it follow that the issue of slavery was a mere propagandistic mirage.

There is a sense, of course, in which the Civil War *was* a disaster: the sense that all wars are. Whether the Civil War was inevitable is a problem to be avoided here, since it is so hard to formulate, let alone solve. I would say that the clash between the two systems in the Civil War could not have been mediated: one or the other side had to win, and rarely in history has this kind of clash been resolved peacefully. The truth here is a double truth. The Civil War did mark the victory of modern capitalism and let loose those tendencies toward a centralized state which Wilson deplores; but also, the Civil War brought to an end the system by which one man could own another and therefore, despite all the necessary discounts, it represents a major turning in the moral development of the United States.

The point needs to be added that while the victory of the North did help to speed the growth of the bureaucratic state, it was surely not the *source* of that growth. More usefully, the Civil War can be regarded as a crucial moment in a historical development which is extremely complex and ambiguous, containing elements that promote freedom and others that stifle it. If Wilson were to push his reasoning a little further, he would have to go back in time and reject a good deal more of Western history—or, with whatever grimace, he would have to accept the two-sidedness of Western history, with the hope that through intelligence and will men may yet succeed in choosing freedom.

When discussing so complex an event as the Civil War—for that matter, the present-day Cold War as well—one must distinguish between a proper skepticism concerning announced political aims and an estimate of the probable consequences. The sincerity or duplicity of Northern claims was not a decisive factor in regard to at least one major outcome of the Civil War: Northern politicians may have been hypocritical and Northern publicists self-righteous, but the slaves were freed. Had the South won, they would not have been. There can be no evading this central fact. I am not saying that the falseness of much Northern writing had no consequence: it had a great deal to do with allowing the former slaves to sink back into semi-serfdom. Yet the fact remains that between North and South there were fundamental differences in social system which vitally affected the destinies of enslaved human beings; and as a result, the war must be regarded as more than a mere struggle for power veiled by moral phrases.

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Wilson, in his revulsion from Northern cant and his disgust with the evolution of Northern society, leans over backward in writing about the South. He is not of course pro-Southern; he has too richly developed a sense of justice and too keen a sense of the ridiculous to fall into that trap; and besides, he finds most Southern apologetics simply boring. Yet he can write, astonishingly, that "there are moments when one may wonder today —as one's living becomes more and more hampered by the exactions of centralized bureaucracies—whether it may not be true, as Alexander Stephens said, that the cause of the South is the cause of us all." Each to his own wonderings; though I must confess that while recent years have led me to wonder about many things, identifying with the Confederacy has not been one of them. Alexander Stephens was obviously a man of probity and intellectual attainments; the idea of states rights which other politicians used as a handy slogan he took seriously; but he was caught up, as he had to be, in the moral shame of the South. He wrote with cogency about "the Demon of Centralization," but as Marius Bewley remarks in an excellent review of *Patriotic Gore,* he also could write that the Confederacy rested "upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery . . . is his natural and normal condition . . ."

Most of us share Wilson's desire to find intellectual ancestors in order to confront American life in the mid-twentieth century; it is a desire both understandable and necessary in a time of chaos. But if we cannot do better than Alexander Stephens, then perhaps we ought to try making it on our own. After all, hasn't that repeatedly been the lesson of Edmund Wilson's own career?

ALGERIA— *(Continued from page 34)*

It must be said that Ben Bella made an effort to put an end to this butchery and disorder of all kinds. In spite of this, there are still kidnappings, impositions, torturing and crimes against our militants as well as the Algerian population. The consequences of this situation have led more than 500 families to take refuge in France. In addition to that, a substantial number of Algerians have abandoned the country to find security and work.

The FLN is divided into several clans each of which is struggling by all means available to take power. Each clan stands for the one-party system and dictatorship. One need only glance at the last election results to realize that democracy is non-existent in Algeria. This did not prevent Ben Bella and an Algerian delegation from going to the United Nations where they spoke of democracy and the right of popular self-determination.

What is the future of our country?

It would be difficult to predict exactly, but one must expect changes and transformations for the better and for the worse. Certain sources close to the new government declare that the latter now has the situation in hand and will end up by imposing peace, security and the resumption of the country's economic and administrative life. But, standing above all this is the menace of the one-party system with all its consequences.

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Walter Goldstein and S. M. Miller

HERMAN KAHN: IDEOLOGIST OF MILITARY STRATEGY

How to govern military technology—which potential weapons should have priority in development, what should be the "mix" of weapons in the military arsenal—and how to relate military strategy to foreign policy have become awesome problems in the nuclear age. Since traditional military analysts are limited by pre-nuclear preconceptions and training, a new secular type has recently emerged to fill the gap: the system analyst. This new breed is composed of younger non-military men with abstract research experience. Adept at mathematical formulations, they particularly lean on the theory of games to structure and compute conflict situations and their impassive outcomes. They are "cool," hard-headed, and unemotional as they contemplate the possibilities of 200 million deaths in wartime. Uncommitted to any narrow military policy, they operate from the premise that any unexamined strategy yearns for an imaginative "scenario."

They wield considerable influence in Washington today. Brilliant, imaginative, and inventive where others are confused or fearful, their logical analyses have appealed to the new enthusiasts in the political and military Establishment. Recent speeches of President Kennedy and the orientation of his policy often seem heavily influenced by the strategic analysts' ideas. So much so that today, one feels, it is impossible to change American foreign or military policy without first challenging the postulates of Deterrence theory that have been advanced so successfully by the scientific strategist.

Among the most distinguished of the "new men," blessed with and prodded by the vision of thermonuclear nightmare, is Herman Kahn. His two recent books, *On Thermonuclear War*,* and *Thinking About the Unthinkable*,** have bulged with premonitions, conjectures, abstract models and contrived scenarios of nuclear conflict. The sustained and unemotional quality of his work can be taken as representative of his strategic colleagues—Schelling, Morgenstern, Knorr, Kissinger, Wohlstetter, etc. In many ways Kahn's work is more bizarre and sensitive to common-sense objections; but it has been precisely this quality of fantasy-plus-realistic analysis that has confused his critics. Some critics, like

* Princeton, 1961. $10
** Horizon Press, 1962. $4.95

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James Newman in the *Scientific American,* bore an emotional revulsion against his outlook, while others, like Amitai Etzioni in the *Columbia University Forum,* failed to grapple with Kahn's system in its own terms. This critique attempts to test both the internal consistency of Kahn's analysis and the relevance of his findings to the tensions of the Cold War.

I

Kahn's major assumption is that nuclear war can be less than catastrophic. Contrary to the beliefs of those unilateralists and fatalists who refuse to look at "the facts," Kahn insists that thermonuclear annihilation can be carefully graduated, and that the threat of annihilation can therefore be viewed as a manipulable instrument of national policy.

The viability of nuclear war is discussed in two basic ways by Kahn. First, he argues that not all nuclear wars would proceed to the stage of full destruction. The "S.U." (that faceless evil he constantly anticipates) may decide to obliterate an American city one day; the U.S.A. may respond with the destruction of Leningrad. Since a "tit-tat-tit" *(sic)* exchange of cities might ensue, a rigid control must be exercised over all the button-pushers involved, lest the war "escalate" toward a limitless catastrophe. The factor of rationality, therefore, will limit the contingent processes of nuclear war, and strategists will be justified in programming such "measured cadences of nuclear reprisal" as feinting bluffs, surprise attacks and "canned" reprisals.

Secondly, Kahn posits the feasibility of nuclear war upon the premise that the levels of destruction could certainly be less than catastrophic. If we examine more closely what is likely to happen, Kahn argues, we can see that not all human life will be snuffed out by such a war if only because any *sane* aggressor would aim at the victim's retaliatory weapons (the "counterforce strategy") and not its cities. The industrial cities and the areas surrounding missile bases are most likely to be hard hit, but the "hinterland," less heavily attacked, would be able to rebuild the economic and military power of the nation. Judging from the post-World War II rebuilding of the Soviet Union, Kahn estimates that the recovery period after a "counterforce" attack would be about ten years.

Kahn emerges at this point with a series of estimates based upon his personal opinion polling and subjective inferences. He contends that most Americans are willing to suffer from 10 to 60 million deaths in order to fight off the Russians (above that figure, a moral issue seems to be involved!), and that they do not dread the post-bellum character of life in a constrained and deprived garrison state. The non-total destructiveness of nuclear war and the willingness of Americans to engage in wars of great destruction, Kahn frequently repeats, can both enlarge the range of alternatives and the flexibility of posture in U.S. military policy. Invulnerable deterrents can be assembled to "back-stop" the daring use of conventional arms, and second-strike missiles can be deployed throughout the world to deter the Soviets from following the

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same dangerous game. To preserve the peace one must prepare for a quick, tactical, first-strike war, Kahn advises, for this is the only effective posture. The Bay of Pigs fiasco notwithstanding, this doctrine of supremacy of nuclear arms still prevails in Washington.

All this conjecturing endears Kahn to the military services and appalls those more sensitive citizens who refuse to compute the pay-off of foreign policies in mega-deaths. In the course of his anti-sentimental analysis, Kahn examines the variety of military moves available—first strike, retaliatory second strike, Counterforce-plus-Countervalue, etc. He argues that if a first-strike capacity is penetrable by the enemy (i.e., that it could be blown up in a surprise attack) then it is not useful except for preventive or pre-emptive strikes. "Hard" missile bases must be substituted for "soft" in order to demonstrate that the bases are not intended *exclusively* for surprise (first strike) attacks; otherwise they will be too provocative to the enemy.* Following this logic, he argues for the evacuation of missile bases in England; in their "softness," they are merely provocative and do not guarantee any retaliatory power against an enemy surprise attack. "Hardened" bases—whether Polaris submarines, constant air-borne sorties of the S.A.C., missile sites buried in "silos"—are necessary to deter an enemy from engaging in a first strike or surprise attack, for the enemy would have to immobilize them with remarkably accurate missiles if it sought to blackmail the victim's surviving cities. That the Soviets might object to the current American strategy of a preponderant, first-strike capability is a refinement that fails to worry Kahn.

While Kahn would junk much of current military strategy and weaponry as old-fashioned, unanalyzed, and unproven in action, his tactical hypotheses should aid all the military services by providing them with new and extended activities. The Army and Navy would receive larger allotments for conventional fighting and retaliatory missiles, and the Air Force would specialize—if Kahn's tactics were fully adopted—in the aggressive instruments necessary to seize the initiative in a strategically-waged nuclear war. Further, he advocates that $5 billion should be spent each year on the shelter program and preparations to evacuate our major cities; these are required either as a pre-attack mobilization, if we intend to strike first, or as a post-attack ruse to foil an aggressor that had crippled our own missiles and then held our population centers as "hostages" for blackmail.

II

Kahn's basic procedure is to state his assumptions, offer possible alternative assumptions, assign quantitative estimates (even though many of them are just guesses) to various possibilities, trace a series of projected consequences and then launch upon a general *tour d'horizon*. His work

* Hanson Baldwin argues in the New York *Times* that it was the "soft" and essentially first-strike quality of the Soviet missiles in Cuba that made them unacceptable to the United States; the encroachment upon the Monroe Doctrine, it was implied, was a far less serious offense.

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is mathematical in orientation and shows a distinct aversion to the more subtle, descriptive modes of strategic writing. Replete with tabular presentations, it is frequently unashamedly slick. In recommending the distribution of radiation counters to reduce the panic after a nuclear holocaust (lest the people confuse the nausea caused by the poisoned water supply with that of radiation poisoning), Kahn displays a human insensitivity that is quite astonishing. The essential point to note is that each of his premises is based not upon empirical evidence but upon abstracted inferences. This allows him to draw a wide (and often contradictory) series of conclusions—ranging from provocative first-strike schemes at one extreme, to careful arms reduction plans at the other. It is the basic lack of strategic coherence that in the long run makes his work both perilous and obfuscating.

The central assumption of Kahn's strategy is that of the feasibility of nuclear war. The two strands of this assumption are, first, that total destruction is unlikely (since it is irrational from the point of view of the enemy) and, second, that recovery from less than total destruction can occur in a relatively short time. Let us examine this latter contention and leave until later a discussion of the first one.

Kahn emphasizes that the pattern of Russian and German recovery after World War II can be taken as predictive of post-World War III through VIII reactions. He admits that the destruction of any fairly prolonged nuclear war (a week or a month perhaps) would cause much more damage than that of World War II; and also that the dangers of radiation may lead to much more widespread debilitation than has previously occurred in wartime. He fails to admit, though, that after 1945 a considerable amount of aid came to the most battered areas from the outside, such as the vast American aid that went to West Germany or the transplantation of German capital goods into Eastern Europe. In a post-World War III era, such aid could not be forthcoming and recovery would thus be far slower. If the assumption of limited destructiveness were relaxed, the possibility of recovery would be all but ruled out, since the replacement of, say, 40% of the capital assets of a highly-geared economy might well take two generations—even in the conditions of peace time.

In order for "recovery" to take place after a fairly minor destruction, it is unquestionable that severe governmental controls would have to be exerted. Immediately after air raids, martial law would have to be enforced to ensure an equitable sharing of the remaining shelter, clothing, and uncontaminated food and water supplies. Kahn dismisses this problem by saying that the blasted areas of the country should be written off, or that the high American standards of consumer comfort and of local government could be temporarily relaxed. "Objective studies," he claims, indicate that the post-attack environment "would not be so hostile as to preclude, at least in the long run, decent and useful lives for the survivors and their descendants." This belief sustains him as he waves aside the prediction that martial law, aggressive economic

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planning, the suppression of political unrest and other garrison state measures might prevail even in the nation that "won" a nuclear war.

Another technical deficiency in Kahn's reasoning is that he underestimates the human dangers and irrational procedures of nuclear war. For example, he believes that hardened missile bases are not only less provocative than soft bases but are unlikely to draw devastation to nearby cities. There is some doubt about this contention. The harder bases may lead to more destructive weaponry being used against them; a nuclear blast triggered off while still in the sky may be the most powerful way of shaking up those missile silos, but it would maximize radiation hazards in those numerous American cities which are dangerously close to the silos. (A map of these likely targets that was prepared for Congress last year showed that practically every big city would stand within lethal range of an attack that concentrated upon our SAC and missile bases.)

Kahn is particularly vulnerable in his public opinion analysis. His "sampling" of opinion seems to have been most haphazard. Even assuming, though, that Kahn's unspecified collection of respondents had provided a sensitive profile of U.S. opinion, this does not necessarily mean that his conclusions are valid. Do his poll responses mean that people are willing to go to war with the possibilities of millions of deaths or that they think the willingness to risk destruction will prevent war? The latter possibility—"standing up to the Russians"—seems to be closer to the current modes of American thinking. Any student of public opinion analysis should know how intricate it is to measure and how quickly the changing of world events can produce a disproportionate change in the opinion set of a nation. But even if Kahn's assertion (that most Americans would accept 60 million American deaths as a legitimate sacrifice, to be "better dead than red") is well-founded *now,* would this resolve be maintained after destruction and death had begun?

III

The problem of credibility and symmetry are especially important to Kahn's system.

If a nation is to be deterred by the threat of retaliatory military power from carrying out an aggressive act, two conditions must be met:

(1) The nation utilizing the deterrence strategy must have the second strike (or retaliatory) strength to inflict an "unacceptable" amount of damage upon the first strike aggressor. That is, its second-strike capacity must be sufficiently invulnerable to ensure that a costly reprisal can be imposed upon the enemy.

(2) The potential aggressor must be convinced that its intended victim would unquestionably carry out its threat to retaliate against an "intolerable" aggression. For example, if the Russians were to feel that the U.S. might not carry out the threat to bomb Moscow in case Soviet troops invaded West Berlin, then the whole strategy of deterrence would lose its effective credibility.

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This competition to threaten and counter-threaten can quickly deteriorate, especially in an unyielding conflict such as that in Berlin, to a nonsensical game of "chicken." If the two nuclear super-powers were to gamble frequently with such tactics for any length of time, it is unlikely that the world could ever regain either a rational or stable enough equilibrium to resolve its outstanding conflicts. This Kahn disputes. A limited holocaust, in the first rounds of a game of chicken, would be of inestimable benefit as an heuristic device. Either it would emphasize the need for disarmament and world government, or it would insist that counterforce tactical weapons are a dire necessity for an effective foreign policy in an age of nuclear conflict. Significantly, Kahn relies—as he ultimately admits in hoping that an accidental war will never begin—upon "faith" in the sanity of men: surely they will realize when the first tactical gambit occurs, that the retaliation to it should be similarly limited and not total!

The deterrence strategists suggest a list of offenses which would instantly be punishable by nuclear assault, and they envisage using conterforce missiles as the cutting edge of a new, offensive foreign policy (i.e., one of Controlled Threats and Reprisals). The likelihood of credibility in the threat would depend upon the untrammelled authority of the military decision-makers. An automatic nuclear response can be automatic *only* if the military leaders in the field meet no political interference in making their decisions. If politicians in Washington make the decision, then automaticity does not occur, not even if "hard talk" should become the propaganda specialty of the White House. If the Soviets should ever doubt the willingness of the President and Congress to abdicate power to the military, they would be entitled to doubt the credibility of the American response.*

The automatic response approach assumes that events are clear-cut and easily readable. Does the Soviet stopping of Western trucks on the autobahn to Berlin or the American pressure upon Laos suggest that "massive retaliation" is in the offing? Moreover, is there in reality such an obvious set of national interests, unchanging over a period of time, that a list of unacceptable transgressions can be compiled? Another disturbing feature is that it would probably be a difficult *political* problem to remove a nuclear assault-rating once it had been attached, even if the attachment had been made to a prestigious but intrinsically worthless and indefensible bastion such as the Off-shore Islands. Would the Soviets understand and respect our touchiness about prestige prizes?

Deterrence, at least in its long-run form, also requires that the two sides be relatively equal in strength and determination, or else it will pay the stronger side to utilize its momentary advantage and launch a preventive (or surprise) attack. How can a symmetry of strength be

* The admission that contrived "leaks" to the Press was essential during the Cuban crisis, to reinforce the credibility of our sticking to a collision course until the Soviets yielded, was just one further proof of the impact of deterrence-type thinking upon the present Administration.

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stabilized when technological innovation is constantly introducing revolutionary elements into the system (e.g., improved anti-missile missiles)? One suggestion that is offered is that the innovating nation turn over its weapons "break-through" to the enemy in order to maintain a nuclear symmetry. This may be an act of the highest ultimate rationality, but it is most unlikely in the present political situation. Possibly over time this kind of super-rationality might emerge, but the biting question is whether unsymmetrical situations give us enough time for long-run solutions: to extend Keynes, in the long-run we are all rational and dead.

IV

Kahn and his colleagues have been obliged to posit an ahistorical level of total rationality and predictability in the affairs of the nuclear super-powers. Each side is expected to behave as if the fanatical hostility of the Cold War had dissolved and as if operational concessions can quickly be negotiated to obviate an exchange of cities. Can one have the confidence in the rationality assumption that Kahn and the game theoreticians have placed upon it? Can we be sure that a losing nation in a nuclear war would not go all out in a Doomsday-type maneuver and destroy its enemy, itself and the planet? Irrational, yes; impossible, no, as Kahn himself recognizes. The likelihood of a *limited* nuclear war and of a partial survival must therefore be doubted as strongly as the capacity of a country to act with flawless intelligence and predictability, or its capacity to withstand and recover from a nuclear assault. Bernard Brodie faces this problem of irrationality squarely, in his *Strategy in the Missile Age,* while Kahn simply insists upon his subjective credo that button-pushers, even in the most tense and ambiguous of crises, would not enact their own "self-fulfilling prophesy:" i.e., by pushing all the available buttons in a spasm of panic.

Heightened and continuous military pressures are likely to drive the Cold War into a state of instability that might severely undermine the logical patterns of Deterrence strategy. Adventurism, competitive chance-taking, itchy trigger fingers, preventive war psychology, and blatant miscalculation would each result in dangerous misinterpretations of the enemy's behavior. In postulating rationality, Kahn neglects the conditions which permit rationality to occur in international relations. The enervating atmosphere of conflict may, in itself, lead to intensified technological rationality, but it is unlikely to promote the rational use of cool intelligence.

Indeed, if it were possible to maintain the overt rationality and effective communication which deterrence theory demands, it should be equally feasible to negotiate the basic issues of the Cold War and to reduce the tensions which daily menace the continuation of a peaceful co-existence.

V

In his efforts to scrutinize military policy Kahn recognizes that accidental war is an urgent and worrying possibility. The technology of

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Deterrence contains a structural defect which can be minimized but not eliminated, for accidental war presents a series of forbidding probabilities that cannot be easily ignored.

In listing some of the sources of system accidents Kahn makes a genuine contribution by analyzing the instability of sensitive, quick-acting systems. With his general belief that most dangers can be overcome if intelligence is applied—"bright makes right"—Kahn launches into a discussion of fail-safe procedures. The greatest reliance is placed upon improved communications between opponents so that a victim could be notified of an accidental triggering of first strike weapons before he is able to take retaliatory action. Since it would be easy to fool the victim by assuring it that the missile flying towards it has been set off accidentally, or that it is a dud, confidence in the enemy's truthfulness would have to be total. Unfortunately, it is the very lack of such confidence that frequently impedes conciliatory behavior at times of great crisis, as was seen in 1870 and in 1914, when the actual *casus belli* was withdrawn but the wars began all the same. Arms races engender distrust, and even Kahn concedes that our fear of fear, itself, is worse than our fear of the Soviet Union.

Recent occurrences do not give much support to the hope that the possibilities of accidental war can be eradicated. The United States has initiated several false alarms and "Red Alerts" when its Early Warning radar screens failed to distinguish a flight of geese or the moon from a flight of on-coming missiles. At the very height of the Berlin crisis, when each side was hypersensitive to surprise attacks from the opponent, the SAC was put on a world-wide alert simply because of a communications failure in the radar system. Together with Kahn, we may wonder if the Cold War could survive just *one* serious accident without some grave excess of brinksmanship following.

The more diversified the military establishment and the more sensitive the weapons in the thermonuclear arsenals, the greater will be the dangers of accidental war, Kahn argues that hardened bases can reduce the dangers since immediate retaliation against the enemy would not be necessary (i.e., as a form of counterforce insurance.) It is all the more pity, therefore, that he rejects the proposals of those minimum or finite deterrence advocates—the "non-provocative" and moderate men in the profession—who urge that shelters, first-strike bases and other "tactical" instruments should never be built. The virtue of the "moderate" case is that—assuming disarmament negotiations have failed—the minimum force needed to deter war is simply a second strike force. If reasonably invulnerable, these missiles could be assured of wreaking an unacceptable amount of damage upon the aggressor's urban "hostages." Since Kahn himself admits that no nation has ever lost—or ever would dare to lose—20 per cent of its population, this "non-offensive" deterrent should be far more effective and "safe."

Despite Kahn's concern for the problem of accidental war (including the ubiquitous threat of escalation from limited to extensive war),

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he has swept the dangers under his system net. Kahn has succumbed to the favorite *deux ex machina* of so many social scientists—the improved quality of communications. This assumes, however, that each side can predict the opponent's movements with understanding and confidence and that it will not seek for hidden motives in the enemy's stratagems. This assumption has already been severely questioned, and the doubts remaining can only be reinforced by the number of Intelligence failures that have marred strategic planning during previous wars and crises.

VI

While analyzing Kahn's work within his own frame of reference, we have ignored the relevance of external criteria. Kahn's perspectives appear to be even more limited when we contrast them to the torturous and confusing reality of the struggle to co-exist. They demonstrate that the weakest element in his analysis is unquestionably the political one.

Kahn's analysis is limited to two nations, unfriendly to each other. This is the essential nature of the argument of strategic analysts who see international relations as a two-country problem, involving the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. (This mode of analysis may spring from the fact that the theory of games originated as a two-person, zero-sum framework in which the winner takes all.) What happens when nuclear weapons are more widely distributed (the *nth*-country problem)? Would the military strength of one nation be sufficient to deter several potential aggressors? Would not symmetry be constantly endangered, particularly if political alliances were shifting, as well they might be? Would behaviors and reactions be as predictable and rational as required by Deterrence theory? Conceivably, they might be in the long-run, but it is getting us over the next ten years that is the crucial issue.

The chief difficulty with Kahn's book is that it is a study of war and its prevention that ignores politics and oversimplifies the complex realities of political conflict. This is particularly noticeable in the *nth* country problem for Kahn does not worry unduly over allies, their reactions to policies, the need for compromise among them, their national interests, and the weaknesses of their collective decision-making.* His worst failure is the implicit conception that the problems of rational security can be neatly dichotomized. On the one side there are the mechanical and essentially pessimistic formulae of the nuclear strategists, who daily await the onset of conflict; on the other there are the optimistic schemes of political compromise and adjustment that determine the success or failure of our foreign policy.

It can quickly be seen, for example, that the difficulties of the U.S. foreign policy—particularly in relation to those emerging nations that are undergoing a rapid social and economic change—presently stem from

* Once again the Cuban crisis proved that the NATO alliance was not a mutual security pact but a U. S.-controlled organization. There was no prior consultation in the decision-making and its political disunity might have been severe if the peak of the crisis had lasted for more than a few days.

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non-military causes. Even if there were no Soviet threat, U.S. policy would have to face a series of challenging crises in these volatile countries. Similarly, it should be seen that nuclear threats often provide merely the shadow of crisis and not the root cause itself. Given the Soviet challenge, the rigid and unimaginative lines that the U.S. has been pursuing has led to recurring hot, tepid, and cold wars. (This does not assume that Soviet policy has been flexible and imaginative.) Should this dogmatism continue, either or both powers will be isolated from the tide of social and economic revolution that is sweeping through the hungry, tropical areas of the world. An isolation of this kind might leave the fearful, nuclear owners in an unenviable position: their foreign policies would be reduced to a "nuclear nullity"—as Liddell Hart has put it—because of their armed and oversensitive mistrust, and they would be forced to act as conservative advocates of a *status quo* because of their fear of radical change.

Nor would the righting of military inequality reduce political crises. The military superiority of the U.S. which prevailed until the U.S.S.R. manufactured its first A-bomb did not reduce conflict nor deeply inhibit the U.S.S.R.'s effort to achieve what it considered to be its indispensable buffer zones in Eastern Europe (or even in Korea). Gross military imbalance may always tempt action but only if the political bases for action exist. Even where imbalances do threaten to produce a decisive superiority of one side, inequities in striking power are not necessarily self-propelling stimuli towards political and military action. However infinite the deterrent value of nuclear arms, there is always a sound reason for a country equipped with a superior arsenal to desist from striking, or for an inferior power to make limited encroachments outside its zone of influence.

In freeing military "hardware" and its disposition from foreign policy, Kahn has isolated moral questions from political considerations and military decisions. The decisions for war and calculated destruction are made by people and not by military necessity. In reifying military tactics and strategy, Kahn has obscured the concrete aims of peoples and governments and has reversed Clausewitz' dictum by making politics the servant of war.

VII

James Newman, an editor of *Scientific American,* has wondered if there is a Herman Kahn. If there is a Herman Kahn, then he must be a packaged Ellery Queen of the strategic school because his quixotic and quicksilver writings take so many varied and apparently inconsistent positions. He is a stern critic of the military establishment but wants to augment military activity; he is concerned with the threat of war and the self-generating possibilities of war in sensitive military operations, yet he sees war as a political tactic. One can interpret much of what he says as encouraging the efforts to achieve disarmament (e.g., the emphasis upon the dangers of accidental war, or the provocative

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nature of ambiguous military positions). Nevertheless, he is a pathfinder for the military. In his effort to explore new hypotheses, Kahn often distorts his perspective so greatly that his strategic scenarios become further and further removed from reality.*

And yet, it is Kahn's "realism" which is his pride and strong point, and also the target of his unrelenting enquiries. As is common with the new breed of anti-sentimental strategic "scientists," the result is a realism that starts with abstract assumptions, blots out much of the world's political experience and ends with big conclusions. C. Wright Mills has aptly characterized this Euclidean system-building as "crackpot realism." The strong light that system analysts have shed on current military operations should not obscure the fact that their vision is based upon such questionable premises as the total rationality of conflict, the extension of communications, and the perfectibility of nuclear gadgets.

Dr. Teller, too, has launched into an ahistorical utopianism in hoping that the world can arm itself against distrust, in order to "buy time" to establish an international order based upon democracy and justice. The signal defect of this excessively logical idealism is that it concentrates exclusively upon the abstractions of conflict and ignores the human capacities of compromise and political adjustment. The people and their political spokesmen might be "soft" when they come to examine the callous and awesome prospects of a thermonuclear conflict, but at least they can foresee the despairing *reductio-ultima* of having to choose between red or dead. The "realism" of the strategists is fundamentally a nuclear pessimism, compounded by a misplaced hypothesizing of human destruction. In seeking for flawless syllogisms it disdains the subtle nuances of political action and human aspiration.

Perhaps this rationalizing was seen at its very worst in the days following the President's announcement of the Cuban blockade. One group of strategists relied upon the sanity of the Soviets to refuse to respond to the U.S. action (i.e., in order to maintain the stasis of "nuclear nullity" implicit in the Balance of Terror). Another, more aggressively minded group, argued for action on the hazardous ground that it would be better to risk the death of millions of Americans than to allow Cuba to remain red. The scintillating and adventuresome logic of either school was replaced at the very climax, fortunately, by the diplomatic maneuvering of the political leadership. Given the rigid adherence at present to "nuclear supremacy" and to tactical nuclear bluffing, one wonders how many more journeys to the brink and back can be undertaken before the White House succumbs, too, to the canned strategies of our apolitical and abstractionist theorizers? Must there be a "heuristic" or accidental thermonuclear war before disarmament is viewed as a serious political possibility?

* There is one scenario that Kahn mentions but does not explore: the United States notifies the Soviet Union that it is now ready to surrender, but only if the surrender is operative before noon on that very day. Failing such arrangements by noon-time, it will blast the Soviets off the face of the earth.

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Roy Finch

THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT—Part I

Mass warfare developed in the modern world even before mass production or mass literacy. One of the rights won by the French revolution, as it turned out, was the right of everyone to take part in war. The Napoleonic wars inaugurated the period of conscripted armies in which the whole citizenry is drawn into fighting. This universalization of war was a break with the tradition of limited wars which had prevailed, for the most part, from the middle ages through the eighteenth century. The average citizen would now learn to identify himself with the state, first of all by being expected to fight and die for it.[1]

The modern American peace movement had its origins in a reaction to this new development, and particularly to the Napoleonic wars. The first American peace societies were founded in New York, Massachusetts and Ohio in 1815. Almost simultaneously similar groups sprang up in England and on the European continent. By 1828 when the American Peace Society was formed, chiefly by William Ladd, there were dozens of small local peace groups, many of which gradually affiliated with it. While this movement drew much of its inspiration from religious sources, it had also a secular character stemming from eighteenth century humanitarianism, which distinguished it from previous Quaker and Anabaptist opposition to war.

The principal arguments against war—still used today—were developed by the American Peace Society, especially in its magazine *Advocate of Peace,* which continued to come out monthly or bimonthly with only a few lapses for almost a hundred years, though it later lost its specifically pacifist character. Much space was devoted to debating the question of the difference between defensive and offensive wars. This became the watershed between pacifists and general peace sympathizers, the pacifists maintaining that the distinction had lost its meaning and that every war would now appear "defensive" to both sides.

The "Temptations" of War

The man who made peace an international cause was Elihu Burritt, the "learned blacksmith," who organized international peace congresses in the 1840s. Burritt was a man of great energy who had taught himself thirty languages while working as a blacksmith. He had a flair for the dramatic and not only urged a universal strike against war, but

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succeeded in collecting 20,000 pledges not to fight, an effort paralleled later by the British Peace Pledge Union in the 1930s, which collected 100,000 such pledges, almost all, like Burritt's, quickly forgotten when war broke out.

The almost complete collapse of the peace cause in the face of the Civil War is a striking example of what would happen again and again. The Civil War looked "different"; it looked like an "exception," one war at least which could be justified. Many pacifists, like William Lloyd Garrison, were also abolitionists and explained that in this case it was necessary to support war in order to get rid of a still greater evil—slavery. The leaders of the American Peace Society argued that the Civil War was not really a war at all, but only a "rebellion," and any government was justified in putting down a rebellion. Only a few, like Burritt and the anarchist Josiah Warren, held out.

On the eve of the Civil War Burritt pointed out the implications of what was happening. Each war, he said, comes as a special temptation to some; and those whom one war leaves untouched another may sweep away. Thousands, for example, who had opposed the Crimean War, did not oppose Garibaldi's war in Italy. The peace movement, he argued, could never succeed as long as pacifists made exceptions for particular "noble" wars.[2]

In reaction to the compromises of the American Peace Society, a new peace movement came into being after the Civil War, centering around the Universal Peace Union, which was founded in 1866. For almost fifty years this group, led by Alfred Love, rallied support for immediate universal disarmament, boycott of war taxes and a constitutional amendment depriving the federal government of war-making powers. Each summer at Mystic, Conn., rallies of sometimes thousands of people were held, at which singing, banners and speeches dramatized the cause. Alfred Love himself seemed to be in a dozen places at once, editing the Union's paper *The Peacemaker,* lobbying in Washington, even intervening in labor disputes, and traveling up and down the country speaking and organizing.

The Universal Peace Union did not knuckle under to the Spanish American War (though this was widely accepted as a "noble" war to free Cuba from Spanish tyranny), but it went down before the seemingly universal triumph of the peace cause in the years 1900–14. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with ten million dollars and the World Peace Foundation with one million dollars seemed to make the smaller groups unnecessary. (It is said that when Love asked Andrew Carnegie for funds for the Universal Peace Union he received instead a signed photograph!) A National Peace Congress in New York in 1907 was attended by most of the members of the Supreme Court, the two presidential candidates, innumerable Congressmen, mayors and governors. Peace, it seemed, had finally won the day.[3]

Again the collapse in 1917. Not only the American Peace Society, but the Carnegie Endowment, the World Peace Foundation, the Church

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Peace Union and the other newly triumphant peace groups swung into line behind another "exceptional" war—this time the war to put an end to war. The Carnegie Endowment turned its offices over to the Creel Committee, the government propaganda agency; socialist and labor anti-war groups vied with each other in their patriotism. Only a remnant of the Universal Peace Union and a handful of the innumerable intellectuals, educators, artists and ministers who had unreservedly supported the peace cause continued to oppose the war.

Out of this new debacle there emerged two new peace organizations —the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters International, both formed during the war by pacifist remnants. The pre-war Woman's Peace Party gave way to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and a still larger group, the National Council for the Prevention of War was formed in 1921.

Once more the peace movement burgeoned, the Fellowship of Reconciliation concentrating on religious groups, the War Resisters League on socialists and independent leftists. Techniques of advertising, mass communication and huge public rallies were used by World Peaceways, organized in 1931, which collected over a million signatures for peace. It is estimated that in 1933 there were some 12 million adherents of peace groups. Even as the world was preparing for World War II, the sentiment for peace again seemed almost universal. It was small consolation that this time the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters League survived. In 1940 and 1941 the popular peace movement again evaporated into thin air.

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It is a melancholy tale—125 years of attempts to build peace on the shifting sands of popular emotion. Even the increase in the number of conscientious objectors, which pacifists sometimes find encouraging, has not been, on the whole, impressive. While about 4,000 objectors maintained their views after being drafted in World War I and there were at least 50,000 objectors conscripted or imprisoned in World War II, the total number of men drafted altogether rose from 2,800,000 in World War I to 13,000,000 in World War II.[4] Even the historic peace churches had difficulty in maintaining their pacifism. The number of Quakers who served in the armed forces in both World Wars far outweighed those who refused to serve, and leading Quakers argued for the support of both wars.

As war became more devastating, mass propaganda became more effective. The arguments of the peace movement were more and more accepted—but only up to a point. Statements which a William Ladd, an Elihu Burritt, or an Alfred Love would have made in the past were now made as a matter of course by generals and cabinet officers—even as they prepared for more war.

The peace movement succeeded superficially, but it was unable to strike deep roots—philosophically, politically or socially. The peace that

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everyone wants, in effect no one wants. Peace leaders could find no group dedicated to peace. This was true of religious bodies, labor, students—none proved particularly reliable. Arguments based on the horrors of war, the cost of war, the ineffectuality of war did not strike deep enough. A peace movement based on these arguments was convincing only until another "exceptional" war came along.

The movement tended to lose itself in two extremes. Either it became a wholly individual affair—a few persons converted to life-long, unyielding pacifism—or it became a diffuse expression of popular sentiment, easy to join and agree with, but equally easy to leave when another war approached. As a cause, it had its share of heroic personalities, men beaten and starved, kept in solitary confinement for long periods of time, even tortured to death.[5] But after each war a virtually new start had to be made, drawing on a new fund of post-war disillusionment. The gap between the tiny number of war-time pacifists and the relatively large number of peace-time pacifists could not be bridged. Often it seemed that the two groups did not speak the same language, but more often the first group sparked and gave leadership to the second. The absolute moral commitment of the war-time pacifist tended again to make sense as each war receded into the past. In retrospect no war looked as "necessary" as it had at the time.

Was nothing learned from these experiences? On the surface this may appear to be so, but a closer look reveals a development in at least two respects. The first is a growing awareness of the social and economic causes of war. The Universal Peace Union, in this respect, was in advance of the American Peace Society, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation and War Resisters League have taken further steps in the same direction. The failure of the easy optimism of the period before World War I drove home to many the lesson that the abolition of war implies far-reaching social changes. The second related development is a growing awareness that moral and intellectual arguments are insufficient in the absence of a concrete program.

A New Transformation

Since World War II the peace movement has undergone another transformation, this time more thoroughgoing than any in the past. This is due, in large part, to two things: the impact of the ideas of Gandhi and the development of the atomic bomb.

To understand the significance of Gandhi for American pacifists it is necessary to look at the conflict between two fundamental ideas and orientations in the peace movement: the idea of *non-resistance* and the idea of *non-violent resistance*. Although the two concepts are often lumped together in the public mind and the one has grown out of the other, there is a radical difference between them. The shift from one to the other represents a change from a conservative, individually-oriented pacifism to a radical, social action pacifism.

In a little book published in 1846 called *Christian Non-Resistance*

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one of the early peace leaders, Adin Ballou, laid down the classic position. At the outset Ballou made it plain that he rejected passivity. Non-resistance, he said, is another *kind* of resistance. "I claim the right to offer the utmost *moral* resistance . . . to every manifestation of evil among mankind," he wrote. "Nay, I hold it my *duty* to offer such moral resistance. In this sense my very non-resistance becomes the highest kind of *resistance* to evil" (italics in original). He then goes on to explain that he advocates "non-injurious resistance."[6]

What constitutes non-injurious resistance? About half of Ballou's book is devoted to anecdotes illustrating it. They reveal non-resistance as a "positive" or "therapeutic" response by one individual to a wrong done him by another individual. Non-resistance is presented as a personal affair, a way of reacting to a personal injury. It aims at the conscience and understanding of the individual wrong-doer.

Ballou and other pacifists argued that those who believed in this kind of non-resistance could not participate in war. This then involved them potentially in another kind of resistance—resistance to the state, which might take the form of civil disobedience. But it remained an individual matter, a single action by a single individual.

The seeming negativism of this point of view and its lack of social content gave rise during World War I to the "service" philosophy of pacifism. What could the pacifist do in place of fighting? The answer was "service," which meant primarily food distribution and relief work, and later work camps for rebuilding devastated or poverty-striken areas. The American Friends Service Committee, founded by the Quakers in 1917, arose out of this concept. Later it led to the setting up of the relief agency CARE, and the present Peace Corps is clearly much influenced by this background of "service" philosophy.

Service and Resistance

The chief expression of the "service" point of view, however, was the "alternative service" program for conscientious objectors in World War II. The historic peace churches set up and administered, under Selective Service supervision, a program of forest service and mental hospital work for war-time pacifists known as Civilian Public Service. (The insistence on the word "civilian" was, of course, to guard against it being used for military projects.) Drafted objectors were assigned to this "service," and the program was justified on the grounds that it was constructive and displayed "positive" cooperation with the government.

"Service," however, lost much of its import when it was conscripted. If it was not voluntary, what after all distinguished it from involuntary servitude? With the best of intentions "service" pacifists had, it came to seem, provided a rationale for a kind of concentration camp program, however humane and "cushioned" it might be. Some men refused to enter these camps; others walked out of them; and still others insisted upon the establishment of openly government-run internment centers. An internecine struggle took place between "service" pacifists

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(who were accused of "fronting" for the government) and "resistance" pacifists (who were accused of not having a "genuinely pacifist spirit").

"Resistance" pacifists felt themselves closer to the labor movement and the European underground than they did to traditional non-resistance. They discussed such questions as the use of strikes and slow-downs, the morality of sabotage and techniques of mass demonstration and direct action. Strikes and slow-downs were carried out in government camps. A Committee for Non-Violent Revolution was organized in 1946 by men meeting in Chicago in defiance of Selective Service orders. In prison other pacifists engaged in work stoppages and hunger strikes. Non-violent resistance came to have a militant meaning, arising out of the conflict with the government and the "buffers" of the historic peace churches.

Such militant non-violent action, however, gave rise to new problems. How, after all, did non-violent resistance differ from violent resistance? Was not non-violence just as potentially coercive as violence? Could it not be used for just as destructive purposes? In the attempt to answer these questions pacifists turned to Gandhi. Gandhi had laid down the conditions for non-violent action: that it must be undertaken only as a last resort, that it must be carried through without hate, that it must be aimed at policies and not persons. Such action was an attempt to use moral force as a weapon; it aimed at confronting opponents with the overt implications of their compliance with a social evil.

To be successful non-violence had to be a matter of principle and not merely of technique; it had to be adhered to even under the most extreme provocation. It implied a degree of self-control which, even Gandhi admitted, could only be expected from a few. The majority might accept it only out of necessity. What was essential, in Gandhi's view, was that the leadership be committed to the principle.

Relation With Radicalism

The wartime resistance movements, particularly in Norway and Denmark where pacifists participated in the underground, raised the most serious problems. Gandhi had stressed openness and honesty. Under what circumstances, if at all, were secrecy and deception permissible? Could pacifists engage in the destruction of property, the blowing of bridges and so forth, if there were no injury to human life involved? Could they forge papers, take assumed names, steal documents, cooperate with other underground groups engaged in killing?

The shift from non-resistance to non-violent resistance brought pacifism into relation with traditional radical groups. Pacifists could now maintain that radicals had never been radical enough about their *means,* but only about their ends. Non-violent action could be understood as the most advanced way of carrying on social conflict. It could be understood to include the actions of labor and minority groups when they went outside of established channels by engaging in strikes, sit-downs, demonstrations and the like. The fact that the non-violent aspect was

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often more a matter of necessity than of principle was regarded as an unfortunate weakness.

The non-violent action point of view led also to the conclusion that revolutions failed because of their violence, which restored old power methods and built up a new fund of resentment and hatred. By copying the very methods of those they sought to overthrow, revolutions guaranteed their own failure. Violence, for the pacifist, is intrinsically reactionary, no matter who uses it or for what end. It is a pacifist dogma that "the more violence the less revolution."

Large-scale mass non-violent action requires organization, training and discipline, which are not congenial to the pacifist. Opposing authority, often at considerable risk, he submits unwillingly to another authority. Various proposals for a non-violent army tend to run afoul of this strong anti-authoritarianism. Preserving spontaneity and informality, and still keeping the discipline of non-violence presents difficulties which pacifists are far from having solved. (Even Gandhi said: "It goes against my nature to plan.")

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Nineteenth century radicalism had at its center a core of terrorism. The acceptance of this terrorism by Communists is vividly expressed in Trotsky's book of 1920, *Terrorism and Communism.* Trotsky wrote:

> The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. The gendarmerie of Tsarism throttled the workers who were fighting for the Socialist order. Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order. Do you grasp this—distinction? Yes? For us Communists it is quite sufficient.[7]

Trotsky could hardly have anticipated that this same weapon of terrorism would be used against him and other Communists.

The Anarchist acceptance of terrorism is equally vividly shown in Alexander Berkman's *Prison Memoirs of An Anarchist.* Berkman describes the true revolutionist as one who is willing "to sacrifice all merely human feeling at the call of the People's Cause." The revolutionist, he wrote, is:

> A being who has neither personal interests nor desires above the necessities of the Cause, one who has emancipated himself from being merely human and has risen above that, even to the height of conviction which excludes all doubt, all regret; in short, one who in the very inmost of his soul feels himself revolutionist first, human afterwards.[8]

Despite his contempt for it, the "merely human" keeps breaking through; it isn't so easy to be "super-human." Berkman describes his attempted assassination of Henry Frick, the steel magnate, after the Homestead massacre. He has just shot and then stabbed Frick:

> An officer pulls my head back by the hair, and my eyes meet Frick's. He stands in front of me, supported by several men. His face is ashen grey;

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> the black beard streaked with red, and blood is oozing from his neck. For an instant a strange feeling, as of shame, comes over me; but the next moment I am filled with anger at the sentiment, so unworthy of a revolutionist. With defiant hatred I look him full in the face.[9]

Here is the text for the anarchist—and the pacifist. Hatred is the antidote for shame. Having felt the "bond of suffering" which reduces everything to the "merely human," Berkman can only counteract it by invoking his hatred. Frick has to be transformed from a suffering human being into a class enemy.

Such "dehumanizing" of the enemy is the quintessence of twentieth century ideology. A social grouping of class, race or nation is given priority to the "merely human." An absolute enemy, then, in the absence of any principle of common humanity, is fit only for extermination. What the nineteenth century called "abstract humanism" is replaced by *unlimited social conflict justifying unlimited inhumanity*. Behind Berkman's contemptuous dismissal of the "merely human" lurk the coming shadows of Hitler, Stalin, and Eichmann. They all reflect the belief that some social grouping is prior to the human (a priority which unfortunately is embodied in the very word *social*-ism).

The truth is that the social has no priority over the human. (We might as well speak of the "merely social"!) Nothing is more concrete than suffering, and suffering is not limited to any social group. In this respect, at least, humanity is a real enough fact. Frick's insensitivity to the suffering of the Homestead strikers and their families is matched by Berkman's insensitivity to the man in front of him. It may be argued that this leaves all the odds on Frick's side; he has the justification of power and the *status quo,* and nothing is going to dislodge him. But Berkman should be able to do what Frick cannot do, and that is to conceive of his opponent as a human being. His moment of shame is his superiority, not his quick suppression of it.

The terrorist aspires to be more-than-human, while his enemy, in his eyes, sinks to the less-than-human. The direct action pacifist, in his apoliticalism and extremism, has surprisingly much in common with the terrorist, but he refuses to be either more or less than human. He refuses to dehumanize either himself or his enemy. He does not regard "being human" as the easiest thing in the world, so that all our efforts must be bent on trying *not* to be human. On the contrary, it seems to him that "being human" is not something to be postponed.

To Trotsky's question: "The previous regime shot workers; we shoot capitalists—do you see the distinction?" the pacifist replies: "No, we do not see the distinction. A social or economic role does not qualify a person for being shot. And there is no blank check for doing the shooting. History does not make us either more or less than human. It does not relieve us of that much responsibility. We are not impressed by the ability or the need to disregard human feelings. That ceases to awe us. We have seen too many supermen now, and we do not trust

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them, especially when they have guns in their hands. Furthermore, we do not see history mysteriously turning murder into a good. We see only murderer and murdered reflecting each other and changing into each other again and again. Violence for us is not the measure of 'realism,' but of another kind of unrealism."

As indeed the Marxist understands, the proletariat have accumulated a moral capital which provides, so to speak, a temporary moral immunity for those who act for it, or even claim to act for it. But this moral capital is not inexhaustible. History, in the almost mathematical exactness of its retribution, permits only so much abuse of force. Marxism is not exempt from morality. It is based on a disguised moral passion, and without this moral passion it would vanish.

A more realistic view of human history cannot discount the role of human choice and hence of the moral factor. (What is the Khrushchev charge against Stalin, if not that he made wrong choices?) Besides every kind of necessity, there is, inescapably, human decision. And a third factor is also present—the factor of chance, the extraneous element which intervenes. History involves the complex interaction of all three factors—the ancient triumvirate of necessity, human choice and chance (or fate, freedom and fortune, the last replaced by Providence in the religious view). We cannot understand what happens or why things almost never turn out the way we expect or plan for, unless we take all three into account. The full concreteness of history lies in the interweaving of these three aspects, and leaving any one of them out distorts our understanding.

Under the influence of early modern science with its excessive causalism and determinism, social theory, including Marxism, tended to discount human choice and also the factor of chance (the latter perhaps present in human life as "spontaneity"). But necessity has a limited role, and there is no possibility of merely living in terms of that even if we wanted to. About this—that choice is always with us—we have no choice. The slow recognition that the moral factor cannot be expunged is being bought now at terrible cost. Scientifically, technically, there is nothing to be said against Buchenwald. It is only in moral terms that it can be condemned. To understand the *objective* nature of morality, however, will require a vast upheaval of thought, which has scarcely begun.

The radical's chief delusion has been the cabbalistic notion that he can "use" evil. He accepts this "filthy necessity," (the delusory "necessity" hiding the genuine moral "filth"), if not with a clear conscience, at least with a secret sense of superiority, which in itself should have made his course suspect. He believes that he has been admitted into the arcanum of history, siding with the powers of good, and that now he knows that evil too can be of "use." But he deceives himself. He mistakes the Prince of Darkness for a scullery maid.

It is idle to talk about "humanistic radicalism" as long as we use the words "revolutionary necessity" to justify crimes—crimes which then

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go on and on. The use of executions, fear, terror and lies as conscious policy under the pretext of "necessity" perpetuates the delusion that social progress can be made without any corresponding progress in the human and the humane. It is typical of this way of thinking that it efficiently describes this sacrifice of the human as "the human cost," as if human beings were what is expendable and the institutional framework and future goals were what really matter. The relativity of human choice, which is always with us, should not hide the difference between supporting human values in the present and being prepared to sacrifice them wholesale for imagined future goods.

The battle of the social engineers of various stripes (socialist, communist, capitalist) to tame the most intractable of animals—the human being—and compress him into suitable social moulds is succeeding all too well today, but for reasons which escape the intelligentsia, who are usually on the side of the engineers and not of the human beings. The argument is most often about what moulds and who is going to do the compressing, rather than how to escape this eventuality altogether. In this area fatalism runs rampant. We seem to know no answer but more and more social rationalization. It is a dream of total control, ostensibly aimed at liberating the rebellious human being, but actually moving toward squashing every bit of rebelliousness out of him.

In this situation the pacifist, when insisting that human beings must be dealt with in human terms, that the human being is more important than any theory and that the inhuman methods cannot achieve human goals, is pointing in the right direction. To find a new basis for political life and for carrying on social struggles is essential for a new radicalism. It is difficult to imagine what else can prevent further repetitions of the atrocities which go with twentieth-century ideological and nationalistic madness.

(Continued in our next issue)

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1 See John Neff, *War and Human Progress.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.
2 Merle E. Curti, *The American Peace Crusade—1815–1860.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1929, pp. 202 ff.
3 Merle E. Curti, *Peace or War—The American Struggle—1636–1936.* New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1936, pp. 205 ff.
4 Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob, *Conscription of Conscience—The American State and the Conscientious Objector—1940–1947.* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 12 & 464.
5 Norman Thomas, *The Conscientious Objector in America.* New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1923. Ernest L. Meyer, *"Hey Yellowbacks!"* New York: John Day, 1930.
6 Adin Ballou, *Christian Non-Resistance—Illustrated and defined.* Philadelphia: J. Miller McKim, 1846, p. 11.
7 Leon Trotsky, *The Defence of Terrorism (Terrorism and Communism).* London: Labor Publishing Co., 1921, p. 56.
8 Alexander Berkman, *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist.* New York: Mother Earth Publishing Co., 1912, p. 8.
9 Ibid., p. 35.

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BOOKS

The Functions of Art

LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, & SOCIETY, by Leo Lowenthal. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1961. $1.95.

Anyone familiar with Professor Lowenthal's *Literature and the Image of Man* would not be disposed to postpone for very long the satisfaction of reading a new book of his. The present one breaks a good deal of new ground, especially in the eighteenth century. One theme that pervades the book is stated at the outset, in a chapter on "Diversion and Salvation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Today these themes tend to get stated in terms of producer or consumer orientation in literature and entertainment. It may be that so stating the issues today is what gives new relevance to the ancient quarrel between the party of Montaigne and the party of Pascal, as Lowenthal puts it:

> Our review begins with two literary figures who, although separated by nearly sixty years in time are, in some respects, poles apart in viewpoint: Montaigne, the founder of modern skepticism, and Pascal, the forerunner of modern religious existentialism.

Lowenthal suggests that the stark polarity of these approaches was consequent upon the traumatic effects of the medieval breakup. Montaigne even uses the word *escape:*

> A painful fancy takes possession of me; I find it shorter to change than to subdue it . . . if I cannot combat it, I run away from it. . . . By changing place, occupation, company, I escape. . . . It loses my trace and leaves me safe.

The idea of the arts as solace for inner pain and malaise suggested to Montaigne the need for variety and diversity of fictions. Lowenthal explains it this way:

> He believes (unlike his successors in later centuries) that these fictional emotions move the writer, the actor (and the barrister) just as they do the audience, because the writers and actors share with their audiences the need to escape from their own woes.

This frankly therapeutic idea of art has always been held by a large group of intellectuals, for whom it is perfectly obvious that bad novels and plays and movies are just as necessary as beer or whiskey, and do not involve any self-deceit whatever. Perhaps their bias is toward the idea of audience as participant in a common experience, such as is natural to those who share a common language, though they may use it to sustain totally different modes of awareness.

Such is not however the Pascal position. Pascal "finds this kind of escape something to be fought against. . . . Most dangerous diversion of all, in Pascal's view, is the theater. It ab-

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sorbs all our senses and therefore has great capacity for deceiving man into believing he has all those noble qualities he sees portrayed on the stage." Thus Pascal takes his stand with that very large party for whom popular culture is a threat to morality, contemplation, and an integrated personality.

Perhaps the two positions could be reconciled by saying that for Montaigne the hope is to escape from immediate miseries, while for Pascal the hope is for ultimate escape, by using the more austere forms of art as a means of spiritual grace. It would be hard to decide how much semantics and how much temperament goes to the making of such a polarity, but the distinction has proved sufficient to provide a deep division of attitudes ever since their time.

It is a great advantage to be able to follow this dispute through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and on into our own time, by means of the learning and experience of Professor Lowenthal. He shows that Goethe tended to straddle somewhat between these two attitudes, prefacing his *Faust* with "Prelude on the Stage" in which he considers the extent to which an artist should condescend to the taste of the populace, by means of a dialogue between the stage manager and the poet. Naturally, the question of the box-office did not arise until there had been an organization of the book-market and the public sufficient to give meaning to such an issue. It was two or more centuries after the invention of the printed book before there was sufficient organization of the market to create a crisis in the minds of authors. So far as English literature is concerned, the great monument to this crisis is Pope's *Dunciad,* in which Pope asserts the responsibility of the author to be a guide and corrective to perception rather than to provide an anodyne for anxieties. In this view the author must inevitably take the side of the language itself, as the accumulated store of perception to which the writer owes the deepest responsibility. That is why Pope made such an issue of dullness, for he saw the hack writers as people not only without perception, but as creators of a collective opacity in language, which is the very *instrument* of perception. Lowenthal quotes Pope in a letter to Swift:

> My spleen is at the little rogues of it; it would vex one more to be knocked on the head with a pisspot than by a thunderbolt. . . . But to be squirted to death, as poor Wycherly said to me on his death-bed, by apothecaries' apprentices, by the understrappers of undersecretaries, to secretaries who were no secretaries—this would provoke as dull a dog as Phillips himself.

There was nothing snobbish about Pope's animus against the little hacks. He really regarded the language as a prime agent of perception, fit to be used only by those trained in direct perception, and not by those who were middlemen and retailers of the perceptions of others. This issue has been increasingly obscured since Pope's time by the sheer quantity of printed language, until, today, those able to exercise direct perception must turn it upon the vast trade in indirect perception. For the packaging and retailing of technologically codified experience has *become* the actuality which at an earlier stage it had merely served to conceal.

In the eighteenth century the actuality had still been the live dialogue of people in responsible places. But by the nineteenth century there

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was no such dialogue of answerable or critical perception at any level of public or private life. And today it is unimaginable that anything is being said anywhere in the world that represents a direct perceptual confrontation of actuality. Nobody anywhere is in possession of any relevant data or awareness of the kind that Pope took for granted as an adequate level of perception and judgment. We tend to assume that serious perception gets outered in one art form or another, but such fragmentation of the components of consciousness would not for a moment have seemed to Pope or Swift to qualify as intelligent perception. It is no accident therefore that intelligence has for some time concentrated upon the unintelligent and the unconscious as objects of attention.

To have provided a history of such a shift in the strategy of intelligence is the task which Lowenthal has assigned to himself in the present book. That is the importance of his main section on "the English Eighteenth Century as a Case Study." (This is a chapter in which he has collaborated with Marjorie Fisk.) All the problems of our own time first confronted the writer in the eighteenth century, and many twentieth century answers were given then to problems that we think of as new. Thus Oliver Goldsmith thought of the novel as superseding the classroom:

> Were our schoolmasters, if any of them have sense enough to draw up such a work, thus employed, it would be much more serviceable to their pupils than all the grammars and dictionaries they may publish these ten years.

One magazine writer recommended that machines be adapted to make the novel-writing process easier, and one essayist analyzed the stereotypes already at hand for such machines:

> . . . according to the arrangement and collection of them [they] become *narrations, speeches, sentiments, descriptions, etc.,* and when *a very great quantity of them* . . . are wedged together after a particular form and manner, they are denominated a NOVEL. . . .

There was a common feeling that the novel had had its day:

> The manufacture of novels has has been so long established, that in general they have arrived at mediocrity. . . . We are indeed so sickened with this worn-out species of composition, that we have lost all relish for it.

Whereas the seventeenth century had sought identity upwards and the eighteenth century downwards, a common basis for taste eluded all the searchers. It was Goldsmith who initiated what Lowenthal regards as "perhaps the most far-reaching change which took place in the concept of the critic . . . not only was he to reveal the beauties of literary works to the general public by means of which, in Goldsmith's terms 'even the philosopher may acquire popular applause'; he must also interpret the public back to the writer."

So far as I know, Lowenthal breaks completely new ground here, in seeing the contribution of Goldsmith as revealing the function of the ideal critic as one of mediation between the audience and the writer. Lowenthal comments: "Critics, writers, and philosophers — Johnson, Burke, Hume, Reynolds, Kames, and the Wartons all adopted Goldsmith's premise, as they began to analyze the experience of the reader. . . . It was this orientation to audience experience which opened

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up an entirely new dimension in the debate over art and popular culture."

But is not this an acknowledgment that the task of perception in the later eighteenth century and ever since shifted from producer to consumer orientation?

The concluding chapters of Lowenthal's book are concerned with "The Triumph of Mass Idols," and the relations of "Literature and Society." This is more familiar ground for most readers, but the research and insight of Professor Lowenthal makes it a rewarding ground to retraverse.

MARSHALL MCLUHAN

Criticism as an Abstract Art

ARSHILE GORKY. THE MAN, THE TIME, THE IDEA, by Harold Rosenberg. Horizon Press, 1962. 144 pp., 45 illustrations, of which four are in full color. $3.75.

Harold Rosenberg is a brilliant critic whose most telling perceptions derive more easily from an organizing of ideas than from observation and description. He invented the name "Action Painting" for the currently fashionable American style that began after the war and now influences all painting from Indonesia to Warsaw and London. Like "impressionism" the name describes a movement as a whole much more accurately than any example. As a name it helps to determine style, giving it a place as an incarnation of American Pragmatism.

Arshile Gorky was the pseudonym of Vosdanig Adoian, a Turkish-Armenian refugee who came to this country in 1920 at the age of fifteen, and set about to create his own being. The paintings that he showed in the late 'thirties looked like copies of Cézanne and imitations of Braque and Picasso, all in very thick paint, with an almost cement-like surface. Later, in the 'forties, his paintings were thin, bright and runny, and resembled somewhat the abstract surrealism of Miro and Matta. With the passage of time, even in the early Cézannesqque paintings, his own individuality seems to emerge, as crimson paint will bleed through an overcoat of white. "With Gorky, to be an artist counted far more than to be himself. Art was the promised land, in which he sought his place. . . . The immigrant is a self-made man. Making oneself (self-creation) is not, however, far distant from making oneself up (self-invention) and from make-up (self-disguise)."

The first big impact of French Post-Impressionism on American art came from the Armory show in 1913. Its effect was disastrous, like the effect of whiskey and gunpowder on savages. Too many painters and sculptors gave

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up their acquired skill of hand for the radical ideas the new art seemed to imply. The painterly form that Sloan and Bellows gave up had its limitations, along with the important merit of deriving from the artist's means and material: it was an organic form. The apparent ends of the Post-Impressionists derived indeed from their professional French means, yet American artists, being provincials, did not have masterly enough control of their means to be able suddenly and radically to change without starting all over again from scratch. The Post-Impressionist impact jolted American art in an inorganic direction; ends became split from means, and when, for instance, Bellows abandoned his natural skill of hand for a new look he lost his own form for a collection of notions. The Americans sought form in art and lost the form of art. Something similar happens as a result of the belief that art is orderly and nature chaotic, that is, this belief produces chaos, which, to be sure, is rationalized as order. This chaos, called order, illustrates some system. Even art that illustrates ideas of art is prone to inorganic form, with means separate from ends. This is the art of the time between the wars when radical social ideas were likewise split from practice, as the means of Bolshevik Marxism had no connection with the ends in view, so that from Bolshevik practice and from the Marxian insistence on the unity of theory and practice was born the theory of Fascism. For if theory is practice, then Fascism is the practice of Leninism. If art is order and order is synthetic, then art is separated from its natural origin, the nature of its materials. A concern with "meaning" separates ends from means, denying paint and denying language. Then ideas count, and criticism prevails over performance.

Action Painting marks a return to the unity of theory and practice. The life and work of Gorky contributed to this return. In his talk and in his paintings he was a channel for the transmission of European art to American artists. He did not start from the Armory Show; he abandoned no skill of hand to assimilate a new look. He saw the new painting, and admiring it, set himself the task of becomming himself such a painter. He did not believe in any identity to be preserved and to express through art. It was art itself, that meant to him culture, that he would learn as a way to acquiring identity. He found himself by losing himself in another person. First he was Cézanne, then Picasso, finally Miro. He did not separate understanding from action. The Americans who insisted on originality, even in adopting Cubism, remained provincial; Gorky through submission to a master, became the peer of his masters. On his first sight of de Kooning's work on a visit to his studio, he remarked, " 'Aha, so you have ideas of your own.' 'Somehow,' de Kooning recalls, 'that didn't seem so good.' " With Gorky, "imitation was a learning to be as well as a learning to do." He contributed, much more than the Armory show, to the Frenchifying of American painting, and in this, his role for this country was similar to the role of Poussin in the Italianization of French art in the seventeenth century. As a French Post-Impressionist in New York before the Second World War, Gorky influenced the possibilities of American painting through the example he set, first of surrender to Picasso, and secondly surrender to the activity of art. When during the De-

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pression he kept to his discipleship, it seemed to Stuart Davis that he wanted to play. Where the socially conscious artists became "part-time revolutionists," Gorky, sticking to his artistic practice, showed that the "pragmatic response of art was to be Action Painting."

The first section of the book is entitled *The Artist as Intellectual,* in which Rosenberg says, "one might say that the idea of getting the idea kept him busy from morning till night. Gorky's career may be conceived as a succession of dialogues with artists living and dead." The next section, *Identity and Make-Up,* tells of his discipleships involving in every case a surrender to a master. *Under the Banner of History* is concerned with Gorky's seriousness, so that, though his "imitating Picasso meant . . . a way of approaching world culture" he could never, like Picasso, go further than parody to the point of making fun of art itself. He was the most serious American painter after Eakins, perhaps more serious than Eakins. For Eakins in a sense always apologized for art, as though art were not worthy of such very serious attention as he gave it. Gorky's only apologetic tone came in his explanation for his Newark Airport mural done for the WPA. Rosenberg considers this mural a descent into commercialism, and perhaps Gorky was apologizing not for art but for his concessions to utilitarian compromise. He was at this time under two pressures, on one side from the part-time revolutionists, and on the other from a philistine public which did not like to be forced to look at anything unusual, even so little unusual as second-hand Cubism. *The Notebook of Vision* describes the last phase of Gorky's painting, influenced by his last, surrealist contacts. *"The Diary of a Seducer . . .* combines most perfectly three qualities of some dozen paintings that are the culmination of Gorky's art: esthetic allusion, technical virtuosity, emotional content." In this section Rosenberg contrasts and connects Gorky with the Action Painters who succeeded him. "For him abstract art meant, finally, not abstracting from experience, but making experience over through a protracted series of connected efforts; a sketch was an event which led to another, not a draft to be perfected. . . . the canvas was not a surface upon which to present an image, but a 'mind' through which the artist discovers, by means of manual and mental hypotheses, signs of

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what he is or might become. To this 'mind' Gorky brought accumulations of the hand that reveal him to be in fact the artist he had begun by inventing."

This book is not an introduction to Gorky's paintings, but concerned with the meaning and idea of Gorky's work. Rosenberg is not a visual critic, and his specific descriptions do not evoke the appearance of the paintings. He is a Post-Impressionist critic; art is a mine from which he extracts ideas; and his portrait of Gorky is an abstract portrait, with the logic of Picasso's Cubist portraits, whose scaffold formality gives you a complete and understandable form instead of suggestions of actual mysteries.

FAIRFIELD PORTER

The Wounds of Hiroshima

BURNING CONSCIENCE: The case of the Hiroshima pilot Claude Eartherly, told in his letters to Gunther Anders; preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by Robert Jungk. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962, xxxvii + 139 pp. $4.

Claude Eatherly, as too few Americans yet know, is the pilot who led the bombing mission which dropped the first atom bomb on mankind over Hiroshima, and the second three days later over Nagasaki. Through acts of repentance, from trying to destroy the "hero" image by committing such antisocial aggressions as forgery and hold-up (in which he took nothing!) to agonized appeals to his fellow-men, he has worked to contaminate our collective conscience with the dread of nuclear war.

Eatherly has been in and out of Army mental hospitals, sometimes officially released, and at other times—unable to overcome illegal commitment by legal means—escaping. As this is written, Eatherly is at liberty. That is to say, the authorities know where he is, but are making no move to return him to the hospital from which he escaped. The authorities, so to speak, prefer as little fuss as possible about the whole business.

But the story has gotten around. Eatherly's letters and behavior have forced him on public attention. In Japan his very name has acquired so compelling an aura that a United States Senator asked him to intervene when students' riots threatened to cancel, and finally did, Eisenhower's visit to Japan. (This was at a time when the government was trying to prove that Eatherly was too irresponsible to be free.) Gunther Anders read about the case, and began the correspondence reproduced in this volume. John Wain wrote a moving poem, first published in England and later reprinted here in

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the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* Ray Bell, a Texas reporter covering for the Waco *News-Tribune* Eatherly's arrest and commitment by a court composed only of psychiatrists appointed by the military authorities, did a first-rate job of exploring the facts, and examining the inconsistencies in the hearings.

More and more articles have appeared in the world press. If the case hasn't yet attracted the universal excitement and press coverage of the Chessman execution, in Europe and Japan it has already become a *cause célèbre,* and I would guess that, at least among those who concern themselves with the terrors of war, it is fairly well known here.

This slim volume, it is to be hoped, will contribute to "spreading the word." If it fails of its purpose, it will be, at least in part, because it was not slim enough. We have to bear and share Eatherly's sorrow. But it is too much to ask us to shoulder as well Anders' pretentiousness and ego. This is not to minimize Anders' contribution, nor the service he performed in initiating his correspondence with Eatherly. Eatherly's replies show that the letters from Anders meant much to him, and helped him to clarify his understanding of himself and his motivations. Unfortunately, what emerges is too much Anders, and too little Eatherly. Anders talks too much, talks about too many things, and tries to prove too many things.

The space is overwhelmingly Anders' (better than three-to-one, I'd say). Some of it is essential for elucidating the facts, but much of it is tedious. No doubt it adds versimilitude to record the proposed division of royalties, but a verisimilitude about Anders and not about Eatherly. The impact of Eatherly's distress is muffled by the sodden pontificating of Anders—quite apart from whether we agree or disagree with any part of it. Anders' sense of self-projection is so strong that one can easily be misled into believing that what we are reading about is the Anders Case and not the Eatherly Case.

Eatherly's letters are genuinely moving. In their distress, confusions, and exhortations, their touches of vanity and humility, they make a compelling document. However, stuffiness and mock pedantry to the point of excessive and sometimes ridiculous footnotes can only be endured. (Example of ridiculous footnote? On page 94, Eatherly: "I even beat a case for a Negro soldier that I knew was guilty, but I was up against an inexperienced prosecution." Footnote: "This proves how unusually unprejudiced Eatherly was.")

Perhaps the syntactical and grammatical incoherence did need to be corrected for the sake of clarity, though the footnoted example (page 70) could just as well have been left intact. But here we get into the area which troubles me most about the book. The premise, of course, has to be that here is a deeply disturbed man who wants you to understand the nature and cause of his disturbance. A man so disturbed that he is frequently incoherent and sometimes, and for whatever motive, irrational. But we are also, in effect, asked to pass *clinical* judgment that he is really of "sound mind," that if he is incoherent it is because he may have been given too heavy a dose of tranquilizers. We are, so to speak, expected to perform a ritual which is essentially the exact reverse of that staged by the au-

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thorities. Black: he's of unsound mind, safe only in incarceration, and what he says is not to be taken seriously. White: he's of completely sound mind, and if his words are sometimes incoherent it is possible (footnote) he is in a "drugged state." *Or* that the anniversary of Hiroshima is approaching. Which is, of course, precisely the point: the frightful recollection.

No doubt some drugs stupefy. But need we do more than face the issue as it is? Are you *supposed* to be of "sound mind" after killing? Can't you be disturbed and unbalanced, given tranquilizers to calm all-too-nameable terrors, and still feel remorse, still have something to say that is worth listening to?

There is no need to prove everything with the one man. After all, there are other psychosocial problems in this very connection just as intriguing as Eatherly's. Jungk writes in his introduction that "It was the 'Eatherly Case' that first opened our eyes to this 'delayed-action effect' of the new weapons"—that is, "mental burdens and stresses." But, conventional bomber raids in which Eatherly had participated had already produced such stresses on Eatherly himself. Other participants in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings have not tried to commit suicide, have not tried to emigrate, have not stuffed bills into envelopes and sent them to Japan, have not apparently suffered the same mental agony. Why are *they* so emotionally brutalized and unsound as *not* to crack up (if indeed they have not). These are matters for psychologists, social and clinical. Most of us are only equipped to deal with the matter from a political, social, and humanitarian point of view. And that would seem quite enough. EMANUEL GELTMAN

En Route to Victory

FREEDOM RIDE, by James Peck. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. 160 pp. $3.50.

Jim Peck is one of those remarkable men who make us all feel a little more human and dignified. Like his colleagues in CORE, he didn't need the bona fides of 53 stitches in his head, earned on a Freedom Ride through Birmingham, Alabama, to establish his right to be heard on the struggle for human rights. He took the beatings and stitches along the road to freedom. If we've made progress along that road, and we have indeed, it's precisely because of men like Jim Peck and such vehicles as the Freedom Ride.

This is not a book about Jim Peck, though he does tell a little about himself, from his first freedom ride in 1947 (when it had not yet earned capital letters), in order to explain the purpose of his participation in the 1961

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Freedom Ride. Nor is it a book about CORE which, after years of pursuing its work with little publicity and infinitely less funds, became front-page news (with hardly more funds). It is a book about the conception of non-violent action that lay behind the Freedom Ride, and the actual events themselves—the general development of actions for civil rights, through Montgomery, the sit-ins, the Ride itself, the arrests, and so forth. Wisely, where he can, Peck lets the participants speak for themselves, as, for example, some of the students who were engaged in the sit-ins.

Altogether, the book makes up for its slimness of size in competence of reporting and presentation. We would perhaps have liked to read a more thorough discussion of non-violence as a conception, and as it relates to the struggle in the South today; we would have liked to read about a lot of other things as well—a critical examination of other approaches, other activities and organizations, projections of activity, of what comes next, and much else. No one book, however, will do that. There will be other books, other discussions, as there are never-ceasing actions. In the meantime, *Freedom Ride* is a worthy and readable account of a great episode. E. G.

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